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Abstract
As a result of strong economic growth and an expanding population over the course of the last
two decades, China has become one of the world’s leading economies and the world’s largest
energy consumer. Given the importance of China to the world economy, and the essential
role that energy plays, it is crucial to understand the energy-related economic challenges
faced by China. This thesis investigates four related topics on the economics of energy in
China. Topics include (1) the relationship between urbanization and energy efficiency, (2)
the cost effect of energy on industrial structure, (3) gasoline price patterns, and (4) the impact
of energy abundance on industrial production and trade distribution. The results emphasize
the importance of urbanization and open-market policies in determining the energy usage in
China, and suggest that energy prices and energy-related regulations are efficient instruments
to promote resources reallocation across industries and resources relocation across regions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Energy and the Economy
In today’s modern economy, energy is essential for economic activity and to maintain the
current high quality of life found across the world. Looking forward, energy will continue to
play a crucial role in driving future economic growth. Since the end of World War II, both
the global economy and energy consumption have experienced dramatic growth especially
during the last two decades. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
in 2016 the world’s total primary energy consumption was double that of 1980. Over a
similar period, the real gross world production has quadrupled from 18.8 trillion dollars in
1980 to 77.9 trillion dollars in 2014. Historically, nations that belong to the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) account for the majority of energy
consumption. However, according to EIA’s projections of the worldwide energy demand
over the period from 2012 to 2040, much of the increase in energy consumption will come
from the developing non-OECD counties. Figures 1.2 and 1.1 present the projections for the
world’s total gross domestic product (GDP) and energy consumption by regions respectively.
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Fig. 1.1 World total gross domestic product
(1990-2040, trillion 2010 dollars)
Fig. 1.2 World energy consumption (1990-
2040 quadrillion Btu)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2016
Accordingly, GDP in non-OECD countries surpassed the OECD total in 2010 and for energy
consumption it was in 2007. By 2040 both of the GDP and energy demand in the non-OECD
region are expected to exceed the OECD total by 80% to 100% respectively.
China, in particular, accounts for a significant part of the increase of worldwide energy
demand. As a result of strong economic growth and an expanding population over the course
of the last two decades, China has become one of the leading economies in the world. Despite
the slowing down of economic growth, China is expected to have an annual average growth
rate of 4.7% between 2012 to 2040. Over this period a transition is expected from being
investment dominated to achieving a better balance between consumption and investment.
China is also one of the world’s leading trading nations, exported 2.06 trillion USD and
imported 1.32 trillion USD in 2016, resulting in a positive trade balance of 736 billion USD.
Its top trading partners include the US, Hong Kong, and Japan.
Meanwhile, China surpassed the US to become the world’s largest energy consumer in 2010.
Its primary energy consumption totaled 2,432 Mtoe (million tons of oil equivalent) with a
recent annual growth rate of 11.2%. Figure 1.3 presents the composition of China’s primary
energy consumption from 1995-2016 and Figure 1.4 presents the trend in China’s energy
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intensity during the same period. Figure 1.3 shows that China’s primary energy consumption
grew rapidly after 2000. Observe that although there has been an increase in energy supplied
from renewable sources, coal and oil continue to supply the overwhelming majority of energy
consumed. From 2003 coal consumption increased significantly leading to a rapid increase
in overall energy consumption. This rise matches the period when both aggregate energy
intensity and coal intensity in China reversed its previous decline and rose slightly in 2003
before resuming its gradual decline. According to the World Bank the energy intensity in
China fell by 48% from 1995 to 2014, while for the same period the US experienced a
decrease of 32%, the EU by 31%, and Japan by 23%.1
Fig. 1.3 Chinese national energy consumption composition (1995-2016)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/
The increased energy demand raises several issues, and one of them is the energy security
concern. The degree of China’s dependence on energy imports increases continuously. The
domestic demand-supply gap in 2014 reached 407 million tons of standard coal equivalent
and the reliance on foreign crude oil reached a new record of 59.6% (People’s Daily, 2014).
1Data source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.COMM.GD.PP.KD.
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Fig. 1.4 Chinese aggregate energy intensity and coal intensity (1995-2016)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/
Environmental concerns in China have also been growing in recent years. Widespread
problems of smog and haze have resulted in complaints and calls to reduce air pollution
(The Economist, 2015).2 The proliferation of serious environmental issues is related to the
structure of China’s energy resource reserves. China is relatively rich in coal reserves with
total proven reserves totalling 114.5 billion tons at the end of year 2014 accounting for 12.8%
of global reserves. In contrast, the proven reserves for oil and gas account for 1.1% and
1.8% of the global share respectively (British Petroleum, 2015). The endowment of natural
resources makes it costly for China to develop alternative energy strategies.3
2http://www.economist.com/news/china/21661053-new-study-suggests-air-pollution-even-worse-thought-
mapping-invisible-scourge
3According to Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 by British Petroleum, total proven reserves for oil,
natural gas and coal in the US are 2.9%, 5.2% and 26.6% respectively.
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1.2 Changing Structure of Power Sector and Energy Pric-
ing
Given that energy consumption is one of the main causes of environmental issues in China,
an energy-centric approach to the problem is needed. Reform of the power generation sector
in China began in the 1980s. Previous interventions include replacing the centrally planned
power generation system with a market-oriented system as well as approving energy related
investments from local governments and domestic enterprises. The blueprint published
in 2002 announced the divestment of the vertically integrated power utility, State Power
Corporation, and the separation of power generation and transmission. China’s current
upstream industry consists of five large state-owned groups which account for more than
60% of power generation capacity. The transmission and distribution sector is comprised of
two power grid corporations which cover the north and south of China respectively.4
In 2011, the government launched a progressive energy pricing reform plan following the
12th Five-Year Plan which promotes the market-oriented competition on energy markets. For
historical reasons, China’s energy prices are highly regulated and the prices often set for
political reasons rather than being market driven. As an important political instrument, China
uses energy prices to subsidize for the poor, and to encourage or restrict the development of
specific industries depending on local governments’ objectives. For example, cross-subsidies
from industrial and commercial consumers to household consumers are prevalent even
through household electricity consumption features a decentralized low voltage network with
4The State Power Corporation was founded in January 1997 and was dissolved in December 2002 with
the aim of introducing more competition in the power sector in China. The five large gencos include China
Huaneng Group, China Datang Corporation, China Guodian Corporation, China Huadian Corporation and
China Power Investment Corporation. The two transmission and distribution corporations include State Grid
Corporation of China and China Southern Power Grid Corporation. After the separation of generation from
transmission, no single player should have more than a 20% share of capacity in an individual province. See
Ngan (2010) for a comprehensive summary of the electricity market reform in China since year 1986.
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large transmission losses and operational costs when compared to the electricity consumption
of industrial and commercial consumers (Ecofys et al., 2015).
In terms of pricing energy, regional authorities appear to have substantial influence. In 2004
the preferential electricity price was required to be cancelled by the central government. It
was used by provincial authorities to support energy intensive industries in their jurisdictions.
Instead, the differential electricity price scheme was issued by the State Council. Firms
operating in six energy-intensive sectors were classified into four categories: eliminated;
restricted; permitted; and encouraged based on their products and manufacturing process.5 A
punitive surcharge was imposed on firms categorized as eliminated and restricted with an
additional 0.05 yuan and 0.02 yuan per kWh imposed on consumed electricity. However, local
authorities continued to evade the national policy for few year. Following the financial crisis
22 provinces maintained or reinstated the preferential electricity price for firms producing
aluminum after the policy was first forbidden in 2004.6 The scheme has been gradually
terminated in most provinces after 2010.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
Given the importance of China to the world economy, and the essential role that energy plays,
it is crucial to understand the energy-related economic challenges faced by China. This thesis
seeks to disentangle several interesting and up-to-date questions regarding energy usage
and efficiency issues based on Chinese data. Starting from the aggregated level, the second
chapter investigates the determinants of energy efficiency at the province level. I investigate
5The six energy intensive sectors include electrolytic aluminum, ferroalloy, calcium carbide, caustic soda,
cement, iron and steel and the punitive surcharge is 0.05 yuan/kWh for the eliminated and 0.02 yuan/kWh for the
restricted. In September 2006 two more sectors (phosphorus and zinc smelting) are added into the differential
electricity price frame and the punitive surcharge was increased to 0.20 and 0.05 yuan/kWh respectively.
6See http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-08/07/content_1672969.htm.
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the impact of urbanization, income per capita and industrialization on the intensity of energy
use in China using provincial panel data for the period 1995 to 2012. Two alternative
measures of urbanization are employed taking into account China’s "hukou" system, i.e. the
household registration system that has lasted for more than 60 years and is directly related
to the availability of social welfare. Utilizing a recently developed mean group estimation
technique, I identify four impact channels through which urbanization affects energy usage
in China.
The third and the fifth chapter look at the usage of energy at the micro level. I investigate
how manufacturing firms react to increasing energy costs through product switching and
geographic specializing. More specifically, in the third chapter I investigate how electricity
prices affect firms’ production choices during the period 2005 to 2007. Employing an
instrumental approach to address potential endogeneity concerns, the results show that the
energy price plays an important role in shifting industrial production towards less energy
intensive industries.
In the fifth chapter of the thesis I investigate the impact of energy abundance on industry
distribution and subsequent trade patterns in China. I utilize a cost-minimizing approach
and estimate a pseudo-endowment indicator to proxy the provincial energy abundance level
which is independent from regional industrial structure. Energy abundance is found to be
an important determinant of industrial product shares at the 2-digit level. Furthermore, two
mechanisms are explored underlying the impact of energy abundance, namely resource
reserves and policy orientation. The findings from Chpater three and Chapter five shall help
policy makers obtain a deeper understanding of firm behavioural mechanisms and develop
effective policies to address energy and environmental issues.
Last but not least, the fourth chapter is inspired by China’s open market policy and investigates
the price effect of Royal Dutch Shell’s entry into Chinese gasoline market. Using the
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 8
difference-in-difference method on pair-wise absolute price differentials, our results suggest
that Royal Dutch Shell’s entry causes a price divergence in a certain period of time. Finally,
the thesis concludes with a brief discussion of the main findings, policy implications and the
limitations of the thesis. The thesis ends with an outline of future potential research topics
related to energy economics in China.
Chapter 2
The Direct and Indirect Effect of
Urbanization on Energy Intensity: A
Province-level Study for China
Statement of Authorship 
 
 
Title of Paper/Chapter 
 
 The Direct and Indirect Effect of Urbanization on Energy Intensity: A Province-level Study for 
China 
 
Publication Status 
 
  Published                                         Available Online  
 
 Submitted f or Publication                  Unpublished and Unsubmitted 
 
Publication Details (web link) 
 
 Elliott, Robert JR, Puyang Sun, and Tong Zhu. "The direct and indirect effect of urbanization on 
energy intensity: A province-level study for China." Energy 123 (2017): 677-692. 
Principal Author 
 
 
Name of Principal Author (Candidate) 
 
Tong Zhu  
 
Contribution to the Paper 
 
Collected and cleaned the data, performed the econometric and statistical analysis and 
prepared the manuscript 
 
Overall percentage (%) 
 
85% 
 
Signature 
 
 
Date 08/09/2017 
 
Co-Author Contributions 
 
By signing the Statement of Authorship, each author certifies that: 
 
i.        the candidate’s stated contribution to the publication is accurate (as detailed above); 
 
ii.        permission is granted for the candidate in include the publication in the thesis; and 
 
iii.        the sum of all co-author contributions is equal to 100% less the candidate’s stated contribution. 
 
 
 
Name of Co-Author 
 
Robert Elliott 
 
Contribution to the Paper 
 
Supervised the development of the work and helped with the evaluation of the manuscript 
 
Overall percentage (%) 
 
10% 
 
Signature 
 
 
Date 
 
08/09/2017 
 
 
 
Name of Co-Author 
 
Puyang Sun 
 
Contribution to the Paper 
 
Helped with data collection and manuscript evaluation 
 
Overall percentage (%) 
 
5% 
 
Signature  
 
Date 
 
08/09/2017 
 
 
 
The Direct and Indirect Effect of Urbanization on Energy
Intensity: A Province-level Study for China
Abstract
In March 2014 China announced its long awaited plan for managing the migration of the rural
population into already overcrowded urban areas. The so called “new style” of urbanization
has potentially important implications for China’s energy use. However, the relationship
between urbanization and energy intensity is not straightforward. In this paper we investigate
the impact of urbanization, income per capita and industrialization on the intensity of energy
use in China using a balanced panel of 30 provinces for the period 1995 to 2012. Our
empirical approach is to use two alternative measures of urbanization and employ augmented
mean group (AMG) estimators to allow for heterogeneity in the estimation of the slope
coefficients and cross sectional dependence. We demonstrate that the direct impact of
urbanization on energy intensity is generally positive while the indirect impact through four
different channels (construction, industrial upgrading, transportation and changing lifestyles)
tends to be negative. On average, a one percentage point increase in urbanization in China
leads to an increase in energy intensity of between 0.753 and 1.473 percent for electricity and
coal intensity respectively although our results are sensitive to the measure of urbanization.
Our results emphasize the importance of province heterogeneity in China which implies that
national targets should be implemented with care.
JEL: Q43; R11; O14
Keywords: Energy intensity; Income per capita; Industrialization; Urbanization
This chapter has been published as: Elliott, Robert JR, Puyang Sun, and Tong Zhu. "The direct and indirect
effect of urbanization on energy intensity: A province-level study for China." Energy 123 (2017): 677-692.
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2.1 Introduction
The ability of both developed and developing countries to reduce the intensity of energy use
is thought to play an important role in determining the world’s capacity to grow sustainably
in the future. Reducing the energy intensity of firms and households is considered to be a
practical solution to many of today’s common challenges including global energy shortages;
mitigating against further changes in the climate; and reducing the impact on health of local
air and water pollution. Understanding the factors that influence energy intensity are of
first-order importance for academics and policymakers especially given the rise of rapidly
growing and energy hungry economies such as China and India.1
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of province level energy intensity
in China. Specifically, we examine the impact of urbanization, income per capita, and
industrialization on energy intensity in China for a sample of 30 provinces for the years 1995
to 2012. In addition to examining the direct impact of these variables on energy intensity this
research also examines a number of indirect channels (construction, transportation, industrial
upgrading, and changing lifestyles) by which changing urbanization may effect energy
intensity. This is a period in China’s history categorized by rapid economic development and
a correspondingly large increase in the demand for energy. From the 1990s to the current day
China has experienced a steady but slow decline in energy intensity albeit with a period of
rising energy intensity in the middle of the last decade. Hence, understanding the factors that
drive changes in energy intensity in China is important for policymakers who are looking to
develop instruments to address China’s energy security and pollution concerns.
1In this paper we use energy intensity and energy efficiency interchangeably. However, strictly speaking,
energy intensity measured as (1) the primary energy supply divided by the output ratio (GJ/$) or (2) energy
consumption of standard coal equivalent per GDP and is usually considered to be part of the wider definition
of energy efficiency. Energy intensity is therefore an indicator of, rather than equivalent to, energy efficiency.
Energy efficiency means using less energy to provide the same service while energy intensity is a precise unit
of measurement.
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One of the factors thought to be important in the evolution of energy intensity is the role
of urbanization.2 Over the previous 35 years China has witnessed urban population growth
of more than 500 million people (The Economist, 2014). Currently, China has the world’s
largest urban population (758 million), followed by India (410 million) (United Nations,
2014). These two countries now account for 30 per cent of the world’s urban population.
In the third plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made
public on October 15th 2013 it became apparent that China’s model of urbanization was
changing. The previous model of rapid but inefficient urbanization is to be replaced with
greater priority given to services and a larger role for the free market. The hope is that the
changes will result in high quality urbanization. The thinking is that by putting additional
emphasis on technology and the efficient clustering of factors of production there will be
improvements in the efficiency of industrialization and hence a more efficient use of energy.
In March 2014, the long awaited first official plan on urbanization, namely the National New-
Style Urbanization Plan (2014-2020), was issued by the Central Committee and the State
Council to provide guidelines for the reasonable flow of migrants into urban areas. According
to the National Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report 2014 issued by National Bureau
of Statistics of China (NBSC, 2015), the total number of migrant workers reached 273.95
million with a growth rate of 1.9% in 2014. With the emphasis on city ecological progress
and urban quality, the plan acknowledged an unequal treatment of rural migrant workers (due
to the hukou system of household registration) and promises to help 100 million of the 260
2Urbanization is defined as the increase in the proportion of a population living in urban areas, or the process
by which a large number of people becomes permanently concentrated in relatively small areas, forming cities
(United Nations, 1997). The criteria for what constitutes an urban settlement vary from country to country,
based on characteristics such as administrative criteria, a minimum population threshold, and population density
(United Nations, 2014). During our study period the measure of urban districts used by China’s National
Bureau of Statistics is associated with both administrative criteria and population density (Qin and Zhang,
2014). According to United Nations (2014), if China was to reach Western levels of urbanization it would need
to increase the level of urbanization by more than 23 percentage points. The urbanization rate of China will
reach 55.6% in 2015 which is slightly higher than the world average of 54% but still considerably below the
urbanization rate of 78.3% for developed countries.
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million migrants and other permanent urban residents to obtain urban household registration
within the planned period.3
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, previous studies of the relationship between
energy intensity and urbanization (Jones, 1991; York, 2007; Jiang and Lin, 2012; Sadorsky,
2013) have tended to use only one indicator of urbanization which is usually the urban
population rate measured as urban population divided by total population (Urban1). In this
paper an additional measure is employed that takes into account China’s “hukou” system.
Since there are two categories of household IDs in China, namely agricultural households
and non-agricultural households, there is some debate about whether those individuals that
are considered to be part of the short-term floating population can be treated as part of
the urban population (Zhang and Huang, 2010).4 The household registration system that
has lasted for more than 60 years has resulted in over 250 million rural migrants living in
the cities without an urban “hukou” (NBSC, 2015). Although migrants provide low-cost
labor they are perceived to receive unfair treatment in regard to the availability of public
services and social welfare (e.g. education and health care). Based on the studies that
examine the demographic measurement of urbanization (Liu and Liang, 1997; Zhu, 1998),
urbanization is measured alternatively as the non-agricultural population divided by total
registered population (Urban2) to reflect the formal urbanization level.
The second contribution is to investigate the different channels through which urbanization
exerts an indirect impact on energy intensity. Based on previous studies (Jones, 1991;
Madlener and Sunak, 2011; Sadorsky, 2013), four indirect channels have been identified,
3The huge movement of people from rural to urban areas underpinned the Chinese economic transformation
but caused an appreciable increase in the share of city residents without urban hukou. Due to limited access
to public services internal migrants have a lower average propensity to consume. The lower consumption
of non-hukou households tends to impede progress towards a consumption-led growth model. According to
Dreger et al. (2015) the current urbanization strategy in the absence of hukou reform is likely to dampen private
consumption in China.
4According to Ru et al. (2012), 46.6 percent of the rural population is engaged in non-farming work and
13.4 percent are engaged in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. For many agricultural households
some degree of non-farming employment is now considered standard.
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namely a construction pathway, a transportation pathway, an industry upgrade pathway and a
residential consumption or lifestyle pathway. However, there has been no previous empirical
validation of the magnitude of each of these channels on energy intensity.5 In this study the
indirect effect of urbanization is investigated extensively based on two energy resources (coal
and electricity).
The third contribution, following Sadorsky (2013), is to control for heterogeneity across the
unit of analysis using two different mean group estimators. Controlling for heterogeneity
is important given the considerable variation in the economic development, resource en-
dowments and climate across China’s 31 mainland provinces. Such an approach is needed
because the strict assumption of parameter homogeneity required for classical regression
models is unlikely to hold across Chinese provinces. Moreover, because energy related poli-
cies are managed by the central government it is likely to have cross-sectional dependence
within the province level panel. Hence, standard panel techniques will tend to produce biased
and inconsistent results. More specifically, the extended version of the Mean Group estimator,
the Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator (Eberhardt and Teal, 2008) is employed that
takes both heterogeneity across parameters and common factors into account.6
To briefly preview the results, it is shown that urbanization exhibits a positive direct impact
on energy intensity generally. Urbanization measured by the “hukou” system has a significant
impact on the total energy intensity while urbanization measured by the percentage of the
floating urban population shows a positive and significant direct impact on coal consumption
intensity and electricity consumption intensity. A one percentage point increase in urban-
5One exception is Norman et al. (2006) who, based on a case study of Toronto, investigate the performance
of three major elements in high and low residential density areas. In this case, construction and transport related
energy use and greenhouse gas emissions are both higher in low residential density areas.
6Zhang and Lin (2012) estimate the impact of urbanization on energy consumption and CO2 emissions
using a province level panel. They estimate a fixed effect model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors which
is argued to be robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence (Hoechle et al., 2007).
Although they consider regional differences (dividing China into three regions), the results may still suffer from
panel heterogeneity concerns.
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ization based on the floating population is shown to increase coal intensity and electricity
intensity by 1.5% and 0.8% respectively. As for the indirect channels, they turn out to be
negative or insignificant determinants of energy intensity. The indirect effect through the
construction sector is shown to be the most significant channel. Transportation and industrial
upgrading are found to be significant determinants but only under certain circumstances.
Different lifestyles, whether in high or low urbanized areas, appear to have a similar contribu-
tion to aggregate energy intensity when taking into account cross-sectional dependence and
province level heterogeneity. Other covariates such as income per capita and industrialization
tend to play more important roles than urbanization in affecting China’s provincial energy
intensity perhaps as a result of the negative impact of the indirect urbanization channels.
Income per capita has a negative and stable influence on energy intensity while industrializa-
tion has the expected positive effect. In terms of the two urbanization proxies, the informal
measurement based on floating urban population generally affects energy usage through
the first three channels while the formal measurement of urbanization based on the “hukou”
system tends to affect energy usage through the construction and transportation pathways.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the mechanisms
by which urbanization, income and industrialization are expected to impact on a country’s
energy intensity. Section 3 presents the methodological approach while Section 4 provides a
summary of the data. The results are presented in Section 5 before Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
In this review of the literature we concentrate on the impact of urbanization on energy
efficiency but also comment on the impact of industrialization and income of energy effi-
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ciency.7 Overall the empirical studies have reached a mixed conclusion on the impact of
urbanization. The results vary from country to country. Loosely speaking, urbanization
has positively contributed to the rising energy demand in China during recent years. Most
of the China-specific studies have focused on the aggregated energy usage or efficiency
without specifying impact pathways. The existing literature generally agrees that income
has a significant impact on energy intensity, which tends to be a non-linear inverted U-shape
relationship. As for industrialization, the majority of the current research finds a positive
relationship between industrialization and energy consumption.
2.2.1 The impact of urbanization on energy intensity
According to the 2012 UN Environment Programme (UNEP, 2012), urban areas, which
currently occupy around 3% of the world’s surface area, were estimated to consume approxi-
mately 75% of the natural resources and account for 60-80% of all greenhouse gas emissions.
Urbanization can impact energy use through direct and indirect channels. The direct impact
refers to the straightforward effect that urbanization exerts on energy use. The seminal study
from Jones (1989) demonstrates that energy consumption increases as a result of, not only
income per capita and industrial structure, but also the rate of urbanization. The elasticity
of income per capita, industrialization and urbanization with respect to energy use were
estimated to be 1.10, 1.08 and 0.48 respectively. Jones (1991) went on to investigate the direct
mechanism by which urbanization impacts energy use employing similar cross-sectional
data and found the long term urbanization elasticity to be 0.35. Similarly, Parikh and Shukla
7I conduct the literature search using Google Scholar combined with Findit@Bham which provides access
to major bibliographic databases such as EconLit and Elsevier. I limit my search to academic journals and
books. To stay focused on the research question and avoid redundancy, I revise my search by using more precise
terms (e.g. energy intensity instead of energy efficiency), adding in limits (e.g. China and energy intensity and
income per capita), and concentrating on key journals (e.g. Energy Economics) and authors (e.g. Pesaran
MH). I often find it very helpful to examine how authors in the discipline have composed their literature review
sections. For example, the structure of the literature review in the present study shares similarities with those of
Jones (1991) and Sadorsky (2013).
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(1995) estimate the relationship between urbanization and increasing resource consumption
for a range of developing and developed countries between 1965 and 1987 and find that the
elasticity of energy intensity with respect to urbanization is 0.47. Likewise, York (2007) and
Rafiq et al. (2016) find similar effects with significant and positive elasticities for urbanization
for the 14 EU countries and 22 emerging countries respectively.
In contrast, other papers have found that under certain conditions urbanization can have a
negative direct impact on energy consumption. Martínez-Zarzoso and Maruotti (2011) find
an inverted U relationship between CO2 emissions and urban population density for half
of their developing country sample with a threshold effect for urbanization’s impact where
once a threshold has been reached, further urbanization does not result in greater emissions.
Everything else equal, they find the highest emission levels come at an urbanization level of
59% to 63% (which compares to China’s current level of around 54%). More recently, Zhu
et al. (2012), in a study of 20 emerging countries between 1992 and 2008, finds little evidence
of an inverted U-shape relationship between urbanization rate and CO2 emissions. Others
have argued that the impact of urbanization on energy consumption varies considerably
depending on the level of development. Mishra et al. (2009) examine nine Pacific Island
countries and find that urbanization affects different economies in opposite directions while
Poumanyvong and Kaneko (2010) find that although urbanization appears to exert a negative
impact on energy use for low-income groups it is positive for middle- and high-income
country groups. From the perspective of ecosystem integration, Long et al. (2016) finds that
urbanization has a potential to decrease the ecological footprint associated with increased
income.
For China specifically, a number of studies examine the direct relationship between energy
consumption and urbanization (Jiang and Lin, 2012; Liu, 2009; Zhang and Lin, 2012; Ma,
2015; Yan, 2015). For example, Jiang and Lin (2012) show that trends in industrialization
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and urbanization predicts that China’s energy demand will keep rising until 2020. In terms
of urbanization, Liu (2009) finds unidirectional Granger causality from urban population
density to total energy consumption although the contribution from urbanization tends to
be smaller in the later years of the sample. At the province level, Zhang and Lin (2012)
show that urbanization has a positive effect on both energy consumption and CO2 emissions
although when they take China’s unbalanced regional development into account they find
that energy consumption decreases dramatically as one moves from the western to the eastern
provinces.
More recently, Ma (2015) finds that urban infrastructure to be a major determinant of the
positive short-run relationship between urbanization and energy intensity, while the long
term increase in energy use associated with urbanization is driven by residential consump-
tion patterns and urban transport systems. Although Ma (2015) touches on the transport,
residential consumption channels, the effectiveness and magnitude of each is not examined
in any detail. Finally for China, Yan (2015) also uses province level data and finds a positive
and significant impact of urbanization on both aggregate energy intensity and disaggregate
energy intensity with the elasticities ranging from 0.111 to 0.287 for the proportion of the
population that is urban and from 0.269 to 0.350 for the proportion of the population that is
non-agricultural.
Turning to the indirect channels by which urbanization impacts energy efficiency, several
have been identified by Jones (1991) and Madlener and Sunak (2011) and summarized by
Sadorsky (2013). The arguments are briefly rehearsed again here. The first indirect channel
is the need for growing cities to absorb ever increasing volumes of high energy intensive
products such as steel and cement. Urbanization means additional demand for building stock
and other infrastructure resulting in inner-city clustering and land shortages which can lead to
a greater use of multilevel building (Parikh and Shukla, 1995). Office buildings, power plants,
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sewage networks are generally accompanied by significant ongoing energy inputs. Likewise,
the maintenance of completed infrastructure projects tends to be energy hungry. In addition,
in developing countries, the process of urbanization is often associated with the uncontrolled
diffusion of informal settlements and illegal housing which are usually inefficient in their
use of energy, even though informal dwellings (e.g. shanty towns) often lack access to basic
amenities including electricity.
The second channel is that as the scale of urban production increases, raw materials need to
be transported from their often rural origin to the urban production center and final goods
in turn need to be transported to the destination of consumption which is likely to be other
urban conurbations or overseas. Urbanization also increases intra-city mobility which causes
the emissions of various pollutants especially in developing countries where the basic transit
infrastructure is generally poor leading to the greater use of private trucks and automobiles.
Thirdly, urbanization is associated with a concentration of economic activity and hence an
increase in urban production. When people move to the city from rural areas the result is that
more human resources are absorbed by the relatively more energy intensive secondary and
tertiary sectors. The decline in the agricultural population can also lead to an increasingly
mechanized and more energy intensive agricultural production process (Jones, 2004). In
addition, in those countries that have a large informal market where economic activities
are neither taxed nor registered, energy consumption can rise (Schneider and Enste, 2000).
Counter balancing these effects is the notion that rising competitive pressures and land
scarcity tends to drive urban production to be more innovative and to use modern and more
technologically advanced capital which is likely to be more environmental friendly (Jones,
1989).
Finally, a forth channel by which urbanization impacts energy intensity is through the change
in lifestyle and consumption patterns of the newly urbanized citizens who tend to be more
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dependent on certain energy intensive products such as air conditioners, refrigerators and
private vehicles (Jones, 1989). Increasing disposable income also increases the likelihood
that households will purchase more electrical appliances. In addition, urban dwellers are
more likely to derive their energy from coal or natural gas and not from decentralized sources
of energy such as wood.
Although the previous literature discusses the indirect mechanisms by which urbanization
impacts energy intensity, few provide a systematic assessment of these different channels.
One exceptions is Liddle (2003) who finds that densely populated countries tend to have
a lower personal vehicle demand. Similar results are found for an input-output life cycle
assessment model for Toronto (Norman et al., 2006). Transportation-related greenhouse gas
emission per capita are estimated to be 3.7 times higher from low residential density areas.
The rank-size relationship is also true when considering the embodied energy and pollutants
from the construction industry.
With regard to lifestyle and residential energy consumption, Krey et al. (2012) focus on
urbanization in China and India using an integrated assessment model and show that total
consumption of fossil fuels in the residential sector is not sensitive to urbanization arguing
that it is the evolution of labor productivity induced by urbanization that really matters.
O’Neill et al. (2012) finds similar results for China and India using a computable general
equilibrium (iPETS) model. Minx et al. (2011) employ a structural decomposition approach
to examine Chinese carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and finds increasing export demand and
structural changes to be the largest contributors to CO2 emissions with capital investment
accounting for 61 percent of emission growth between 2005 and 2007. The effect of
urbanization and the related evolution of lifestyles are shown to be more significant than
other social-demographic factors such as population and household size with the overall
emission effect of urbanization still coming out as positive even after netting out the potential
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carbon savings due to economies of scale. Finally, Wang (2014) examines different types of
energy consumption and finds that urbanization reduces residual energy consumption per
capita but substantially increases aggregate energy consumption.8
2.2.2 The impact of income per capita on energy intensity
A number of studies that examine the relationship between income and energy consumption
with mixed results. Malenbaum (1978) was the first to show resource intensity changing with
income. Galli (1998) in turn estimated the long-term relationship between energy intensity
and income for ten Asian emerging countries across 28 years and found a negative and
significant coefficient for the squared income term. Using spatial econometric techniques,
Maddison (2006) found a monotonic relationship between income and greenhouse gas
emissions based on a two-year panel from 136 countries. Zhao and Fan (2008) examined the
relationship between growth and energy consumption for different Chinese regions using a
smooth transfer regression (STR) estimation and found a stationary nonlinear relationship
even during different developing phases. A recent study by Song and Zheng (2012) shows
that although the evaluation process of China’s energy intensity follows a U-shape, the
turning point is higher than 95% of the sample meaning that for most years, energy intensity
follows a declining trend with regard to GDP per capita. Jiang et al. (2014) find similar
results showing that for 19 out of 29 provinces between 2003 and 2011, energy intensity fell
with the growth of income. In contrast, Shao and Jia (2006) and Liu (2007) find no strong
causal relationship between Chinese economic growth and the energy consumption.9
8In a related literature, Khanna et al. (2013) examine the local enforcement of two of China’s recent energy
efficiency policies based on household appliances across several pilot locations between 2006 and 2009. They
generally find high compliance but with a large variation with insufficient organizational coordination between
government agencies and the low priority given to energy efficiency in national quality testing as the main
challenges.
9Bernardini and Galli (1993) examine the long-term trend in energy and materials consumption intensity
with energy intensity being determined by three main factors and helps to explain the non-linear results found
in other papers. First, energy consumption is driven by income because of changes in the final demand structure
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2.2.3 The impact of industrialization on energy intensity
Industrialization, which refers to the process by which a society transforms itself from a
traditional agricultural society to one based on higher value added manufacturing, means that
mechanized mass production and assembly lines are used to replace craftsmen and individual
manual labor. The result is higher energy consumption driven by certain heavy industries (for
example ferrous and nonferrous metals processing, petroleum refining and paper and allied
production). Sadorsky (2013)(Sadorsky 2013) finds in the long-run that a 10% increase in
industrialization causes a 0.7% to 1.2% increase in energy intensity. Feng et al. (2009)(Feng
et al. 2009) who investigate the long-term relationship between economic structure, energy
consumption and energy intensity between 1980 and 2006 for China find that economic
structure Granger causes energy intensity.
To explain the impact of industrialization more precisely, Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004), Ma and
Stern (2008) and Liao et al. (2007) divide the economic structure of a country into a number of
sub-sectors and identify structural and efficiency effects. Liao et al. (2007) find an efficiency
effect where the role of technology is considered to be the dominant contributor to the change
in energy intensity. Structural change at the industry level increases energy intensity while
structural shifts between sub-sectors decreases overall energy intensity (Ma and Stern, 2008).
Using a panel of approximately 2,500 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises between
1997 and 1999, Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) demonstrate that the efficiency effect plays an
important role in reducing energy intensity at the firm-level and accounts for 47% of the
so that energy intensity follows a bell shape such that energy intensity rises and then declines as the economy
passes from the pre-industrial to industrial and on to a post-industrial stage. In pre-industrial communities
energy intensity is relatively low because of the dominant agriculture sector. As industrial growth accelerates it
is accompanied by the rapid development of infrastructure. Further increases in income per capita then induces
high energy-consuming lifestyles until material demand reaches saturation point. Finally, in the post-industrial
there is a decline in energy intensity as an economy makes the transition to a less energy intensive service sector
economy.
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decline. For the service sector in the OECD Mulder et al. (2014) argue that structural changes
had an increasingly important effect on aggregate energy intensity especially after 1995.
Advances in technology can also make production more environmental friendly. In China,
non-state and foreign investment has also had a significant impact on the diffusion of energy-
saving technologies Herrerias et al. (2013). The cleaning effect of new technology is also
found by Garbaccio et al. (1999) who finds that technical change within an industry is the
main driver of a declining energy-output ratio (with structural change increasing energy
consumption).
2.3 Methodology
The empirical approach of this paper follows Sadorsky (2013) who uses Jones (1991) original
estimating equation to enable us to estimate the relationship between three measures of
energy intensity and income per capita, industrialization and two alternative measures of
urbanization. The estimating equation (in logs) is therefore given by:
EIit = α+β1iY PCit +β2iINDit +β3iURBANit +ξt +υi+ εit (2.1)
The subscripts i and t denotes a province and year respectively. The dependent variable
EIit is either total energy intensity (TEI), coal energy intensity (CEI) or electricity energy
intensity (EEI). The right hand side variables are measures of income per capita (YPC),
industrialization (IND) and the measures of urbanization (Urban1 and Urban2). ξt captures
year fixed effects and υi captures province fixed effects. εit is the error term.
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Using logs and assuming the error term εit is distributed with zero mean and constant variance-
covariance matrix the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. One concern however
is that classical panel regression techniques could produce misleading and inconsistent
results because of the homogeneity assumption across provinces. Under the homogeneity
assumption pooled OLS and various fixed effects specifications impose the condition that
β1i = β1, β2i = β2, β3i = β3 and negates the possibility of individual panel specificity. In
this case, this is a concern because the variables are measured at the province level where
there are considerable differences in growth and development between the coastal and inland
provinces.
The ideal solution to address this possible source of bias is to estimate β1i, β2i, β3i separately.
A starting point is to use the standard Mean Group (MG) estimator developed by Pesaran and
Smith (1995). The β coefficients are estimated separately for each province and the simple
arithmetic average is taken. For i = 1,2,3 . . .N, t = 1,2,3 . . .T , let:
EIit = αi+β
′
i Xit + εit (2.2)
βˆMG = N−1∑
i
βˆ i
where βi is the panel specific coefficient vector and Xit is the vector of independent variables
including Y PCit , INDit and URBANit where subscript i represents an individual province.
Although Mean Group (MG) estimators can account for parameter heterogeneity they are
still based on the assumption of cross sectional independence. If the assumption fails to hold
then the MG estimation procedure will lead to biased and inconsistent results. To address
this problem Eberhardt and Teal (2008) developed the Augmented Mean Group (AMG)
estimator which takes into account both parameter heterogeneity and possible cross-sectional
dependence. The AMG estimator includes a “common dynamic process” extracted from
a pooled OLS regression of first differences which provides a panel-equivalent average
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movement of the unobserved common factors. Common factors are those that are time
specific and common across provinces. The AMG approach follows a two-stage procedure;
∆EIit = β
′
i∆Xit +
T
∑
s=2
cs∆Ds+∆eit (2.3)
⇒cˆs ≡ µˆ∗t
EIit =αi+β
′
i Xit +κiµˆ
∗
t + eit (2.4)
βˆ AMG = N−1∑
i
βˆ i
In the first stage (Equation 2.3) we estimate a standard first difference OLS regression with
T −1 year dummies denoted by Ds. The coefficients on the year dummy cˆs are recorded and
relabeled as µˆ∗t . In the second stage (Equation 2.4) the variable µˆ∗t is included to represent
the evolution of the unobservable common factor over time.10
To identify the channels by which urbanization impacts energy intensity we also include
in our estimating equation the energy intensity of different sectors and the corresponding
interaction term. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms capture the direction and
magnitude of the indirect impact of urbanization on energy intensity. A significant interaction
term implies that the intensity contribution from that subsector is dependent on the level of
10An alternative to the AMG approach is to use the Common Correlated Effects (CCEMG) estimator
developed by Pesaran (2006) and used by Sadorsky (2013) which also takes into account both parameter
heterogeneity and common factors. This CCEMG has a general multifactor error structure and assumes that
the unobservable common factor can be substituted by the cross-sectional average of the independent and the
dependent observations. Compared to the AMG approach, the CCEMG estimator is relatively data-intensive
since the degrees of freedom are reduced considerably after the inclusion of the averages as proxies for the
unobservable common factor in each region regression. In relatively short province time-series this could lead
to loss of precision in the province estimates. With panel data, N is regarded as infinite asymptotically and T is
finite. Since we have a relatively short panel the CCEMG approach is unreliable. For reasons of completeness
we present the CCEMG results in the appendix.
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urban development. Our estimating equation is therefore:
EIit =α+β1iY PCit +β2iINDit +β3iURBANit +β4iSUB_EIit (2.5)
+β5iURBANit ×SUB_EIit +ξt +υi+ εit
The subsector intensity SUB_EIit is calculated by measuring CEI/EEI for the construction,
transportation, tertiary and residential sectors. Detailed definitions can be found in Table A.1
of the appendix.11
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Data description
In this paper we use a balanced panel for 30 Chinese provinces for the period 1995 to 2012.12
The original data are obtained from China Statistical Yearbooks, China Population Statistical
Yearbooks and China Energy Statistical Yearbooks. In the following empirical analysis, total
energy intensity (TEI) and two specific energy intensity variables, namely coal intensity
(CEI) and electricity intensity (EEI) which are measured by energy consumption per real
GDP, coal consumption per real GDP and electricity consumption per real GDP respectively.
Energy intensity in construction and tertiary sector is defined as the energy consumption
(coal or electricity) in that sector divided by the real value added in that sector while the
11Year dummies are included in all classical estimations. With the mean group (MG) estimations, a linear
trend term was included but none were significant at the 95% level. Since the time effects tend to be nonlinear,
the linear trend term is negated. In the augmented mean group (AGM) estimator, t−1 year dummies are taken
into account automatically in the first stage of the estimation procedure.
12We exclude Tibet from our analysis since it contains only a small numbers of observations and has extreme
high values of energy intensity due to the low real GDP. We also use linear interpolation to account for the
boundary change for Chongqing (which was separated from Sichuan province to become a municipality in
1997).
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denominator for transportation and residential energy consumption (coal or electricity) is the
total population at year end. Income per capita refers to the real gross domestic product per
capita and industrialization is measured as the industrial value added divided by GDP.13 We
include two measures of urbanization (discussed in more detail later). First, we divide the
percentage of the population living in urban areas by total province population at year end
(Urban1). Second, we divide the percentage of non-agricultural population by the number of
people registered in the province (Urban2).14 Table A.2 provides a simple correlation matrix
for our main variable of interest. The raw data suggest a negative correlation between total
energy intensity and income per capita, industrialization and urbanization.
Figure 2.1 presents the provincial average trend in China’s energy intensity between 1995
and 2012. Both aggregate energy intensity and coal intensity in China reversed its previous
decline and rose slightly in 2003 before resuming its gradual decline. The electricity intensity
is relatively stable. Table 2.1 provides a summary of our key variables for each of China’s
30 provinces between 1995 and 2012. The heterogeneity across provinces is evident with
aggregate energy intensity ranging from a low of 0.816 in Guangdong to 3.428 for Ningxia.
The industrialization and urbanization variables have a lower variance although Beijing still
has an urbanization rate that is more than double that of many of the other provinces in
China.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
13Industrialization has also been measured as the ratio of secondary sector value added to GDP (Jiang and
Lin, 2012; Jiang et al., 2014). Although the definitions are slightly different in our case the correlation between
the two measures is 0.98.
14It is necessary to distinguish between different statistical definitions of population in China. The denomi-
nator for Urban1 is the population at year end (Changzhu renkou) and is defined as the number of long-term
residents living in a specific region, including the local registered population but not including those that leave
the area for more than half a year, people registered in other places or people never registered in one place
but live in a region for more than half a year. The denominator for Urban2 is the registered population (Huji
renkou) which is defined as the population who are registered in the hukou system. An individual with a hukou
registration in a local area is counted whether they live locally, or even if they leave for a half year or more (Liu,
2004).
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[Table 2.1 about here]
Table 2.2 provides data descriptive for our key variables for each of China’s 30 provinces. It
shows that income per capita grew by an average of 11.2% a year while energy intensity fell
by an average of 3.7% a year. The decline in coal intensity averages 6.3% a year which is a
lot faster than that for electricity intensity which declined by just 1.3%. At the same time
industrialization increased by an average of 0.78% a year. The average annual growth rates
for urbanization indicators Urban1 and Urban2 were 4.3% and 2.5% respectively.
[Table 2.2 about here]
Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix show the trends in urbanization, industrialization
and income per capita for the period 1995 to 2012. Both urbanization indicators have
increased over time while the growth of Urban2 is smoother than Urban1. Figure A.2 shows
industrialization was relatively stable until 2002 when it experienced rapid growth before
declining as the global economic crisis of 2008/2009 impacted the Chinese economy before
resuming its upward trajectory. Figure A.3 shows that income per capita continued to rise
throughout this period.
2.4.2 Formal and informal urbanization
Studies that distinguish between formal and informal urbanization in China date back to the
nineties. For example, Liu and Liang (1997) provide a detailed case study of the informal
urbanization on the fringe of Beijing. In addition to political, cultural and social reasons,
economic factors are regarded as some of the most important determinants of rural-urban
migration. Zhu (1998) argues that the distinction between formal and informal urbanization
is important to understand the urbanization process in China and provides a precise definition
of formal and informal urbanization. The formal urban population refers to the de jure urban
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citizens who have the non-agricultural hukou registration while the informal urban population
also includes some de facto urban inhabitants that consist of the floating population that
have arrived from other areas as well as local residents that only hold the agricultural hukou
registration even if they are involved in non-agricultural activities. These temporary residents
tend to have no access to a range of benefits and privileges available to urban residents, they
tend to work in the industrial sector, have poor living conditions and relatively high migration
frequency.15 According to the China Household Finance Survey, urban residents holding
agricultural hukou registration account for one quarter (25.3%) of the total population during
2009 to 2013. The proportion is considerable large comparing with 29.3% of urban residents
holding non-agricultural hukou registration (Gan, 2014).
Due to the important difference in social and economic status between the floating population
and local residents we make the distinction between measures of urbanization based on
hukou registration from one based on the urban floating population. The only other study
that examines the relationship between migration and energy is Yan (2015) who uses the
ratio of non-agricultural population to total population as the robustness check for the urban
area population. Table 2.3 provides the annual average population based on these two
definitions from 1995 to 2012. At the first glance one can observe that the urban population
is consistently higher than the non-agricultural population that is currently registered in that
province. The difference between the floating population and local citizens is the agricultural
population that have arrived from rural areas and other non-agricultural people from other
cities. Guangdong, and Zhejiang have the largest recorded difference between the two
15Shen (2002) examines migration patterns and concludes that migrants from within a province have an
employment advantage over those from other provinces. In both cases migrants tends to live in company
quarters (31.4%), rented housing (29.3%) and construction sites (15.8%). The accommodation situation has
improved in recent years according to the urbanization and labour migration survey conducted by Tsinghua
University (2013). Approximately 21.6 percentage of temporary residents with agricultural hukou now own
private property in urban areas above the county level, while 79.8% of non-agricultural floating population have
their own property.
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measures and considered to the largest hosts for migrants during our period of analysis, a
finding that matches that of Zhang and Song (2003).16
2.5 Empirical Results
Before we present our results it is useful to note that classic panel unit root tests which do
not take cross-sectional dependence into account can be misleading (low power). Standard
unit root tests can over reject as a consequence of considerable size distortion (Baltagi et al.,
2007).17 Hence, Pesaran (2007a) developed the CIPS test (Cross-sectional Im-Pesaran-Shin
test) for stationarity that can also be used as a test for cross-sectional dependence. Table 2.4
presents the CIPS test and the Pesaran (2004) CD test for cross-sectional dependence for
each of our variables. The p-values in the second column of Table 2.4 show that each of our
series rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence except CEI in transportation
industry. The CIPS test which contains two lags, a trend term and an intercept also indicates
that the series include a unit root. When we are searching for an appropriate model to test
our hypothesis we are looking for a high p-value for the CD test and a low p-value for the
CIPS test. Our results at this stage are similar to those of Sadorsky (2013) whose data also
exhibit cross-sectional dependence with each series containing a unit root.
[Table 2.4 about here]
To investigate the relationship between urbanization, industrialization, income per capita and
energy intensity we estimate a series of models under different assumptions. Tables 2.5 and
2.6 present the results using pooled OLS and simple fixed effects models to benchmark our
16Zhang and Song (2003) find that at the end of 1998, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangsu were the
top four migration host provinces. In Table 2.3, Jiangsu ranks in 6th place while Fujian is in 10th place.
17The power of a binary hypothesis test is the probability of rejecting the null when it is false, which is
related to type II error. The size of a test is the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis, which is
related to type I error.
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results against those of previous studies. Three types of energy intensity are investigated,
namely total energy intensity (TEI), coal energy intensity (CEI) and electricity energy
intensity (EEI). Table 2.7 presents our mean group estimations that take into account cross-
sectional dependence while Table 2.8 presents the results from the AMG estimations that
allow for both cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneous slope parameters. Finally,
Tables 2.9 to 2.12 present our indirect results where we examine the four channels by which
urbanization may have an indirect impact on energy usage. Year dummies are included
and all models are estimated with robust standard errors. As part of a series of robustness
checks all models were reestimated including quadratic terms (which were nearly always
insignificant and hence not reported) and using our alternative measure of industrialization
(secondary sector value added divided by GDP) which gave quantitatively and qualitatively
similar results.
Table 2.5 reports the pooled OLS results which reveal a consistent negative and significant
effect of income per capita on energy intensity. The coefficients of income per capita
estimations range between -0.803 and -1.517 with the impact being larger for the energy
intensity of coal (CEI). The results also show that industrialization is a strong positive
determinant of energy intensity and the coefficient is significant across all specifications
with relatively stable elasticities ranging between 1.696 and 3.517 across all six models.
Since coal is an important input into the process of industrialization, the marginal impact
of industrialization on energy usage is consistently stronger for CEI. For urbanization we
find a positive and significant impact for both of our urbanization measures. The coefficients
range from 1.345 to 2.255, which implies that a one percentage point increase in urbanization
would induce a 1.345% to 2.255% increase in energy use considering other variables at a
constant level.
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In Table 2.6 we include province fixed effects. The results are broadly similar although the
magnitude of the effects are now smaller. Concentrating on urbanization, the coefficients
for the fixed effects estimations range from between 0.875 and 1.126 which are consistent
with Zhang and Lin (2012) who find an urban impact of 0.41 and Ma (2015) who presents an
impact range from 0.20 to 0.29. The Urban2 and Urban1 results are broadly similar.
[Table 2.5 about here]
[Table 2.6 about here]
The difficulty with the results presented in the previous two tables is that under the null
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence, all p-values associated with the CD test for
TEI and CEI reject the null hypothesis which means there is a problem of cross-sectional
dependence. The fact that electricity use suffers less from cross-sectional dependence might
be due to the multiple power generation approaches and well-developed power distribution
and transmission network occupied by the State Grid Corporation of China (covering 88% of
Mainland China) and China Southern Power Grid Company Limited (covering Guangdong,
Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou and Hainan). Equally problematic is that the CIPS test results
suggest that the fixed effects regressions are poorly fitted due to non-stationary residuals.
Our first attempt to address these concerns is to use mean group (MG) model the results of
which we present in Table 2.7.
[Table 2.7 about here]
The results in Table 2.7 show that the coefficients on income per capita and industrialization
remain statistically significant at the 1% level (with the exception of the coefficient on
industrialization in column (6) which is now insignificant). Income per capita is again
negative and industrialization appears to have a large impact on the use of coal. Urbanization
continues to have a positive impact on energy intensity in three of our six specifications.
2.5 Empirical Results 33
The coefficients on both income per capita and industrialization are now much smaller than
those of the OLS regressions in Table 2.5 but consistent with those from the fixed effect
model in Table 2.6. In contrast to what we found in previous tables, all the MG regressions
have stationary residuals according to the CIPS test. However, the CD test results continue
to suggest that we have an issue with cross-sectional dependence. Hence, in Table 2.8
we present the results from our augmented mean group estimations and are our preferred
specification.
[Table 2.8 about here]
The coefficients on income per capita shown in Table 2.8 remain generally negative and
significant at the 5% level. The coefficients range from -0.29 to -0.81 which is consistent
with the elasticities found by Sadorsky (2013) who estimates a range of elasticities from
-0.57 to -0.53 and -0.45 to -0.35 for the short run and long run elasticities respectively. The
income elasticities for EEI are larger than those of CEI implying that provinces with higher
income per capita tend to consume electricity more efficiently. Returning to industrialization,
under the AMG specification, we find it to be insignificant in four out of six regressions.
The significant coefficients are also smaller than those of our previous tables and are now
consistent with the findings of Ma (2015) which is 0.217 although slightly higher than the
long-run effect of 0.07 to 0.12 found by Sadorsky (2013) who looks at developing countries
more generally. Considering the disaggregated energy types, urbanization (Urban1) has a
positive and significant impact on CEI and EEI at the 5% level (Column (2) and (3)). In each
case the AMG models pass both tests which gives us greater confidence in our findings. The
results suggest that the impact of urbanization on energy intensity is not as clear cut as may
have initially thought from the OLS and FE regressions.
To further examine the various channels though which urbanization has an impact on energy
use we now include interaction terms of sector energy intensity and our measures of urban-
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ization. Our four sectors are (1) Construction; (2) Transport, storage and post; (3) Wholesale,
retail trade, hotel, and restaurants; and (4) Residential consumption. The results are shown in
Tables 2.9 to 2.9 using both MG and AMG approaches for our three types of energy intensity
and two urban indicators.
Table 2.9 presents our analysis of the construction channel. Both the energy intensity in
the construction sector and its interaction term with our urban indicators are included . It
is reasonable to assume that the energy intensity at the sector level will make a positive
contribution to aggregate energy intensity. As a result, both CEI and EEI in the construction
sector have positive coefficients at least at the 10% significant level. According to Parikh and
Shukla (1995), the process of urbanization tends to be accompanied by increased building and
other infrastructure activities. However, the interaction terms between our urban indicators
and energy intensity in the construction sector also show a significant and negative impact
on both types of energy intensities. This suggests that in those provinces that have higher
urbanization levels, the contribution to energy intensity from the construction sector to
aggregate energy intensity is lower than that in the less urbanized provinces. In other
words, the construction sector uses energy more efficiently in already highly urbanized areas.
Given the rapid rate of urbanization in China, the importance of energy conservation in
the construction sector has become an important area of policy with the Chinese central
government launching a serious of regulations and criteria targeted at the construction sector.
Returning to the results we find that the MG results still suffer from non-stationary residuals.
Focusing on the AMG model (which passes both the CD test and CIPS test) the coefficients
on the sector energy intensity and the interaction term obtained with Urban2 are generally
larger (approximately 3 times) than those for Urban1. One possible explanation is that
local residents with non-agricultural hukou have a better chance to purchase one or more
houses. Therefore, through the construction channel, the model specification with Urban2
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based on the hukou system would lead to a larger impact of urbanization. The income per
capita variables remain a negative and significant determinant of energy intensity under
the MG and AMG assumptions except in columns (2) and (6). However, the finding for
industrialization suggests it only has a minor influence on aggregate energy intensity with
the AMG specification showing only one out of four of the coefficients being significant at
the 10% level.
[Table 2.9 about here]
The second channel where urbanization can have an impact is through the transportation
sector. Energy consumption and emissions tend to raise substantially as intra-city and inter-
city mobility increases. At first glance, the transport pathway that links urbanization and
energy efficiency suggests an inverted relationship. Our results suggest that transportation
tends to be more energy efficient in highly urbanized provinces. This is consistent with
Norman et al. (2006) who shows that low density areas have relatively a lower number
of public transit users. Furthermore, residents living in low density areas have a much
higher vehicle dependency than those living in the city center. According to the CIPS test,
the AMG specification results are more reliable where the urban impact pathway through
the transportation channel found to be weaker. The coefficients for interaction terms in
column (4) and (6) are significant at the 5% level implying that the transportation sector is
less electricity/coal intensive in more urbanized areas when using Urban2/Urban1 as the
measurement criteria respectively. As for the other control variables, income per capita
remains generally negative and significant under both the MG and AMG specifications, while
industrialization drops out in most of our AMG estimations.
[Table 2.10 about here]
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As noted in the literature review, urbanization is associated with a concentration of economic
activity. The usual process of development is from the primary to secondary to tertiary. In
Table 2.11 we investigate the industry composition channel by including energy intensity in
the tertiary sector and its interaction with urban indicators. Energy intensity in the tertiary
sector is measured as coal or electricity consumption in wholesale, retail trade and hotel,
restaurants subsectors divided by real value added in those subsectors. Column (1), (2),
(4), (6) and (8) pass the CD and CIPS test at the 1% level which suggests cross-sectional
independent and stationary residuals. The results show that coal consumption tends to be
affected the most through this channel. In first two columns, not surprisingly we find that coal
energy intensity makes a positive contribution to the aggregate coal intensity. The interaction
terms have a negative and significant impact on aggregate CEI which implies that in highly
urbanized provinces the contribution from the tertiary sector is lower than in less urbanized
areas. However, the mechanism is less clear when we consider electricity intensity. Under
this impact scenario, income per capita remains the most robust factor and all coefficients are
negative and significant at the 1% level. The significance and magnitude of the income effect
is fairly stable across all our channels in Tables 2.7 to 2.12, ranging from approximately -0.3
to -0.8. As for the industrialization variable, it performs differently for different energy types
with coal use seemingly more affected than electricity use.
[Table 2.11 about here]
The final channel we investigate is lifestyle and residential energy consumption. Residual
coal/electricity consumption per capita and its corresponding interaction term with our urban
indicators are included in both the MG and AMG specifications. It is notable that under
this channel, urbanization performs differently for each of our two energy types. More
specifically, when we take the residential energy consumption into account, residential CEI
and EEI are positively related to the aggregate intensity with the aggregate CEI seemingly
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more affected. The AMG estimation results are presented in columns (5) to (8) in Table 2.12.
Both of our two urban indicators shows a negative impact on aggregate CEI although the
interaction terms are insignificant. It implies a significant impact through the other channels
and the insignificance of channel four. As for the other covariates, income per capita remains
a negative and robust influence on both energy types, and industrialization increases energy
intensity.
[Table 2.12 about here]
To summarize our results, for each of our four channels we find that only one of the four
channels offers a robust explanation for how urbanization affects energy intensity. We find
that energy use in the construction sector in highly urbanized areas tends to be more efficient
relative to provinces with low urbanization levels. When considering specific urbanization
measurement, Urban1 exerts significant impacts on aggregate CEI through construction
channel and industrial upgrading, while Urban2 has indirect impacts on CEI through the
construction and transportation channels. Electricity intensity tends to be affected only
through the first two channels. It seems that the impact through the last three channels,
namely transportation, industrial upgrading and residential consumption are not necessarily
as large as expected. This may be due for two reasons. First, the four channels described in
the literature are mainly based on the energy consumption amount rather than energy intensity.
For example, urbanization is usually accompanied by increased transportation in the city area,
while mobility in the city-country fringe tends to have a higher reliance on vehicle transport
rather than urban mass transit (Norman et al., 2006). The concentration of economic activity
also brings the opportunity for the more efficient use of energy. Based on the theory of
industrial symbiosis, firms which are geographically close could form an industrial ecosystem
by utilizing the waste materials from one production process into another. Both economic
profits and environmental benefits are maximized via the cycling and reusing of resources
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such as water and energy citepChertow2008, VanBerkel2009. After standardizing by the real
value added in each sector, using energy intensity is more meaningful since it measures the
efficiency of energy use.
Secondly, disaggregating by energy type may be missing differences at a more disaggregated
level. For example, industries such as transport, storage and post tend to be more petroleum
intensive. As a result, this might explain our insignificant finding for coal/electricity consump-
tion through channel two. As for the inconsistent performance of our two urban indicators, it
may due to the difference between the measures. The household registration system that has
lasted for more than 60 years has resulted in over 250 million rural migrants living in the
cities without an urban “hukou” (NBSC, 2015). Although migrants provide low-cost labor
they are perceived to receive unfair treatment in regard to the availability of public services
and social welfare (e.g. education and health care). According to the National New-Style
Urbanization Plan (2014-2020), the government intends to reform the household registration
system to pay more attention to “people-centered” urbanization.
2.6 Conclusions
Using a balanced panel of 30 Chinese provinces covering the period 1995 to 2012 we
investigate the impact of urbanization, income per capita, and industrialization on energy
intensity. We employ recently developed econometric techniques to take into account the
substantial heterogeneity across Chinese provinces. First and foremost, in this paper we
show that the direct impact of urbanization on energy intensity is positive although not
as strong as previous predictions. When we consider the indirect influence, four major
impact channels are investigated and the results are in consistent with previous studies. More
specifically, the indirect effect through the construction sector is shown to be the most robust
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impact channel whilst the industrial upgrading (sector change) and transportation pathways
tends to be significant under certain circumstances. Different lifestyles around high/low
urbanized areas are likely to have the same contribution to the energy intensity when we
take the cross-sectional dependence and provincial heterogeneity into consideration. Two
of our urbanization indicators also behave differently under certain circumstances which
demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between informal and formal urbanization.
Province level heterogeneity also proved to have a substantial influence on the estimation for
China. The relationship between economic growth, industrialization and urbanization energy
can be captured more precisely by taking heterogeneous parameters and common factors into
account which we test for using the CD and the CIPS tests.
Our results show that for China, urbanization impacts on energy intensity through the direct
and indirect mechanisms. Urbanization measured by the percentage of the floating urban
population shows a positive and significant direct impact on both coal consumption intensity
and electricity consumption intensity. One percentage point increase in Urban1 is predicted
to increase CEI and EEI by approximately 1.5% and 0.8% respectively. The indirect effect
of urbanization through the construction sector is generally negative significant and the
magnitude of the impact is larger when based on a formal measure of urbanization (Urban2)
than that from the informal one (Urban1). The interpretation of the interaction term between
urban indicator and energy intensity in the construction sector is that in highly urbanized
provinces the construction sector contributes less to the aggregate energy intensity level.
In other words, the construction sector utilizes energy more efficiently in highly urbanized
provinces. Similar results are found when we consider the transportation pathway and
the industry upgrade pathway under specific circumstances. Energy consumption due to
residents’ consumption was shown to be an efficient channel through which urbanization
impacts energy intensity.
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With regards to income per capita, there is strong evidence that per capita real GDP affects
energy intensity estimated using both classic and more advanced econometric techniques.
The elasticity is relatively large for the pooled OLS and ranges from -0.8 to -1.5, whilst it is
smaller and stable for the fixed effect and mean group related estimations. The elasticity for
the direct effect ranges from -0.3 to -0.8 which is generally consistent with Sadorsky (2013)
who estimates elasticities between -0.57 to -0.53 and from -0.45 to -0.35 for the short run
and long run respectively. Our findings indicate that income per capita is one of the most
important drivers of reductions in energy consumption and is in consistent with previous
studies that also focus on China’s provincial data (Song and Zheng, 2012; Jiang et al., 2014;
Ma, 2015).
Industrialization is regarded to be one of the overwhelming contributors to China’s economic
growth. We find that energy intensity increases as the percentage of industrial value added
rises. However, the impact of industrialization is not as strong as expected. It may due to
the cleaner production benefiting from technology improvement (Garbaccio et al., 1999;
Herrerias et al., 2013). Since accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Chi-
nese central government has launched a series of nation-wide policies focusing on energy
conservation and emission reductions. These policies cover various aspects of secondary
industry such as power generation and the manufacture sector. Increasing openness could
also lead to the diffusion of energy-saving technologies. As a result, the positive effect of
industrialization on energy intensity tends to be limited because of the active or passive
technology change.
Although we have attempted to explain how the rate of urbanization impacts energy intensity
more research is required. Improving energy efficiency is usually considered a practicable
way to mitigate many common challenges such as climate change and possible energy
shortages. The findings in this paper suggest a number of interesting policy implications.
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First, the sensitivity of our results to the use of mean group techniques emphasizes the
importance of provincial heterogeneity in China. Different geographical structures, nature
features, energy storage and availability and even local culture and preference could all be
part of the explanation. As a result, national targets need to be reconsidered taking into
account local features. Identifying the inherent features of a region and implementing energy
and environment policy at the local levels should be considered. Secondly, more attention
should be given on the differences between informal urbanization and formal development.
The urbanization rate as measured by the floating population surpassed the world average of
54% in 2014 (United Nations, 2014). Behind these numbers however are questions relating
to the quality of the urbanization. Without basic infrastructure and urban planning, many
urban areas in China are abandoned (so called ghost cities) while others consist of large
numbers of high-rise buildings. Reform of hukou system will help to improve information
management and optimize urban planning. Finally, policies to develop and plan for changes
in industrial structure and technological upgrading need to be carefully considered. There
is no doubt that urbanization and industrialization will continue for the foreseeable future
despite the global slowdown in growth. Improving the efficiency of energy use may have
a short term detrimental impact on economic growth but needs to be considered as part of
a bigger picture to reduce urban air pollution and reduce China’s dependence on imported
energy. Finally, it is possible that the recent policy to encourage further urbanization may not
have the negative impact on energy intensity and hence pollution that some expect. Equally,
urbanization may not deliver the reductions in energy intensity that others might expect.
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2.7 Figures and tables
Fig. 2.1 Chinese aggregate energy intensity, coal intensity and electricity intensity (1995-
2012)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2013 (Units: tons of standard coal equivalent / RMB 10,000 in 2005 prices). The unit for coal intensity
is tons / RMB 10,000 in 2005 prices and the unit for electricity intensity is kWh / yuan in 2005 prices.
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Table 2.1 Energy, income per capita, industrialization and urbanization in China’s 30
provinces (1995-2012) in 2005 prices
Province Income per capita Industrialization Energy Intensity Coal Intensity Electricity Intensity Urban 1 Urban 2
Shanghai 4.414 0.465 0.996 0.164 0.0981 0.783 0.804
Beijing 4.066 0.301 1.009 0.287 0.0865 0.809 0.726
Tianjin 3.459 0.528 1.312 0.446 0.108 0.709 0.593
Zhejiang 2.581 0.529 0.882 0.28 0.108 0.461 0.255
Jiangsu 2.446 0.531 0.915 0.316 0.103 0.459 0.393
Guangdong 2.327 0.485 0.816 0.191 0.105 0.53 0.425
Liaoning 2.023 0.498 1.89 0.567 0.137 0.551 0.478
Fujian 1.976 0.465 0.829 0.3 0.0995 0.434 0.277
Shandong 1.952 0.524 1.217 0.464 0.11 0.402 0.322
Inner Mongolia 1.896 0.44 2.162 1.097 0.163 0.466 0.374
Jilin 1.452 0.439 1.777 0.921 0.121 0.461 0.445
Hebei 1.412 0.507 1.937 0.878 0.145 0.329 0.251
Heilongjiang 1.395 0.516 1.692 0.504 0.114 0.54 0.47
Chongqing 1.388 0.473 1.266 0.741 0.109 0.439 0.265
Hubei 1.264 0.426 1.532 0.854 0.119 0.415 0.326
Xinjiang 1.246 0.417 2.32 0.905 0.128 0.372 0.389
Shanxi 1.226 0.52 3.327 1.332 0.221 0.394 0.293
Hainan 1.161 0.246 0.86 0.134 0.157 0.396 0.319
Shannxi 1.15 0.479 1.553 0.715 0.133 0.347 0.262
Ningxia 1.14 0.446 3.428 1.511 0.396 0.381 0.33
Hunan 1.119 0.401 1.311 0.73 0.0998 0.347 0.21
Henan 1.119 0.504 1.379 0.666 0.129 0.289 0.198
Sichuan 1.048 0.424 1.483 0.526 0.11 0.294 0.223
Qinghai 1.046 0.466 2.916 0.872 0.374 0.387 0.297
Jiangxi 0.987 0.436 1.059 0.505 0.0923 0.345 0.246
Jiangxi Anhui 0.95 0.422 1.345 0.882 0.109 0.329 0.206
Guangxi 0.92 0.387 1.154 0.554 0.121 0.309 0.182
Yunnan 0.813 0.426 1.603 0.634 0.141 0.261 0.162
Gansu 0.764 0.439 2.44 0.982 0.252 0.287 0.221
Guizhou 0.592 0.384 3.278 2.164 0.261 0.244 0.153
Notes: Data source China Statistical Yearbooks, China Population Statistical Yearbooks and China Energy Statistical Yearbooks. Income
is the annual average real GDP per capita (10,000 RMB/person); Industrialization is the annual average secondary industry value added
divided by GDP; Energy intensity is the annual average energy consumption per real GDP (tons standard coal/10,000 RMB); Coal intensity
is the annual average coal consumption per real GDP (tons/RMB 10,000) and the electricity is the annual average electricity consumption
per real GDP (kWh/yuan); The two urban indicators are urban population density and nonagricultural population density.
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics for China’s 30 provinces (1995-2012) in 2005 prices
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Income per capita 540 1.638 1.379 0.217 7.416
Industrialization 540 0.386 0.081 0.121 0.53
Energy Intensity 540 1.659 0.866 0.48 6.47
Coal Intensity 540 0.704 0.532 0.059 3.38
Electricity Intensity 540 0.147 0.084 0.049 0.504
Urban1 540 0.425 0.165 0.135 0.893
Urban2 540 0.336 0.161 0.135 0.898
Growth rates
Income per capita 510 0.112 0.0459 -0.0376 0.261
Industrialization 510 0.00782 0.0331 -0.0898 0.171
Energy Intensity 510 -0.0373 0.0615 -0.269 0.259
Coal Intensity 510 -0.0627 0.131 -0.65 0.694
Electricity Intensity 510 -0.0132 0.0806 -0.312 0.565
Urban1 510 0.0433 0.105 -0.423 1.295
Urban2 510 0.0225 0.0465 -0.135 0.586
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks, China Population Statistical
Yearbooks and China Energy Statistical Yearbooks.
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Table 2.3 Annual average population summary in 30 provinces (1995-2012)
Rank of Province Urban population at year end Non-agricultural Difference value
difference value population
1 Guangdong 6419 3796 2623
2 Zhejiang 3111 1281 1830
3 Shandong 4581 3209 1371
4 Henan 3442 2129 1312
5 Hunan 2718 1494 1223
6 Jiangsu 4390 3198 1192
7 Anhui 2487 1411 1076
8 Sichuan 3092 2034 1057
9 Hebei 2996 1940 1056
10 Fujian 1984 1054 931
11 Guangxi 1812 939 873
12 Yunnan 1536 728 808
13 Shanghai 1924 1143 781
14 Jiangxi 1863 1150 713
15 Beijing 1543 898 645
16 Hubei 2703 2089 614
17 Liaoning 2645 2045 599
18 Shanxi 1603 1029 575
19 Shaanxi 1609 1043 565
20 Chongqing 1455 893 563
21 Guizhou 1100 620 481
22 Tianjin 949 574 375
23 Inner Mongolia 1290 930 360
24 Heilongjiang 2107 1803 304
25 Gansu 875 617 258
26 Jilin 1456 1211 245
27 Hainan 416 291 125
28 Qinghai 237 156 81
29 Ningxia 287 212 75
30 Xinjiang 867 809 57
Source: NBSC website, http://data.stats.gov.cn/. Unit: 10,000 person. For Tibet, the urban population at
year end is 650,000 and non-agricultural population is 440,000.
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Table 2.4 Tests for cross-section dependence and units roots
Variable CD-test p-value corr abs(corr) CIPS p-value
TEI 70.79 0 0.8 0.8 -2.372 0.328
CEI 72.37 0 0.818 0.819 -1.819 0.995
EEI 21.06 0 0.238 0.52 -2.265 0.555
Income per capita 88 0 0.994 0.994 -1.815 0.995
Industrialization 32.02 0 0.362 0.64 -1.718 0.999
Urban1 80.1 0 0.905 0.905 -1.863 0.99
Urban2 79.88 0 0.903 0.903 -1.299 1
CEI in Construction Industry 33.55 0 0.379 0.55 -1.615 1
EEI in Construction Industry 19.3 0 0.218 0.429 -1.849 0.992
CEI in Transport Industry 0.23 0.82 0.003 0.369 -1.586 1
EEI in Transport Industry 72.79 0 0.832 0.823 -2.392 0.29
CEI in Tertiary Industry 6.39 0 0.072 0.437 -2.436 0.214
EEI in Tertiary Industry 11.39 0 0.129 0.499 -2.926 0
Residential Coal Intensity 14.53 0 0.164 0.369 -2.12 0.821
Residential Electricity Intensity 82.59 0 0.933 0.933 -1.635 1
Note: For the CD test, the null hypothesis is cross sectional independence. For the CIPS
test, the null hypothesis is non-stationarity. Column 1 and 5 show the statistical values of the
CD test and CIPS test while column 2 and 6 provide the corresponding p-values. Column
3 and 4 provide the average correlation and the average absolute correlation between the
cross-sectional units.
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Appendix A
Fig. A.1 Chinese Annual Average Urbanization in 30 Provinces (1995-2012)
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and China Population Statistical Yearbooks 1996-2013
56
Fig. A.2 Chinese Annual Average Industrialization in 30 Provinces (1995-2012)
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 1996-2013 (Units: Secondary industry added value/GDP)
Fig. A.3 Chinese Annual Average Income per capita in 30 Provinces (1995-2012)
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 1996-2013 (Units: 10,000 RMB/person in 2005 prices)
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Electricity Prices and Industry Switching: Evidence from
Chinese Manufacturing Firms
Abstract
Energy is an essential input into a firm’s production process. Understanding how firms
respond to changes in energy prices is important for understanding the micro-foundations of
growth in developing economics. In this paper we investigate how electricity price changes
affect firms’ production choices in China during the period 2005 and 2007. Employing
an instrumental approach to address potential endogeneity concerns, our results show that
the energy price plays an important role in shifting industrial production towards industries
with lower energy intensities. More specifically, we find that manufacturing firms are more
likely to switch to less energy intensive industries as a result of rising cost of energy. A 10%
electricity price increase leads to an increase in the probability of switching to a less energy
intensive industry by approximately 2.34% to 2.42%. Our results imply that electricity prices
can be an effective way to promote energy efficiency through resource reallocation between
industries.
JEL: L6; O13; O14
Keywords: Sector switching; Electricity prices; Firm behaviour
A draft of this chapter has been previously submitted to and presented at the Royal Economic Society
Annual Conference 2017 and the 10th International Workshop on "Empirical Methods in Energy Economics". It
is available online at : https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=RESConf2017&
paper_id=925.
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3.1 Introduction
Energy is a fundamental input for manufacturing production and energy costs account for
a significant part of operational costs. Electricity costs as a percentage of total production
costs or value added for energy intensive sectors range from a low of 12-16% for blast/basic
oxygen furnace steel production and textiles, to 20-25% for electric arc furnace steel and
copper, to 30-50% for aluminum and chemicals (BLS and Tractus, 2016). Since firms are an
important engine of growth in the economy and energy is an essential input in the production
process, identifying how firms respond to energy supply shocks is crucial for understanding
the growth in developing economies.
In this paper we investigate how changes in energy prices affect firm behaviour in different
provinces for the period 2005 to 2007. Specifically, we test the impact of input constraints on
firm’s choice of industry under the exogenous electricity prices. Employing an instrumental
approach, our results suggest that higher electricity prices tend to promote surviving firms
to adjust the 4-digit industry they operate in. In particular, we find that higher energy costs
provide an incentive for firms to switch to a less energy intensive industry, and dampen a
firm’s desire to switch to a more energy intensive industry. With our preferred method a
10% electricity price increase leads to a 2.34% to 2.42% increase in the probability of a firm
switching to a less energy intensive industry, and a 2.12% to 2.24% drop in the probability of
a firm switching to a more energy intensive industry all else being equal. The dampening
effect also depends on a firm’s initial energy intensity level. Energy prices are shown to be
an efficient tool in promoting industrial structure shifting to less energy intensive one and
bolstering energy efficiency. Besides energy costs, we also find some significant firm-level
characteristics and industrial characteristics that influence firms’ switching decision. For
example, switchers tend to be large-size highly productive firms relative to the average, and
state-owned firms are generally less likely to switch their main products. Furthermore, our
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findings confirmed the interest conflict between the central and local authorities in terms of
the electricity pricing regime.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, this is the first paper to study how varying
electricity prices in China affect the industry choice of firms. Our approach is to combine a
unique regional industrial electricity price dataset with a comprehensive firm-level dataset.
Understanding the impact of electricity costs on firms’ industry choices and hence technology
choices is important due to the implications for a country’s industrial structure and subsequent
economic growth potential. The industrial electricity price dataset comes from National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and covers 36 large and medium sized cities
in China. The firm-level dataset is the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset which includes
all state-owned enterprises and private enterprises with more than 5 million RMB yearly
turnover.
Second, we construct an instrumental variable from the interaction of regional coal production
and thermal power generation capacity to isolate the exogenous variation in energy prices.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in investigating the impact of energy prices on
firms behaviour. However, most of these studies have ignored the endogeneity issue of the
energy price. The electricity price scheme in China is originally designed in the 1960s and
developed in the 1980s under which there are several categories of end users. Each type
of end user is assigned a specific price by provincial and local pricing bureaus under the
guidance of the central government. Hence, the endogeneity concerns may arise from the
political influence under which the low energy prices serve as a favourable policy used by
local officials to support industries in their jurisdictions. Unobserved political influence might
impact both local energy prices and firm performance. Employing instruments which affect
firm behaviour only through the price variation help us to obtain more precise estimation
results.
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The reminder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 3.2 provides a summary of the
literature on firm performance under energy constrains and the switching behaviour. Section
3.3 and 3.4 describe the methodology and statistical description of the data. The empirical
results are presented in Section 3.5 and the final section concludes and discusses the policy
implications.
3.2 Literature Review
The literature that examines the impact of energy related costs on firm performance has
received renewed attention in recent years. Energy related costs appeared in the literature
can take different forms such as power shortages, electricity prices and production costs of
energy. Indicators used to measure firm performance include output, productivity, profitability,
employment and investment. Existing research recognises the critical role played by energy
prices in affecting manufacturers’ productivity and output. However, there has been little
discussion about the price impact on existing firms’ product choice. Furthermore, empirical
evidence has shown that incumbent firms that switch into new industries tend to behave
differently compared with newly created firms. In this section we document the literature on
the effect of energy related costs and the literature on the switching behaviour.
Due to the importance of a reliable power supply for industrial production, one group
of studies focuses on the impact of power shortages on firm performance especially in
developing countries (Hallward-Driemeier and Stewart, 2004; Dollar et al., 2005; Alby et al.,
2012; Alam, 2013; Allcott et al., 2016; Fisher-Vanden et al., 2015). By investigating the
quality of infrastructure, Hallward-Driemeier and Stewart (2004) find that a large number
of firms in poor countries have suffered from erratic and low quality power supply, which
is estimated to have reduced sales by up to 10%. Based on survey data from Bangladesh,
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China, India and Pakistan, Dollar et al. (2005) demonstrate that the reliability of the public
power grid is an important determinant in firm performance and power outages are one of
the most serious barriers to firms increasing productivity and profitability. From a global
perspective, Alby et al. (2012) develop a theoretical framework to explain the investment
behaviour of enterprises under physical constraints. Using data from 87 countries covering
28 two-digit ISIC industrial classification, their empirical results reveal that power outages
have a non-linear effect on investment capacity and the corresponding industrial structure
across countries and sectors. The non-linear effect varies according to the degree of power
dependency as well as firm size.
At the country level, Alam (2013) and Allcott et al. (2016) consider the Indian electricity
supply as an example and Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015) focus on China. Alam (2013) studies
Indian firms’ adaptation to electricity outages and states that outages may not necessarily
lead to output reductions due to the adjustment in production process and input demand. The
impact of electricity shortages on firms is heterogeneous with firms operating in electricity-
intensive industries expected to be the major losers. Instrumenting electricity shortages with
supply shifts from hydroelectric power availability, Allcott et al. (2016) find that power
shortages for Indian manufacturing lead to an average decline in revenues and producer
surplus of approximately 5 to 10 percent with relatively small losses in productivity due
to input adjustments. Similar conclusions have been found for China. Fisher-Vanden et al.
(2015) study the severe electricity shortages due to the repaid growth of electricity demand
in the early 2000s and the resulting influence on Chinese firms. Production costs are found
to rise by 8% due primarily to the increase in outsourcing of intermediate inputs.
Other studies have estimated the impact of electricity from the perspective of price variation
rather than shortages (Davis et al., 2008, 2013; Dilaver and Hunt, 2011; Abeberese, 2012;
Ganapati et al., 2016). Although a negative relationship is observed between the electricity
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price and electricity productivity, Davis et al. (2008) predict a positive price elasticity on
plant-level output per kWh equal to 0.6 for period from 1985 to 2000.1 The result implies a
long-run improvement in energy efficiency caused by higher prices for U.S manufacturing.
They also found a tradeoff between electricity productivity and labour productivity since
large plants facing lower energy costs have a reduced incentive to invest in physical capital.
Price dispersion faced by U.S. plants located in various states has been further documented
by Davis et al. (2013). Around 85-95% of the differential can be explained by regional
factors, such as generation costs and regulatory factors across states, and purchase quantity.
Utilizing the structural series technique, Dilaver and Hunt (2011) found a electricity price
elasticity of -0.16 for Turkish industrial electricity consumption over the period 1960 to 2008.
Abeberese (2012) examines the electricity price effect on a series of Indian firm outcomes
including industry choice, product mix, capital-labour ratio and productivity. The main
finding is that a 1% increase in electricity price instrumented by generation conditions lead
to approximately 1.6 to 1.8 percentage point change in the probability of a firm switching
industries. Output, the capital labour ratio and labour productivity are also shown to decrease
as a result of an increasing electricity price. A recent study of Ganapati et al. (2016) develops
a partial equilibrium methodology to estimate how the energy price change is shared between
U.S. manufacturers and consumers. They find that under the imperfect market competition
environment, costumers bear about 70 percent of energy price-driven changes in input costs.
In terms of firms’ switching behaviour, evidence has been found by several studies inves-
tigating the multi-production and firm turnover(Redding et al., 2006; Bernard et al., 2006,
2007; Goldberg et al., 2010; Newman et al., 2013). Redding et al. (2006) is one of the
most important studies that investigates product switching of surviving firms. Using the
quinquennial U.S. Manufacturing Censuses data from 1972 to 1997, they find that product
1In the study regional fixed effects as well as power generation shares from hydro, nuclear and petrol/natural
gas are employed as instruments for the electricity price per kWh paid by plants to isolate the exogenous
variation.
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switching is frequent and prevalent among U.S. firms. Approximately two-thirds of firms
have altered their mix of five-digit SIC products every five years and the change in output
due to the adding and dropping of products by surviving firms accounts for approximately
one-third of the aggregate change.2
Determinants of product switching include demand and supply shocks which are product-
specific but common to all firms. Under this scenario the adding and dropping rates for
the same product tend to be negatively correlated since popular products should be added
by more firms and dropped by fewer firms and vice versa. A complementary explanation
of switching is derived from an extended industrial dynamic model, where the interaction
between firms and products is emphasized and where sunk costs play a fundamental role
in determining product-market entry or exit. Generally speaking the findings suggest that
product switching leads to a more efficient resource allocation within firms and makes a
notable contribution to firm and aggregate growth. One type of supply shock, namely trade
liberation, has been further investigated by Bernard et al. (2006) and shows that switching
rates tend to increase with trade liberalization. As trade costs fall, firms’ product scope shrinks
and the least- productive product tends to be dropped by surviving exporters. When focusing
on trade exposure to low-wage countries, the capital-labour ratio plays an important role in
determining firms’ switching behavior since labour-intensive firms are more susceptible to
import from low-wage countries due to the comparative advantage (Bernard et al., 2007).
According to Goldberg et al. (2010), compared to US firms, product switching is far less
common in large developing countries such as India. Although multi-product firms account
for 47% of manufacturing firms over a 5 year period only 28% of firms report a product
switch compared to a 54 percent for US firms. However, common features for both India
and US firms include that large and multi-product firms tend to be more likely to engage
2Product switching in Redding et al. (2006)’s study is defined at 5-digit SIC level which consists of 1,848
products in total.
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in switching behavior. Looking at Vietnamese data at the firm, sector and industry levels,
Newman et al. (2013) demonstrate that switchers have different characteristics and behave
differently to newly established firms and exiting firms. Large firms with higher productivity
involved in multi-product production tend to have a higher probability of switching into a
new sector, while small firms with single products are more likely to switch out. There is
also weak evidence that firm characteristics such as the capital-labour ratio and ownership
play only a minor role in promoting switching.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Dependent variables
Following Newman et al. (2013), we define the switching behaviour as a firm whose main
product in year t and main product in year t + 1 are from different four-digit industries3.
Table 3.1 provides an illustrative example for the switching behaviour. A dummy variable
Switch is defined as missing for all switchers since the year after switching. By doing so we
exclude the disturbance from industry switches in when we consider the characteristics of
the original industry.
[Table 3.1 about here]
This study aims to analyze the impact of energy prices on a firm’s switching decision. Our
priors are that firms located in provinces with high energy prices will have a higher probability
of switching into less energy intensive industries compared to firms located in low energy
cost provinces everything else equal. To measure whether a firm switches from high to low or
low to high energy intensity (hereafter, EI) industries, ideally we would have the 4-digit level
3The 4-digit industry classification that we use in this paper is GB/T4754-2002.
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energy consumption information. However, unfortunately such information is unavailable
for Chinese manufacturing industries. Our solution is to consider energy inputs and fixed
capital as complements. The correlation between 2-digit electricity consumption and 2-digit
fixed capital is 0.845 during our study period. Hence, we decompose the industrial electricity
consumption at the 2-digit level to create an estimate of electricity inputs at the 4-digit
level using the proxy of total fixed capital.4 Equation 3.1 is now calculated using sectoral
electricity consumption disaggregated into industrial electricity consumption.
FA4−digit,t
FA2−digit,t
=
EC4−digit,t
EC2−digit,t
EC4−digit,t =
FA4−digit,t
FA2−digit,t
×EC2−digit,t (3.1)
FA and EC represent the total fixed capital aggregated from firm-level data and electricity
consumption respectively.
For our measure of electricity consumption at the 4-digit level, energy intensity at the 4-digit
level is then defined as electricity consumption at the 4-digit level over total industrial output
aggregated from firm-level data.
EI4−digit,t =
EC4−digit,t
Y4−digit,t
=
FA4−digit,t ×EC2−digit,t
FA2−digit,t ×Y4−digit,t (3.2)
From our 4-digit energy intensity estimates, we can now identify the direction of switching
behaviour. A dummy variable Switch_HL is used to mark the switching behaviour from a
high EI industry to a low EI industry; Switch_LH signals switching the other way around.
Furthermore, we define the extent of the change in EI (or EI gap) as the absolute value of the
4The relationship of complementarity between energy and fixed capital has been analyzed extensively by
previous researchers. For example, the E-K complementarity is found for manufacturing sectors in U.S. (Berndt
and Wood, 1979), Canada (Fuss, 1977), Netherlands (Magnus, 1979), UK (Hunt, 1984) and New Zealand
(Patterson, 1996). Recent studies include Apergis and Payne (2009) Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009) Pablo-Romero
and Sánchez-Braza (2015), and Khayyat (2015) for a detailed literature review.
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EI difference between the current industry and the industry that a firm switches into. Hence,
for switchers, the EI gap is given by
EI gapispt = |EIisp,t −EIisp,t+1| (3.3)
For non-switchers, EI gap is
EI gapispt = 0 (3.4)
The dependent variable EI gap quantifies how large the energy intensity difference is between
the current industry and the next industry. This can be considered as a measure of the difficulty
a firm faces when switching its main product from the perspective of energy inputs.
3.3.2 Independent variables
Our main variable of interest is the energy price. We measure local industrial electricity
prices (IEP) at the province level. Due to data limitations, the time period for our industrial
electricity price dataset is relatively short and only covers the years 2005 to 2007. Hence,
other regional impact factors are assumed to be time invariant and proxied by province
specific dummies.
Since firms evaluate their decisions and adjust future expectations on the basis of current
production and capabilities (Newman et al., 2013), productivity plays a crucial role in
the decision making process of the firm. We employ two variables to represent the firm
productivity level, namely total factor productivity (T FP) using the LP method (Levinsohn
and Petrin, 2003) and the value added per worker (Labor productivity). We also include total
fixed assets per worker (KL ratio) as a measure of sunk costs of production. In a study of US
manufacturing firms from 1977 to 1997, Redding et al. (2006) find that within industries,
labour intensive plants are more likely to be affected by international trade exposure and hence
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switch production relative to capital intensive plants. Based on the Vietnam manufacturing
data, Newman et al. (2013) argue that the capital labour ratio plays a positive and significant
role for new firms making the entry decision, while it is neutral or even obstructive for the
decision to switch for incumbent firms.
Firm size and ownership structure are also considered important factors that may influence a
firm’s switching decision. Numerous studies have investigated the link between firm size
(Size) and growth (e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 1991; Hall, 1986; Blonigen and Tomlin,
2001) and most find a negative impact of firm size on productivity growth. Newman et al.
(2013) point out that large firms may find it difficult to retrain workers if they plan to switch
their industry of production. Based on U.S. manufacturing firms, Redding et al. (2006)
argue that young firms with small scale production have a higher tendency to drop products.
As for ownership structure, state owned firms are often considered to be less efficient and
less productive than private firms as the production decisions may be politically driven
(Groves et al., 1994; Jefferson and Rawski, 1994). In contrast, firms with significant foreign
investment are expected to have a better performance since foreign investment from more
advanced countries may allow advanced technologies as knowledge (Dunning, 1988; Carr
et al., 2001; Hu et al., 2005). Using the Chinese Industrial Census data, Li et al. (2001)
suggests that domestic firms benefit from the presence of foreign investment but also from
competition between foreign and local firms. To control for the influence of ownership
structure, we include the state-own capital share (SOE) and the share that is from foreign,
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan owners (FIE). As a robustness check, we also use ownership
dummies that are equal to one when the share of ownership exceeds 51%.
We also control for multi-product firms (MULT I), exports as a share of output (EXP) and
investment in research and development as a share of output (R&D). Multi-product firms are
able to reallocate resources more efficiently than their single-product competitors (Redding
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et al., 2006). In contrast, Goldberg et al. (2010) find that product churning is far less frequent
in developing countries such as India due in part to complex industrial regulations. Hence,
we separate single-product firms from multi-product firms. Bernard et al. (2006) indicates
that trade liberalization can enhance firms’ performance in terms of output per product and
the total number of products since surviving firms reallocate resources and drop their less
productive products as trade costs fall. Moreover, if firms export, they tend to export a
series of goods to multiple destinations, and hence, the U.S. export market is occupied by
a relatively small number of firms (Bernard et al., 2007). On the other hand, Arnold and
Hussinger (2005) argue that the causal linkage from exporting to productivity growth is not
always straight forward. Using German manufacturing firm data they find there is evidence
of self-selection where high productive firms choose to export. As for R&D expenses,
evidence shows that the induced technology transfer and innovation by R&D improve firms’
productivity and expand their production scale (Griffith et al., 2004; Minniti, 2006). Firms
with higher innovative capability could switch the production or produce more varieties
to adapt with customers’ preference and have a better chance of survival (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). As a robustness check we also use export
and R&D dummies that are equal to one if export or R&D expenditure is positive.
In addition to firm characteristics we also control for industry level controls that may
affect a firm’s switching decision. Our industrial controls are aggregated from firm-level
estimates of productivity, capital labour ratio, firm size, ownership structure, exports and
R&D expenditure. We also control for the firm concentration ratio (CR) and industrial energy
intensity (EI) to account for the degree of competition and the dependency on energy of an
industry respectively. The existing literature that studies the effect of market concentration
on firm survival tends to be inconclusive. For example, Audretsch (1991) found a positive
impact of market concentration on the short-run survival rates at the industry level and no
impact on the long-run scenario using U.S. manufacturing firms established in 1976. In
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contrast, Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) find limited evidence in a study of firm survival at
the establishment level and found a negative impact of market concentration.5
3.3.3 Model specifications
By including a range of firm-level and industry-level characteristics that may determine
whether a firm decides to switch from one 4-digit industry to another, our empirical specifi-
cation is given by:
Pr(Switchispt) =α+β1IEPpt +β2IEPpt ×EIst +Φ+Φ ′ (3.5)
+θs+δp+ηt + εispt
Φ = f
 Productivityispt ,KL ratioispt ,Sizeispt ,SOEispt
FIEispt ,EXPispt ,R&Dispt ,MULT Iispt
 (3.6)
Φ
′
= f
 ProductivityNst ,KL ratioNst ,SizeNst ,SOENst
FIENst ,EXP
N
st ,R&D
N
st ,CRst ,EIst
 (3.7)
The subscripts i, s, p, t represent firm, 4-digit industry, province and year respectively. Fixed
effects at the industry, province and year are given by θs, δp, ηt respectively. Firms located
in provinces with costly electricity are expected to be more likely to reallocate resources and
hence adjust their main goods of producing. Industries that are highly dependent on energy
resources are expected to be more sensitive to energy price changes. The impact of energy
prices is captured by the coefficient of IEPpt as well as the coefficient of the interaction term
between IEPpt and EIst .
5For more literature on market concentration, see Mata and Portugal (2002) and Geroski et al. (2010).
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The industry-level variables with superscript N capture the characteristics of industry s that
the firm switches out of. The industrial characteristics are calculated independently for each
firm i by excluding firm i’s information.6 CRst and EIst are simple averages at the 4-digit
industry level.
As discussed in the previous section, a potential concern is that the electricity price may
be endogenous due to two possible reasons. First, firms located in regions with relatively
high energy costs may make lower profits and hence, have incentives to move to different
sectors in order to enjoy preferential electricity prices. The electricity price faced by an
individual firm is then affected by the switching activity. Second, high energy costs may
hinder the profitability of local firms, resulting in a low GDP growth and tax contribution.
Local authorities then have a motive to lower the real electricity price through ways such
as short-term preferential prices, subsidies and tax refunds. As a result, if the observable
electricity prices are higher than the real electricity prices, then we may underestimate the
price effect of electricity on switching behaviour.
The potential for electricity prices to be affected by firm behaviour presents a challenge in
analyzing the causality between electricity costs and switching behaviour. As a result, the
endogeneity caused by both sources may induce a downward bias and underestimation of the
price effect. The endogeneity of the energy price is also mentioned by Abeberese (2012),
Ganapati et al. (2016) and Allcott et al. (2016). Abeberese (2012) interacts the coal price
and the thermal power generation capacity to create an instrument for India electricity prices.
Similarly, Ganapati et al. (2016) interact three types of fuel prices (coal, natural gas and
petroleum) and the shares of fuel used to generate electricity respectively as instruments
for U.S. state-level electricity prices. In their study of the impact of electricity shortages
on India manufacturing firms, Allcott et al. (2016) use the average state level shortage of
6Strictly speaking, the subscripts for ProductivityNst , KL ratio
N
st , Size
N
st , SOE
N
st , FIE
N
st ,EXP
N
st and R&D
N
st are
ispt since the algorithm varies for each individual firm. For the consistency of expression, we use the subscript
st for all industrial characteristics.
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hydroelectric power availability as an instrument. For China, a significant proportion of the
electricity generated comes from thermal power plants which use coal as the main source
of fuel. During our period, electricity generation from coal accounted for around 80% of
total electricity generation (World Bank, 2014). Although the coal price affects generation
costs to a large extent, the electricity sales price does not capture the frequent fluctuations in
coal prices because coal prices are market driven while electricity prices are highly regulated.
As a result, we use the interaction between coal production and thermal power generation
capacity as an instrument for provincial industrial electricity prices.
IVpt =Coal productionpt ×T hermal power generation capacitypt (3.8)
Capacitypt =
Electricity generation f rom coalpt
Electricity generation f rom all types o f f uelpt
(3.9)
As before subscripts p, t signify that variables at the provincial level in year t. The instrument
is expected to have a negative impact on energy prices. Definitions of our variables can be
found in Table B.1 in the appendix.
3.4 Data
In this section we provide a brief introduction to the two main dataset that we use in the paper.
The first is the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset classified by the Chinese Industrial
Classification (CIC) system. Complied and issued by NBSC, national economic activities
are broken down by industry. At the 2-digit level the manufacturing sector is coded from 13
to 43. The annual survey provides detailed performance variables such as industrial output,
export value, fixed assets and investments for all “above scale” industrial firms in China.7
7The scale defined for Chinese Industrial Enterprise Dataset indicates firms with annual sales no less than 5
million RMB until 2011 when the standard was raised to 20 million RMB.
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To clean the data we follow Brandt et al. (2012). First we link firms from annual surveys
with IDs and then match firms that might have changed their IDs as a result of restructuring,
merger or acquisition using other information such as firms’ name, legal person name, post
code, phone number etc. Then we drop observations where key variables are negative
and firm survival is less than two years between 2005 and 2007.8 Table 3.2 compares the
output aggregates at the 2-digit level between the enterprises dataset and the NBSC website.
Manufacture of tobacco (16) and Recycling and disposal of waste (43) are dropped because
of insufficient coverage and a relatively small total industrial output. After dropping outliers
following similar methods in Brandt et al. (2012) the result is a dataset with 261,786 firms
covering 28 2-digit manufacturing sectors. The energy intensity information at the 2-digit
level can be found in Table B.2 in the appendix.
[Table 3.2 about here]
Table 3.3 presents an overview of switching behaviour. On average approximately 2.7% of
firms change their main product per year.9 More switching happens from high EI industries
to low EI industries and the EI gap tends to be larger when the switching is from a high
EI industry to a low EI industry. Table 3.4 presents the results from a significant test that
shows that the mean of the EI gap of group "Switching to a low EI industry" is significantly
different to the mean for the group "Switching to a high EI industry".
[Table 3.3 about here]
[Table 3.4 about here]
8Key variables include industrial output, sales, value added, intermediate, employment,fixed capital, de-
preciation, the share that is state-owned, Foreign or from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, export and R&D
expenditure.
9Newman et al. (2013) finds a 6 to 35 percentage of switching for Vietnamese manufacturing firms between
2001 and 2008.
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The second dataset we use is the industrial electricity price dataset, released by the China
Price Information Center (CPIC) under NDRC. It provides the retail price for industrial
electricity of 35kV and above for 36 large and medium sized cities or province-equivalent
municipal cities.10 We use the average province price aggregated across the cities in that
province to represent the industrial electricity price level of that province. This allows us to
consider the role of the provincial government in energy pricing.11
Table B.3 in the appendix provides a brief description of province electricity prices and
the relationship between the industrial electricity price, thermal power generation capacity
and coal production for individual provinces. The average industrial electricity price is 627
yuan/MWH in 2005 prices. For our thermal power generation variable, we observe that
Shanghai, Tianjin and Shandong have the electricity fully powered by coal. Shanxi produces
on average 588 billion tons of coal and is the top producer in China. In Figure 3.1 we plot
the industrial electricity price which we represent geographically in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.1
shows that the average electricity price rose smoothly relatively between 2005 and 2012
including during our period 2005 to 2007. After 2009 there is evidence of greater price
dispersion across provinces. Figure 3.2 shows that the east and the southern areas of China
have generally higher electricity costs than the north and the west area. Figure 3.3 provides
an overview of the inverse relationship between IEP and our instrument. The validity of
instrument is checked later using post-regression tests. Finally, Table 3.5 provides summary
statistics for our control variables. A correlation matrix can be found in Table B.4 of the
appendix.
[Figure 3.1 about here]
10The 36 large and medium size cities comprise 31 province-equivalent municipalities or provincial capitals,
and 5 large non-capital cities including Qingdao (Shandong province), Ningbo (Zhejiang province), Dalian
(Liaoning province), Shenzhen (Guangdong province) and Xiamen (Fujian province).
11Electricity pricing in China is mainly controlled by NDRC and provincial governments. Province-level
officials set electricity prices taking account inflation, industrial support and social stability under the instruction
of NDRC. For more information about energy pricing in China, see Fredrich Kahrl (2011); US ITC (2007);
IEA and OECD (2006).
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[Figure 3.2 about here]
[Figure 3.3 about here]
[Table 3.5 about here]
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Preliminary investigation
If firms expect continuously rising energy prices they have an incentive to adjust production
to produce goods in industries that are less energy intensive. Our investigation of the impact
of electricity prices on switching using traditional estimation methods is presented in Table
3.6. The dependent variable is switching dummy that is of 1 if a firm switched to a different
main product at the 4-digit level. We include 4-digit industry fixed effects, province fixed
effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Column (1) in Table 3.6 presents the results including only IEP and fixed effects at different
levels on the right hand side.12 Firm-level characteristics and industry-level characteristics
are added in column (2) - (5). For robustness we employ two measures of productivity (TFP
and labour productivity) and two series of measurements for the ownership, exports and
R&D expenditure (share variables and dummies). The pooled OLS results show a statistically
significant and positive impact of IEP on firms’ switching probability. A 10% increase
12With the binary dependent variable, linear probability model (LPM) is not bounded with the unit interval
and it does not estimate the structural parameters of non-linear models. While since our interest lies on the
marginal effects rather than structural parameters and LPM often does a good job on marginal effect estimation
(Wooldridge, 2010, pp 563), we use LPM in the present study. Using a trimmed sample with log transformation
and cluster-robust standard errors we hope to ease the possible bias due to heteroscedasticity induced by LPM
to some extent(Horrace and Oaxaca, 2006). We replicate Table 3.6 using Probit method and the results are
presented in Table B.5. The parameters of variables of interest are highly significant and consistent across
different specifications.
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in electricity prices increases the probability of a firm switching by approximately 0.54%.
Results are highly consistent and statistically significant across different specifications. As
shown in Table B.3, the province with the highest annual industrial electricity price in our
sample is Guangdong (772.9 Yuan/MWh) and Inner Mongolia has the lowest price level
(444.4 Yuan/MWh). As a result, everything else equal, the switching probability of firms
located in Guangdong is approximately 9.4 percentage points higher than firms from Inner
Mongolia due to electricity cost differences.
Our results also show that the overall impact also depends on the current EI level of an
industry. The positive coefficient of the interaction term between IEP and EI shows that firms
from energy intensive industries are more likely to be affected by high energy costs and hence
are more likely to adjust their main product. For example, from Table B.2 we know that
Sector 33-Smelting and processing of non-ferrous metals has an EI that is around ten times
higher than Sector 40 which has the lowest EI. It implies that for two firms sharing similar
characteristics, located in the same province but operating in these two sectors respectively,
the probabilities of switching industries of these two firms differ by roughly 13%. It is
intuitive that in industries where energy costs are a large proportion of total costs, firms are
more sensitive to electricity price changes.
Turning to the other right hand side variables, the coefficients and significance levels are
relatively stable across different specifications. We consider further the firm-level charac-
teristics. Both of our productivity measures, total factor productivity and value added per
worker, significantly increase the probability of the switching. A 10% increase in productivity
increases the probability of switching by 0.024%. Our results are in line with Newman et al.
(2013) who argue that productivity is a critical factor for firms to consider staying with the
same product or switching, or even to exit the market, and show for Vietnam that firms
with 1% higher TFP tend to increase the switching probability by 0.021 percentage points
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during the eight years from 2001 to 2008. The capital labour ratio is found to have a negative
impact on switching and firm size shows a positive influence on the switching decision. One
implication is that switchers tend to be the large labour intensive firms in our sample which
is partly in line with Newman et al. (2013) who find that switchers tend to be small labour
intensive firms. Turing to the multi-product firms that account for nearly 30 percent of firms
in our sample, we find as expected that firms operating with multiple products are more likely
to switch their main production when facing the electricity price changes.13
Considering ownership we find that firms with a large share of state ownership are less likely
to switch products compared with mainly domestic firms. The probability of switching falls
by roughly 0.10 percentage points if there is a 10% increase in the share of state ownership.
A similar result has been found when we include a SOE dummy which is assigned as unit
value when state owned investment share is greater than 51%. On average a state owned
firm is less likely to switch their main product by approximately 0.88 to 0.89 percentage
points. For foreign ownership, Column (2) and column (3) show that on average a 10%
increase in foreign investment share and a 10% increase in exports as a share of total
output leads to an approximately 0.025 and 0.027 percentage point increase in the switching
probability, respectively. However, the FIE and export dummy variables are insignificant.14
Finally, although R&D expenditure is considered to be an important factor that affects firm
performance such as the entry and exit decisions (Klepper, 1996; Agarwal and Audretsch,
2001), we find no significant impact of R&D expenditure (share and dummy variables) on
the switching decision at individual firm level.
13In Chinese industrial firm dataset the 4-digit sector code is assigned based on the product which accounts
for the highest share of total revenue while no quantity or value information is provided for products other than
the main product. There are variables recording firm’s main product 1, main product 2 and main product 3.
However, the records are imported in Chinese without a uniform codebook (roughly at the 2 to 3 digit level).
The dummy variable MULTI is simply defined as dummy with unit value if the firm has multiple records in
product types.
14The inconsistency may be due to the less variation in our sample when both of the dependent and
independent variables are measured by dummy variables.
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We now turn to our industry controls. We find a negative coefficients on average industry
firm size shows that firms tend to stay in industries where the average firm size is large. A
possible explanation might be the high sunk costs of establishing market positions in these
industries. High sunk costs act as a barrier to exit as well as to entry, because these costs can
not be recovered if a firm decides to leave an industry (Eaton and Lipsey, 1980). It commits
the entrant to stay in the market and gradually invest more to experience higher expected
growth rates (Cabral, 1995; Cabral and Ross, 2008). For our ownership variables, we find
strong evidence that firms tend to switch out from industries with a high foreign presence.
Given the fact that at the individual level SOEs are less likely to switch, we conclude that
it is mainly private firms that are crowed out from industries with large share of foreign
ownerships.15 For exports, we observe that firms are less likely to switch out from strongly
export-oriented industries. Some evidence shows that firms have a higher tendency to switch
if they have a higher share of R&D expenditure over total output.17 Concentration ratio and
industrial EI levels have no effect.
[Table 3.6 about here]
3.5.2 Switching directions
In the previous section we find that the electricity price plays an significant role in affecting
firm’s switching decision. However, we have not considered the direction of the impact
although we assume that higher electricity prices promote firms to switch from producing
15Existing foreign presence can also prevents new foreign entrants (Mitchell et al., 1994; Shaver et al., 1997;
Mata and Portugal, 2002; Chang and Xu, 2008). For example, Mitchell et al. (1994) argues that both a low and
a high foreign market share are not suitable for new foreign entrants due to the lack of market information and
the increasing congestion effects.16 The phenomenon of crowding-out foreign investments has also been found
among Chinese manufacturing firms (Chang and Xu, 2008).
17The inconsistency of the significance on R&D share and dummy variables may be due to the large amount
of zero values of R&D expenditure in out dataset. We generally consider R&D expenditure has insignificant
effect on firms’ switching behaviour.
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high EI goods to low EI goods. Table 3.7 and 3.8 presents the results on switching directions
using the traditional method. The dependent variable Switch_HL in Table 3.7 is a dummy
that equals to one when a firm switches into a less energy intensive industry, and zero for
non-switchers. Correspondingly, the dependent variable Switch_LH in Table 3.8 captures
the switching behaviour from a less energy intensive industry to a more energy intensive
industry.
The positive and significant coefficients of IEP in Table 3.7 confirm our prediction that higher
electricity costs drive firms away from producing energy intensive goods. Firms located
in provinces with high IEP are more likely to switch to a less energy intensive industry
everything else equal. The coefficient on IEP ranges from 0.074 to 0.075, which suggests that
with a 10% electricity price increase the probability of firm switching their main product into
a less energy intensive industry rises by approximately 0.74%. The insignificant interaction
term between IEP and EI shows that there is no additional incentive for firms in energy
intensive industries to switch out merely because of high electricity costs.
Table 3.8 presents the results for switching to a more energy intensive industry. The results
show that firms are more likely to switch to a high EI industry if they experience a high
electricity price. The positive and significant coefficients on IEP suggest that with a 10%
increase in IEP the probability that a firm switches to a more energy intensive industry rises
by about 0.85% to 0.92%. This is against our priors that firms located in provinces with
costly electricity should be less likely to drop their current main products and switch into
productions that rely heavily on electricity instead. The abnormal coefficients on IEP in Table
3.8 suggest that there might be a severe misspecification. We consider the observable IEP is
inappropriate for the evaluation of price effects. The misspecification bias occurs due to the
ignorance of unobservable government impacts using the traditional estimation method. The
investigation in the next section shows that the intervention from local authorities distorts the
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price impact by hindering firms’ incentive to switch to a low EI industry and encouraging
firms to stay in a high EI industry.
In terms of other controls, we generally find consistent results comparing to those in Table 3.6
in the previous section. Our results show that large multi-product firms with high productivity
are more likely to switch to both a more and less energy intensive industries. SOEs are
generally less likely to switch their main products in both cases. However, we do find some
differences in the determinants of switching behaviour. For example, firms that switch to a
low EI industry tend to be more productive than the average. Negative coefficients on KL
ratio in Table 3.7 suggest that labour intensive firms are more likely to switch to a low EI
industry. In other words, capital intensive firms are more likely to stay within producing
energy intensive goods. A possible explanation could be the corresponding competitive
advantage of capital intensive firms in energy intensive industries (Cole and Elliott, 2003;
Cole et al., 2005). On the contrary, exporters are more likely to switch to low EI industry
everything else equal. These features do not stand up for switching behaviour to a more
energy intensive industry in Table 3.8.18 As for the industry-level characteristics, some
evidence suggests that firms operating in a industry with large foreign ownership share are
more likely to switch to an energy intensive industry which corresponds to our previous
findings in Table 3.6.
[Table 3.7 about here]
[Table 3.8 about here]
18The share of R&D expenditure over total output shows a negative and significant impact on switching
to a less energy intensive industry. However, R&D dummy indicates a insignificant effect. As we mentioned
this may be due to a large amount of zero value of R&D expenditure in our sample and we consider R&D
expenditure has insignificant effect in general.
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3.5.3 The endogenous electricity price in China
As we have discussed previously, provincial energy prices may be endogenous due to the
policy-oriented pricing scheme in China. Hence, an instrument is employed to address the
potential endogeneity issue, namely the interaction term of provincial coal production and
thermal power generation capacity. Thermal power generation capacity is not expected to
have a direct impact on the decision of local firms other than the link to electricity; the
amount of coal production is determined by geographical factors and as a consequence, no
immediate influence on firms production is expected.
We use the under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) and the weak-identification
test (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic) to test for the validity of our instrument. With null
hypothesis that the matrix is not full column rank, a rejection of the null indicates that the
model is identified. The null hypothesis for weak-identification test is that the instrument
is only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable and a large F statistic that exceeds
the Stock-Yogo critical values eliminates the weak identification concern.19 The rejection
of the under-identification test and weak-identification test suggest that our instrument is
valid. Coal production and thermal power generation capacity jointly play a significant role
in determining regional electricity prices. In the meanwhile they are exogenous from regional
firms’ decision about switching.
Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 present the 2 stage least square (2SLS) results for switching to
a less and a more energy intensive industry respectively. The coefficients on IEP remains
highly significant at the 1% level for both switching directions. However, comparing with the
OLS results, the 2SLS coefficients on IEP rises substantially for switching to a less energy
intensive industry, and show an opposite impact on switching to a more energy intensive
19The Stock-Yogo critical values for F statistics calculated after each 2SLS regression are available upon
request. The F statistic in all specifications in our study pass the weak-identification test.
3.5 Empirical Results 86
industry. The instrumented coefficients suggest that a 10% increase in IEP leads to a 2.34%
to 2.42% increase in the probability of switching to a less energy intensive industry, and
a 2.12% to 2.24% fall of the probability of switching to a more energy intensive industry
everything else equal. Furthermore, the negative and significant coefficients on the interaction
term in Table 3.10 suggest that the dampening effect of IEP rises as the firm’s initial EI level
increases.
The comparison between results under OLS estimation and IV estimation shows that the
endogeneity on electricity prices has not only lowered the incentive of firms to switch to
less energy intensive industries, but also distorted the restrictive effect of IEP on stopping
firms from switching to more energy intensive industries. The reversed sign of coefficients of
the electricity price indicates the severe misspecification of OLS estimation and emphasizes
the unobservable government impacts on regional electricity prices. Our finding together
with previous literature shows that it turns out the local energy intensive industries are
protected by governments’ preferential energy prices and other supportive policies such as
subsidies. IEP has become a political tool for local authorities to promote the development
of energy intensive industries. The preferential electricity price and negotiated price were
prevalent across provinces during the period of our study. Although NDRC instituted policies
to increase electricity prices charged for energy intensive industries in 2004, significant
resistance by local authorities to implementing these surcharges has implied a general failure
of these initial attempts. Provincial and local officials maintained a strong incentive in
providing reduced utility fees to heavy industries operating within their localities because of
the jobs, tax revenues and personal payoffs provided by these firms (US ITC, 2007; IEA and
OECD, 2006; Zhang, 2011).
As for the firm-level characteristics in Table 3.9 and 3.10, the parameters are highly consistent
with the OLS estimation in Table 3.7 and 3.8 in terms of both statistical significance and
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magnitude. Switchers tend to be large, productive firms with a low capital-labour ratio (for
firms switching to a less energy intensive industry) other conditions equal. SOE firms are
also found to be less likely to switch their main product. Some evidence shows that firms
with a high share of exports over total output are more flexible and tend to switch to a less
energy intensive industry. R&D expenditure shows insignificant effect in general.
Comparing industrial characteristics, coefficients that are significant in Table 3.7 and 3.8
remains statistically significant with our IV estimations. Firms operating in energy intensive
industries with large competitors are less likely to switch out generally to both directions. In
terms of ownership structure, industries with a large share of state-owned ownership are less
likely to have firms switching to a low EI industry but more likely to have firms switching
to a high EI industry. This may be due to the fact that most of the key energy-related heavy
industries are state-owned. Firms that compete in industries with large share of foreign
ownerships are also more likely to switch to a energy intensive industry. R&D expenditure is
generally insignificant and the concentration ratio measured by the top 5% firms’ output over
total industrial output is insignificant in any specification.
[Table 3.9 about here]
[Table 3.10 about here]
3.5.4 Robustness checks
To provide reliable evidence of the price effect, we conduct two series of estimations for
robustness check. First, we examine the relationship between IEP and the extent of the
change in EI that firms switch across. The dependent variable is the EI gap defined in Section
3.3.1 – the absolute electricity intensity difference between the present industry and the aimed
industry for switchers, and zero for non-switchers. This can be considered as a measure of
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the difficulty a firm faces when switching its main product. Table 3.11 and 3.12 presents
the results on EI gap using OLS and 2SLS methods respectively. For simplicity’s sake, we
keep the results using ownership dummies in this section. For simplicity’s sake, we use
dummy variables only instead of both share and dummies to represent the ownership structure.
The first three regressions in Column (1) to (3) include switchers to low EI industries and
and non-switchers; the remaining three columns cover switchers to high EI industries and
non-switchers.
The results are highly consistent with those using Switch_HL and Switch_LH as dependent
variables under OLS and 2SLS estimations respectively. The price effects are positive and
significant for promoting switching to a low EI industries. The coefficients on IEP with
our 2SLS estimation in column (2) and (3) of Table 3.12 are nearly three times higher than
those under OLS estimation. In our preferred method (Column (2) and (3) of Table 3.12), a
10% IEP increase leads to a 11.03% to 11.05% increase in the EI gap that a firm switches
across to a low EI industry. As for switching to a more energy intensive industry, as indicted
previously, OLS estimation and IV estimation reveal contrasting price impacts. With our
2SLS estimation in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.12, a 10% increase in IEP means that the
EI gap to a high EI industry pulls by approximately 17.77%. The results of other controls
also match those observed in earlier estimations.
[Table 3.11 about here]
[Table 3.12 about here]
The second series of robustness checks is based on a smaller sample that excludes all SOEs
and the top 10% largest firms. Table 3.13 and 3.14 present the results on switching directions
with the subsample using OLS and 2SLS methods respectively. These results again are highly
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consistent with previous findings. Overall, our confirm the association between IEP and
firms’ switching behaviour, and further support our idea of endogenous electricity prices.
[Table 3.13 about here]
[Table 3.14 about here]
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate how energy prices affect manufacturing firms’ behavior in
Chinese provinces between 2005 and 2007. Specifically, we test the impact of industrial
electricity price on firms’ production choice under exogenous energy prices variability. By
considering the potential endogeneity arising from the policy-oriented pricing regime in
China, our results suggest that industrial electricity prices act as an effective intervention that
could be used to promote the shifting of the industrial structure towards a energy efficient
structure.
Evidence shows that the more expensive energy not only provides a strong incentive for
firms to switch into less energy intensive industries, but also prevents firms from switching
into more energy intensive industries. A 10% electricity price increase is found to increase
the probability of switching to a less energy intensive industry by approximately 2.34% to
2.42%, and reduce the probability of switching to a more energy intensive industry by 2.12%
to 2.24%. The prevention effect also strongly depends on a firm’s current energy intensity
level. The higher the current energy intensity is, the less likely that a firm in a province with
costly electricity will switch to a even more energy intensive industry. The price effect is
statistically significant and robust under different specifications
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A number of firm characteristics and industrial characteristics are also shown to have sig-
nificant impacts on firms’ switching decision. Our results suggest that switchers tend to be
large and more productive firms. SOE firms are generally less likely to switch their main
product. Labour intensive firms and exporters tend to switch out to seek opportunities in less
energy intensive industries. At the industry level, firms operating in industries with large
competitors are less likely to switch generally, while firms in industries with large shares of
state-owned and foreign ownerships are more likely to switch into high EI industries.
An important finding is the evidence of the preferential electricity price used by provincial
and local authorities to support their jurisdictional energy intensive industries. By comparing
results from OLS estimation with 2SLS estimation, the prevention effect of costly energy
has been reversed as a result of endogenous linkage between firm performance and energy
prices. This finding suggests that an ignorance of the local protectionism and the conflict of
interest between the central and local authorities in China could lead to a biased evaluation
of national-wide policies.
Furthermore, in the period of our study most of our provinces experienced a steady price
increase. Over time the IEP of the majority of provinces continues an upward trend and
the price difference between them has become smaller. Nevertheless, the price difference
between province at the bottom and the majority has actually become larger as shown in
Figure 3.1, especially in the recent years. As a result, there is a larger price variation across
Chinese provinces. North and west provinces such as Inner Mongolia and Shanxi actually
experienced price falls comparing to the south and eastern regions. Given the price impact on
the industrial structure, it may cause energy intensive industries to shift from the south-east
to the north-west. In fact, the westward movement of energy intensive firms in China has
been found in the work of Wu et al. (2017).
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Finally, the ongoing energy market reform aims at fostering competition in energy sectors
and a decreasing of energy prices is expected throughout the country. Take the recent
electricity transmission and distribution pricing reform as an example. The reform, first
rolled out in Shenzhen in 2014, aimed at taking the monopoly power from grid companies
and allowing room for the market to decide prices on both generation and consumption sides.
Lower electricity prices may lead to an increasing of energy consumption which offsets the
efficiency improvement and make it more challenging of improving energy efficiency. Along
with energy pricing reforms, supplementary policies on promoting energy diversification
and investment in energy-saving technology shall be further strengthened. Due to the
high generation costs the market share of renewable energy is limited. Once the negative
externality of fossil energy is internalized properly, unconventional energy is expected to play
a more important role in China’s energy market. Accelerating the replacement of laggard
production equipment and encouraging innovation is another important way to bolster energy
efficiency and control environmental pollution. Rebalancing the economy towards a less
energy-hungry growth mode are effective means to curb pollution and to control carbon
emissions that cause global warming.
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Figures and tables
Fig. 3.1 Industrial electricity price trend in China (2005-2012)
Fig. 3.2 Annual average electricity price in China (2005-2007)
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Fig. 3.3 Industrial electricity price and the instrument (2005-2007)
Table 3.1 Definition of switching behaviour
Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007
Edible vegetable oil processing Edible vegetable oil processing Non-edible vegetable oil processing
(CIC 1311) Switch = 0 (CIC 1311) Switch = 1 (CIC 1312) Switch = .
Edible vegetable oil processing Non-edible vegetable oil processing Non-edible vegetable oil processing
(CIC 1311) Switch = 1 (CIC 1312) Switch = . (CIC 1312) Switch = .
Edible vegetable oil processing Edible vegetable oil processing Edible vegetable oil processing
(CIC 1311) Switch = 0 (CIC 1311) Switch = 0 (CIC 1311) Switch = 0
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Table 3.2 Sectoral output comparison from different data sources
CIC2 Sector output Aggregated output Percentage CIC2 Sector output Aggregated output Percentage
from NBSC from firm level from NBSC from firm level
13 13695 12538 91.55 28 3312 3173 95.83
14 4855 4512 92.94 29 2797 2659 95.07
15 4024 3786 94.09 30 6523 6047 92.7
16 3277 2497 76.19 31 12159 11198 92.1
17 15573 14692 94.34 32 26859 25338 94.34
18 6245 5846 93.61 33 12969 11738 90.51
19 4255 4016 94.38 34 8844 8207 92.79
20 2592 2347 90.52 35 14254 13466 94.47
21 1912 1760 92.06 36 8210 7613 92.72
22 5174 4851 93.76 37 21082 19761 93.73
23 1756 1643 93.57 39 18695 17628 94.29
24 1780 1689 94.9 40 33099 31547 95.31
25 15000 9732 64.88 41 3543 3392 95.76
26 21202 19395 91.47 42 2652 2454 92.53
27 5210 4953 95.05 43 464.6 412.6 88.8
a 2005-2007 annual average. 16-Manufacture of tobacco and 43-Recycling and disposal of waste are dropped because
of insufficient coverage and relatively small total industrial output.
Table 3.3 Summary of switching behaviour (2005-2007)
2005 2006 Total
Number of firms 258,260 240,757 261,786
Switchers 6,775 6,648 13,175
Percentage of all firms (%) 2.62 2.76 5.03
Numbers of firms Mean of EI gap
Switching to a low EI industry 6,870 409
Switching to a high EI industry 6,305 293
Note: EI gap unit Kwh/10000 yuan.
Table 3.4 Linear restriction test of equal EI gap
EI gap Coef. Std. Err. t p > |t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Switching to a low EI industry 0.041 0.001 75.311 0 0.04 0.042
Switching to a high EI industry 0.029 0.001 46.808 0 0.028 0.031
H0 : β1−β2 = 0
F(1,11889) =198.72
Prob > F =0.0000
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Table 3.5 Summary statistics (2005-2007)
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
IEP 457,022 680.12 68.53 431.67 790.56
Coal production 457,022 5,018.65 7,601.51 0.00 58,141.91
Capacity 457,022 0.84 0.17 0.36 1.00
TFP 457,022 6.54 1.00 2.00 11.53
Labour productivity 457,022 99.46 122.60 4.63 1,031.82
KL ratio 457,022 78.68 108.56 0.70 1,002.06
Size 457,022 16,797.92 61,382.54 8.00 3,125,911.00
SOE share 457,022 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
FIE share 457,022 0.17 0.35 0.00 1.00
EXP share 457,022 0.18 0.35 0.00 1.00
R&D share 457,022 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.77
SOE dummy 457,022 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
FIE dummy 457,022 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
EXP dummy 457,022 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
R&D dummy 457,022 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
CR 457,022 0.38 0.07 0.09 0.94
EI 457,022 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.46
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Table 3.6 Effect of industrial electricity price on switching (Pooled OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Switch Switch Switch Switch Switch
Log(IEP) 0.0640*** 0.0529*** 0.0530*** 0.0544*** 0.0544***
(0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120)
Log(IEP) × EI 0.1300** 0.1304** 0.1266** 0.1270**
(0.0571) (0.0571) (0.0571) (0.0571)
Firm-level controls
TFP 0.0024*** 0.0024***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0023*** 0.0023***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Log(KL ratio) -0.0009 -0.0028*** -0.0011** -0.0030***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Log(Size) 0.0020*** 0.0035*** 0.0022*** 0.0037***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Multi 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0068***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
SOE share -0.0097*** -0.0098***
(0.0021) (0.0021)
FIE share 0.0025** 0.0025**
(0.0012) (0.0012)
EXP share 0.0027** 0.0027**
(0.0012) (0.0012)
R&D share -0.0052 -0.0053
(0.0064) (0.0064)
SOE dummy -0.0088*** -0.0089***
(0.0020) (0.0020)
FIE dummy 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0011) (0.0011)
EXP dummy 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0009) (0.0009)
R&D dummy 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Industry-level controls
TFPN 0.0132 0.0116
(0.0094) (0.0094)
Log(Labour productivity)N 0.0129 0.0122
(0.0097) (0.0097)
Log(KL ratio)N 0.0254 0.0149 0.0153 0.0058
(0.0140) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0145)
Log(Size)N -0.0644*** -0.0557*** -0.0568*** -0.0489***
(0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0128)
SOE shareN -0.0925 -0.0944
(0.0625) (0.0624)
FIE shareN 0.1728*** 0.1727***
(0.0448) (0.0448)
EXP shareN -0.1178*** -0.1186***
(0.0302) (0.0302)
R&D shareN 0.5592*** 0.5527***
(0.1622) (0.1618)
SOE dummyN -0.0561 -0.0580
(0.0579) (0.0578)
FIE dummyN 0.1638*** 0.1635***
(0.0394) (0.0394)
EXP dummyN -0.0962*** -0.0967***
(0.0235) (0.0234)
R&D dummyN -0.0048 -0.0046
(0.0202) (0.0202)
CR -0.0177 -0.0179 -0.0190 -0.0192
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0147)
EI -0.6341 -0.6373 -0.6083 -0.6104
(0.3667) (0.3669) (0.3664) (0.3666)
Constant -0.4067*** -0.0305 -0.0327 -0.0369 -0.0431
(0.0756) (0.1166) (0.1194) (0.1169) (0.1196)
Observations 457,022 451,198 451,198 451,198 451,198
Adjusted R-squared 0.0291 0.0308 0.0307 0.0307 0.0307
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of clusters 256,053 255,832 255,832 255,832 255,832
Note: Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at **5%, ***1%.
All monetary values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and 4-digit industry
dummies are included in all specifications.
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Table 3.7 Effect of industrial electricity price on switching to a less energy intensive industry
(Pooled OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_HL
Log(IEP) 0.0737*** 0.0746*** 0.0745*** 0.0740*** 0.0739***
(0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0172)
Log(IEP) × EI 0.0049 0.0051 0.0038 0.0041
(0.0546) (0.0546) (0.0544) (0.0544)
Firm-level controls
TFP 0.0005** 0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(KL ratio) -0.0012*** -0.0016*** -0.0013*** -0.0016***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Log(Size) 0.0011*** 0.0014*** 0.0010*** 0.0014***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Multi 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0030*** 0.0030***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
SOE share -0.0029** -0.0029**
(0.0012) (0.0012)
FIE share 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0007)
EXP share 0.0023*** 0.0023***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
R&D share -0.0092*** -0.0093***
(0.0032) (0.0032)
SOE dummy -0.0028** -0.0029**
(0.0012) (0.0012)
FIE dummy -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0006)
EXP dummy 0.0013** 0.0013**
(0.0006) (0.0006)
R&D dummy 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Industry-level controls
TFPN -0.0022 -0.0038
(0.0121) (0.0119)
Log(Labour productivity)N -0.0022 -0.0032
(0.0124) (0.0123)
Log(KL ratio)N 0.0079 0.0097 0.0012 0.0040
(0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0182) (0.0180)
Log(Size)N -0.0272 -0.0286 -0.0209 -0.0232
(0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0153)
SOE shareN -0.1289 -0.1286
(0.0766) (0.0765)
FIE shareN -0.0540 -0.0540
(0.0459) (0.0459)
EXP shareN -0.0158 -0.0157
(0.0328) (0.0327)
R&D shareN 0.3531** 0.3538**
(0.1665) (0.1656)
SOE dummyN -0.1003 -0.0998
(0.0711) (0.0710)
FIE dummyN -0.0307 -0.0307
(0.0401) (0.0401)
EXP dummyN -0.0321 -0.0321
(0.0277) (0.0277)
R&D dummyN -0.0150 -0.0150
(0.0222) (0.0222)
CR 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.0020
(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0167)
EI 0.0321 0.0322 0.0340 0.0347
(0.0653) (0.0653) (0.0646) (0.0645)
Constant 0.0299*** 0.2318** 0.2326** 0.2246** 0.2231**
(0.0083) (0.1065) (0.1121) (0.1051) (0.1106)
Observations 457,022 451,198 451,198 451,198 451,198
Adjusted R-squared 0.0158 0.0167 0.0167 0.0166 0.0166
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of clusters 9,325 9,249 9,249 9,249 9,249
Note: Standard errors clustered at province-industry level are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at
**5%, ***1%. All monetary values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and
4-digit industry dummies are included in all specifications.
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Table 3.8 Effect of industrial electricity price on switching to a more energy intensive industry
(Pooled OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Switch_LH Switch_LH Switch_LH Switch_LH Switch_LH
Log(IEP) 0.0917*** 0.0854*** 0.0854*** 0.0867*** 0.0867***
(0.0183) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193)
Log(IEP) × EI 0.0850*** 0.0851*** 0.0861*** 0.0862***
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0316) (0.0316)
Firm-level controls
TFP 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(KL ratio) 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Log(Size) 0.0008*** 0.0011*** 0.0009*** 0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Multi 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0024***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
SOE share -0.0040*** -0.0040***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
FIE share 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0007) (0.0007)
EXP share -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0008)
R&D share 0.0010 0.0009
(0.0038) (0.0038)
SOE dummy -0.0031*** -0.0031***
(0.0010) (0.0010)
FIE dummy 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006)
EXP dummy -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0006)
R&D dummy -0.0008 -0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Industry-level controls
TFPN 0.0033 0.0032
(0.0113) (0.0113)
Log(Labour productivity)N 0.0047 0.0049
(0.0120) (0.0120)
Log(KL ratio)N 0.0080 0.0048 0.0047 0.0014
(0.0166) (0.0178) (0.0173) (0.0189)
Log(Size)N -0.0284** -0.0259 -0.0241 -0.0215
(0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0147)
SOE shareN 0.0914 0.0909
(0.0574) (0.0573)
FIE shareN 0.1215** 0.1211**
(0.0477) (0.0478)
EXP shareN 0.0072 0.0070
(0.0429) (0.0428)
R&D shareN 0.0623 0.0619
(0.1636) (0.1638)
SOE dummyN 0.0783 0.0779
(0.0524) (0.0524)
FIE dummyN 0.1018** 0.1015**
(0.0408) (0.0408)
EXP dummyN -0.0007 -0.0010
(0.0270) (0.0270)
R&D dummyN -0.0189 -0.0188
(0.0263) (0.0263)
CR -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0023
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158)
EI 0.0363 0.0383 0.0396 0.0419
(0.0443) (0.0451) (0.0450) (0.0459)
Constant 0.0446*** 0.1972** 0.1888** 0.1820** 0.1723
(0.0090) (0.0909) (0.0952) (0.0925) (0.0971)
Observations 457,022 451,198 451,198 451,198 451,198
Adjusted R-squared 0.0140 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of clusters 9,325 9,249 9,249 9,249 9,249
Note: Standard errors clustered at province-industry level are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at
**5%, ***1%. All monetary values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and
4-digit industry dummies are included in all specifications.
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Table 3.9 Effect of industrial electricity price on switching to a less energy intensive industry
(2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_HL
Log(IEP) 0.1415 0.2344*** 0.2341*** 0.2422*** 0.2419***
(0.0740) (0.0790) (0.0790) (0.0803) (0.0802)
Log(IEP) × EI -0.2121 -0.2121 -0.2171 -0.2170
(0.1464) (0.1464) (0.1462) (0.1462)
Firm-level controls
TFP 0.0005** 0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0005** 0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(KL ratio) -0.0012*** -0.0016*** -0.0012*** -0.0016***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Log(Size) 0.0010*** 0.0014*** 0.0010*** 0.0014***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Multi 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0030***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
SOE share -0.0028** -0.0029**
(0.0012) (0.0012)
FIE share 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0006)
EXP share 0.0022*** 0.0022***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
R&D share -0.0094*** -0.0094***
(0.0032) (0.0032)
SOE dummy -0.0028** -0.0028**
(0.0011) (0.0011)
FIE dummy -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006)
EXP dummy 0.0013** 0.0013**
(0.0005) (0.0005)
R&D dummy 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Industry-level controls
TFPN -0.0034 -0.0052
(0.0079) (0.0078)
Log(Labour productivity)N -0.0027 -0.0039
(0.0082) (0.0081)
Log(KL ratio)N 0.0046 0.0070 -0.0033 0.0003
(0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0128)
Log(Size)N -0.0231** -0.0252** -0.0157 -0.0188
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0112)
SOE shareN -0.1450*** -0.1446***
(0.0558) (0.0557)
FIE shareN -0.0684 -0.0685
(0.0377) (0.0377)
EXP shareN -0.0076 -0.0075
(0.0253) (0.0253)
R&D shareN 0.3827** 0.3843***
(0.1487) (0.1482)
SOE dummyN -0.1152** -0.1144**
(0.0529) (0.0528)
FIE dummyN -0.0372 -0.0372
(0.0324) (0.0324)
EXP dummyN -0.0317 -0.0317
(0.0201) (0.0201)
R&D dummyN -0.0180 -0.0181
(0.0174) (0.0174)
CR -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127)
EI -0.0857 -0.0849 -0.0865 -0.0849
(0.0897) (0.0894) (0.0895) (0.0893)
Constant 0.0616 0.2973*** 0.2951*** 0.2920*** 0.2872***
(0.0347) (0.0756) (0.0783) (0.0756) (0.0782)
Observations 457,022 451,198 451,198 451,198 451,198
Adjusted R-squared 0.0157 0.0162 0.0162 0.0161 0.0161
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Weakidentification (F statistic) 8,757 4,383 4,393 4,239 4,247
No. of clusters 256,053 255,832 255,832 255,832 255,832
Note: Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at **5%, ***1%.
All monetary values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and 4-digit indus-
try dummies are included in all specifications. Instrument tests include the under-identification test
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) and weak-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic). The
null hypothesis is that the matrix is not full column rank, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is
identified. Null hypothesis for weak-identification test shows that the excluded instruments are correlated
with the endogenous regressor but only weakly. Large F statistic that exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical
values eliminates the weak identification concern.
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Table 3.10 Effect of industrial electricity price on switching to a more energy intensive
industry (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Switch_LH Switch_LH Switch_LH Switch_LH Switch_LH
Log(IEP) -0.2782*** -0.2235*** -0.2239*** -0.2117*** -0.2122***
(0.0720) (0.0732) (0.0731) (0.0744) (0.0743)
Log(IEP) × EI -0.2414*** -0.2413*** -0.2393*** -0.2391***
(0.0822) (0.0822) (0.0820) (0.0820)
Firm-level controls
TFP 0.0004 0.0004**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(KL ratio) 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Log(Size) 0.0007*** 0.0010*** 0.0008*** 0.0011***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Multi 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0024***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
SOE share -0.0040*** -0.0041***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
FIE share 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0006)
EXP share -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0006)
R&D share 0.0017 0.0017
(0.0037) (0.0037)
SOE dummy -0.0032*** -0.0032***
(0.0010) (0.0010)
FIE dummy 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006)
EXP dummy -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0005)
R&D dummy -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Industry-level controls
TFPN 0.0040 0.0043
(0.0078) (0.0078)
Log(Labour productivity)N 0.0048 0.0053
(0.0079) (0.0080)
Log(KL ratio)N 0.0191 0.0156 0.0168 0.0129
(0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0114)
Log(Size)N -0.0383*** -0.0355*** -0.0352*** -0.0321***
(0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0101)
SOE shareN 0.1128** 0.1122**
(0.0456) (0.0456)
FIE shareN 0.1586*** 0.1584***
(0.0375) (0.0375)
EXP shareN -0.0105 -0.0108
(0.0260) (0.0260)
R&D shareN 0.0313 0.0301
(0.1220) (0.1220)
SOE dummyN 0.0965** 0.0960**
(0.0423) (0.0422)
FIE dummyN 0.1195*** 0.1193***
(0.0322) (0.0322)
EXP dummyN -0.0050 -0.0052
(0.0186) (0.0186)
R&D dummyN -0.0089 -0.0088
(0.0165) (0.0165)
CR -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122)
EI -0.1162** -0.1151** -0.1142** -0.1127**
(0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0478) (0.0478)
Constant -0.1287*** 0.0798 0.0744 0.0717 0.0648
(0.0338) (0.0731) (0.0747) (0.0736) (0.0749)
Observations 457,022 451,198 451,198 451,198 451,198
Adjusted R-squared 0.0116 0.0128 0.0128 0.0129 0.0129
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Weakidentification (F statistic) 8,757 4,383 4,393 4,239 4,247
No. of clusters 256,053 255,832 255,832 255,832 255,832
Note: Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at **5%, ***1%.
All monetary values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and 4-digit indus-
try dummies are included in all specifications. Instrument tests include the under-identification test
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) and weak-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic). The
null hypothesis is that the matrix is not full column rank, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is
identified. Null hypothesis for weak-identification test shows that the excluded instruments are correlated
with the endogenous regressor but only weakly. Large F statistic that exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical
values eliminates the weak identification concern.
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Table 3.11 Effect of industrial electricity price on EI gap (Pooled OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Switch to a less energy intensive industry Switch to a more energy intensive industry
Log(IEP) 0.4245*** 0.4048*** 0.4040*** 0.3456*** 0.3433*** 0.3435***
(0.0622) (0.0636) (0.0636) (0.0470) (0.0482) (0.0482)
Log(IEP) × EI 0.1199 0.1226 0.1959** 0.1959**
(0.2689) (0.2689) (0.0947) (0.0947)
Industry-level controls
TFP 0.0048*** 0.0027**
(0.0014) (0.0011)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0042*** 0.0026**
(0.0014) (0.0011)
Log(KL ratio) -0.0049*** -0.0085*** 0.0038*** 0.0017
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Log(Size) 0.0034** 0.0064*** 0.0036*** 0.0053***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Multi 0.0171*** 0.0171*** 0.0105*** 0.0105***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0020)
SOE dummy -0.0126 -0.0128 -0.0125** -0.0125**
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0050) (0.0050)
FIE dummy 0.0025 0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0025
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0026)
EXP dummy 0.0061** 0.0061** -0.0032 -0.0032
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0023)
R&D dummy -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0028
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Industry-level controls
TFPN -0.0416 0.0241
(0.0454) (0.0392)
Log(Labour productivity)N -0.0360 0.0234
(0.0480) (0.0399)
Log(KL ratio)N 0.0682 0.0989 -0.0440 -0.0629
(0.0734) (0.0760) (0.0537) (0.0540)
Log(Size)N -0.1819*** -0.2077*** -0.0492 -0.0335
(0.0673) (0.0681) (0.0470) (0.0479)
SOE dummyN -0.6778** -0.6719** 0.4804** 0.4766**
(0.3178) (0.3171) (0.1961) (0.1961)
FIE dummyN -0.0156 -0.0155 0.3016 0.3012
(0.1769) (0.1770) (0.1591) (0.1590)
EXP dummyN -0.1803 -0.1796 -0.0192 -0.0199
(0.1172) (0.1170) (0.0907) (0.0907)
R&D dummyN 0.0171 0.0167 -0.1587** -0.1584**
(0.1015) (0.1015) (0.0780) (0.0780)
CR -0.0823 -0.0815 0.0283 0.0279
(0.0736) (0.0736) (0.0600) (0.0599)
EI 0.4740 0.4628 -1.7003*** -1.7011***
(1.7312) (1.7324) (0.6183) (0.6193)
Constant -2.7511*** -1.1421 -1.1532 -2.2235*** -1.8538*** -1.8584***
(0.4004) (0.6061) (0.6236) (0.3031) (0.4713) (0.4796)
Observations 451,876 446,052 446,052 449,133 443,309 443,309
Adjusted R-squared 0.0194 0.0204 0.0204 0.0120 0.0129 0.0129
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of clusters 255,266 252,990 252,990 254,889 251,120 251,120
Note: Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at **5%, ***1%. All monetary
values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and 4-digit industry dummies are included in all
specifications.
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Table 3.12 Effect of industrial electricity price on EI gap (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Switch to a less energy intensive industry Switch to a more energy intensive industry
Log(IEP) 0.5924 1.1054** 1.1028** -1.5561*** -1.1770*** -1.1771***
(0.4266) (0.4304) (0.4806) (0.3329) (0.3471) (0.3467)
Log(IEP) × EI -0.9216 -0.9205 -1.1993*** -1.1987***
(1.0577) (1.0577) (0.4056) (0.4056)
Firm-level controls
TFP 0.0050*** 0.0026**
(0.0014) (0.0011)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0044*** 0.0025**
(0.0014) (0.0011)
Log(KL ratio) -0.0047*** -0.0085*** 0.0044*** 0.0024
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Log(Size) 0.0032** 0.0064*** 0.0032*** 0.0049***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Multi 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0105*** 0.0105***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0020)
SOE dummy -0.0125 -0.0127 -0.0128** -0.0129***
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0050) (0.0050)
FIE dummy 0.0020 0.0020 -0.0025 -0.0025
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0026)
EXP dummy 0.0058** 0.0059** -0.0033 -0.0033
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0023)
R&D dummy -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0019
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Industry-level controls
TFPN -0.0479 0.0300
(0.0457) (0.0393)
Log(Labour productivity)N -0.0392 0.0259
(0.0480) (0.0399)
Log(KL ratio)N 0.0496 0.0840 0.0171 -0.0050
(0.0761) (0.0777) (0.0560) (0.0560)
Log(Size)N -0.1600** -0.1891*** -0.1054** -0.0868
(0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0493) (0.0498)
SOE dummyN -0.7420** -0.7350** 0.5767*** 0.5719***
(0.3184) (0.3176) (0.1964) (0.1963)
FIE dummyN -0.0421 -0.0421 0.3885** 0.3884**
(0.1793) (0.1794) (0.1609) (0.1609)
EXP dummyN -0.1788 -0.1783 -0.0379 -0.0386
(0.1172) (0.1171) (0.0907) (0.0908)
R&D dummyN 0.0048 0.0045 -0.1083 -0.1080
(0.1023) (0.1024) (0.0785) (0.0785)
CR -0.0914 -0.0903 0.0332 0.0325
(0.0739) (0.0739) (0.0601) (0.0601)
EI 7.1051 7.1089 7.2866*** 7.2775***
(6.7376) (6.7407) (2.5944) (2.5953)
Constant -3.8324 -5.7005 -5.7144 10.0224*** 8.0841*** 8.0976***
(2.7474) (3.1655) (3.1717) (2.1435) (2.2969) (2.3015)
Observations 451,876 446,052 446,052 449,133 443,309 443,309
Adjusted R-squared 0.0194 0.0201 0.0201 0.0092 0.0092 0.0107
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Weakidentification (F statistic) 8,703 4,203 4,212 8,647 4,184 4,193
No. of clusters 255,266 252,990 252,990 254,889 251,120 251,120
Note: Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at **5%, ***1%. All monetary
values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and 4-digit industry dummies are included in all
specifications. Instrument tests include the under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) and weak-identification
test (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic). The null hypothesis is that the matrix is not full column rank, a rejection of the
null indicates that the model is identified. Null hypothesis for weak-identification test shows that the excluded instruments
are correlated with the endogenous regressor but only weakly. Large F statistic that exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical values
eliminates the weak identification concern.
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Table 3.13 Effect of industrial electricity price on switching with the subsample (Pooled
OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_LH Switch_LH Switch_LH
Log(IEP) 0.0739*** 0.0781*** 0.0780*** 0.0892*** 0.0856*** 0.0857***
(0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0195) (0.0195)
Log(IEP) × EI -0.0437 -0.0434 0.0687** 0.0687**
(0.0625) (0.0625) (0.0348) (0.0348)
Firm-level controls
TFP 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Log(KL ratio) -0.0009** -0.0012*** 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Log(Size) 0.0008** 0.0010*** 0.0006** 0.0009***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Multi 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0022*** 0.0022***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
FIE dummy -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
EXP dummy 0.0016*** 0.0016*** -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
R&D dummy 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Industry-level controls
TFPN -0.0111 0.0107
(0.0126) (0.0116)
Log(Labour productivity)N -0.0108 0.0144
(0.0128) (0.0124)
Log(KL ratio)N -0.0175 -0.0088 -0.0005 -0.0107
(0.0190) (0.0186) (0.0179) (0.0202)
Log(Size)N 0.0024 -0.0048 -0.0150 -0.0069
(0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0145) (0.0159)
SOE dummyN -0.1061 -0.1047 0.1505** 0.1495**
(0.0825) (0.0824) (0.0609) (0.0609)
FIE dummyN -0.0221 -0.0219 0.0872** 0.0865**
(0.0406) (0.0406) (0.0415) (0.0415)
EXP dummyN -0.0292 -0.0289 0.0026 0.0021
(0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0281) (0.0281)
R&D dummyN -0.0227 -0.0228 -0.0294 -0.0293
(0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0284) (0.0283)
CR -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0018
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0159) (0.0159)
EI 0.0071 0.0075 0.0354 0.0401
(0.0692) (0.0692) (0.0486) (0.0495)
Constant 0.0310*** 0.1686 0.1703 0.0434*** 0.0794 0.0572
(0.0087) (0.1121) (0.1174) (0.0092) (0.0977) (0.1027)
Observations 402,229 397,255 397,255 402,229 397,255 397,255
Adjusted R-squared 0.0161 0.0168 0.0168 0.0137 0.0144 0.0144
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of clusters 8,910 8,837 8,837 8,910 8,837 8,837
Note: Standard errors clustered at province-industry level are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at **5%, ***1%.
All monetary values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and 4-digit industry dummies are
included in all specifications. The subsample excludes all SOEs and top 10% largest firms.
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Table 3.14 Effect of industrial electricity price on switching with the subsample (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_HL Switch_LH Switch_LH Switch_LH
Log(IEP) 0.1199 0.2135** 0.2133** -0.3489*** -0.2570*** -0.2583***
(0.0758) (0.0829) (0.0828) (0.0740) (0.0764) (0.0763)
Log(IEP) × EI -0.1689 -0.1689 -0.3244*** -0.3243***
(0.1744) (0.1744) (0.0970) (0.0970)
Firm-level controls
TFP 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(KL ratio) -0.0009*** -0.0012*** 0.0006 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Log(Size) 0.0008*** 0.0010*** 0.0005** 0.0007***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Multi 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0022*** 0.0022***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
FIE dummy -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
EXP dummy 0.0016*** 0.0016*** -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
R&D dummy 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Industry-level controls
TFPN -0.0119 0.0113
(0.0083) (0.0083)
Log(Labour productivity)N -0.0112 0.0143
(0.0085) (0.0084)
Log(KL ratio)N -0.0217 -0.0125 0.0140 0.0036
(0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0121) (0.0120)
Log(Size)N 0.0070 -0.0006 -0.0285*** -0.0203
(0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0110) (0.0109)
SOE dummyN -0.1186 -0.1170 0.1734*** 0.1724***
(0.0611) (0.0609) (0.0497) (0.0497)
FIE dummyN -0.0284 -0.0283 0.1089*** 0.1084***
(0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0340) (0.0340)
EXP dummyN -0.0286 -0.0283 -0.0025 -0.0030
(0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0196) (0.0196)
R&D dummyN -0.0255 -0.0256 -0.0176 -0.0175
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0174)
CR -0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0128) (0.0128)
EI -0.0628 -0.0620 -0.1451*** -0.1411**
(0.1034) (0.1031) (0.0550) (0.0549)
Constant 0.0525 0.2191*** 0.2185*** -0.1618*** -0.0392 -0.0585
(0.0355) (0.0805) (0.0830) (0.0347) (0.0778) (0.0792)
Observations 402,229 397,255 397,255 402,229 397,255 397,255
Adjusted R-squared 0.0160 0.0165 0.0165 0.0102 0.0116 0.0116
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Weakidentification (F statistic) 7,754 3,767 3,776 7,754 3,767 3,776
No. of clusters 229,674 229,384 229,384 229,674 229,384 229,384
Note: Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at **5%, ***1%. All monetary
values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and 4-digit industry dummies are included in
all specifications. Instrument tests include the under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) and weak-
identification test (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic). The null hypothesis is that the matrix is not full column rank, a
rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. Null hypothesis for weak-identification test shows that the
excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor but only weakly. Large F statistic that exceeds the
Stock-Yogo critical values eliminates the weak identification concern. The subsample excludes all SOEs and top 10%
largest firms.
Appendix B
Table B.1 Independent variable definition
Variable Definition Source
Firm-level
TFP Total factor productivity (LP method) Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
Labour productivity Real value added per worker, million yuan/1000 person in 2005 price Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
KL ratio Real fixed assets per worker, million yuan/1000 person in 2005 price Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
Size Total fixed asset stock, 10,000 yuan in 2005 price Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
SOE share State-owned capital/Total capital Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
FIE share Foreign, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan capital/Total capital Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
EXP share Export value/Total output Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
R&D share Expenditure in research and development/Total output Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
SOE dummy =1 if SOE share >51% Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
FIE dummy =1 if FIE share >51% Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
EXP dummy =1 if EXP share >0 Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
R&D dummy =1 if R&D share >0 Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
Multi Dummy variable with value one if survey shows a firm produces multiple products
(roughly defined at the 3-digit and 4-digit level) Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
Industry-level
CR Output of the top 5% of firms/Output of all firms in that industry Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset
EI Electricity consumption/Real output China Energy statistical Yearbooks
Province-level
IEP Industrial electricity price, yuan/MWH China Price Information Center
Coal production Province-level coal production, 10,000 tons China Energy statistical Yearbooks
Capacity Electricity generation from coal to electricity generation from all types of fuel China Energy statistical Yearbooks
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Table B.2 2-digit manufacturing sectors electricity intensity ranking
Manufacturing CIC 2005 2006 2007 mean
Smelting and processing of non-ferrous metals 33 1856 1414 1330 1533
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 31 1544 1429 1193 1389
Manufacture of chemical raw materials and chemical products 26 1302 1193 1037 1177
Smelting and processing of ferrous metals 32 1188 1196 1086 1157
Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing 42 1354 1112 854.2 1107
Manufacture of rubber 29 952.8 868.5 759.8 860.4
Manufacture of paper and paper prod. 22 979.8 889.3 688.8 852.6
Manufacture of chemical fibers 28 894.1 763.7 672.0 776.6
Manufacture of metal products 34 773.6 710.2 591.5 691.8
Manufacture of textiles 17 649.9 674.0 600.2 641.4
Manufacture of plastics 30 636.2 556.6 469.2 554.0
Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, palm, and straw products 20 577.6 524.2 422.7 508.2
Printing and recorded media 23 420.8 389.9 350.3 387.0
Manufacture of medicines 27 360.5 318.0 268.3 315.6
Manufacture of general purpose machinery 35 324.9 283.4 243.2 283.8
Manufacture of foods 14 303.8 284.6 250.0 279.5
Manufacture of special purpose machinery 36 300.6 260.6 216.4 259.2
Manufacture of articles for culture,education and sport activity 24 287.0 247.0 219.2 251.0
Processing of petroleum, coking,processing of nuclear fuel 25 261.2 235.9 229.5 242.2
Manufacture of beverages 15 247.8 229.4 199.1 225.4
Processing of food from agric. products 13 238.7 228.2 191.4 219.4
Manufacture of textile,apparel, footwear£¬and caps 18 176.1 176.6 163.8 172.2
Manufacture of transport equipment 37 191.4 169.5 153.9 171.6
Manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment 39 176.8 155.4 142.2 158.1
Manufacture of leather, fur, feather and related products 19 158.4 155.2 143.0 152.2
Manufacture of furniture 21 170.1 151.3 122.2 147.9
Manufacture of measuring instruments and machinery for cultural activity and office work 41 152.9 146.4 142.0 147.1
Manufacture of communication equipment, computers and other 40 121.5 121.5 122.3 121.8
Note: Data source China Energy statistical Yearbooks 2006-2008. Unit kWh/10,000 yuan.
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Table B.3 Summary of the energy variables by province (2005-2007)
Province Industrial electricity price Thermal power Coal production
(Yuan/MWH) generation capacity (10,000 tons)
Guangdong 772.9 0.78 127.8
Jiangsu 721.3 0.98 2782
Jilin 719.2 0.85 3024
Zhejiang 718.6 0.79 24.78
Shanghai 709.5 1 0
Liaoning 690.3 0.95 6704
Anhui 684.4 0.98 8695
Tianjin 676.4 1 0
Heilongjiang 676 0.98 9950
Hebei 668.4 0.99 8556
Shandong 658.6 1 14206
Hubei 656 0.40 1070
Sichuan 646.5 0.36 8761
Beijing 646.2 0.98 732.6
Fujian 608.1 0.65 1935
Jiangxi 604.4 0.81 2782
Guangxi 601.6 0.54 700.8
Chongqing 590.2 0.77 3968
Ningxia 583.8 0.95 3218
Henan 568.3 0.95 19194
Gansu 562.5 0.68 3840
Hunan 529 0.63 5967
Guizhou 520 0.74 11159
Yunnan 504.8 0.50 7185
Shanxi 491 0.98 58863
Innermongolia 444.4 0.98 30268
Average 626.9 0.80 8301
Note: Data source China Energy statistical Yearbooks and China Price Information
Center. Thermal power generation capacity is defined as the share of electricity gen-
erated by coal over electricity generated by all types of fuels. Shaanxi and Qinghai
provinces are dropped as outliers in terms of coal production and industrial electricity
price. These two provinces account for approximately 0.94% of total number of firms.
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Table B.5 Effect of industrial electricity price on switching (Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Switch Switch Switch Switch
Log(IEP) 0.1112*** 0.1110*** 0.1122*** 0.1120***
(0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0199)
Log(IEP) × EI 0.1787*** 0.1801*** 0.1749*** 0.1763***
(0.0554) (0.0554) (0.0553) (0.0553)
Firm-level controls
TFP 0.0023*** 0.0023***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Log(Labour productivity) 0.0021*** 0.0022***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Log(KL ratio) -0.0007 -0.0025*** -0.0009** -0.0027***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Log(Size) 0.0019*** 0.0034*** 0.0021*** 0.0036***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Multi 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
SOE ratio -0.0094*** -0.0094***
(0.0018) (0.0018)
FIE ratio 0.0026*** 0.0026***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
EXP ratio 0.0028*** 0.0028***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
RD ratio -0.0044 -0.0046
(0.0052) (0.0052)
SOE dummy -0.0083*** -0.0083***
(0.0017) (0.0017)
FIE dummy 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0009)
EXP dummy 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0008) (0.0008)
R&D dummy -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Industry-level controls
TFPN 0.0018 0.0024
(0.0096) (0.0096)
Log(Labour productivity)N 0.0032 0.0039
(0.0098) (0.0098)
Log(KL ratio)N 0.0155 0.0133 0.0124 0.0097
(0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0144)
Log(Size)N -0.0367*** -0.0351*** -0.0341*** -0.0322**
(0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0129)
SOE ratioN 0.0609 0.0611
(0.0593) (0.0592)
FIE ratioN 0.0289 0.0285
(0.0456) (0.0456)
EXP ratioN -0.0042 -0.0043
(0.0347) (0.0347)
R&D ratioN 0.0035 0.0035
(0.0029) (0.0029)
SOE dummyN 0.0750 0.0751
(0.0563) (0.0562)
FIE dummyN 0.0314 0.0310
(0.0405) (0.0405)
EXP dummyN -0.0122 -0.0125
(0.0261) (0.0262)
RD dummyN -0.0094 -0.0094
(0.0220) (0.0220)
CR -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0023
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169)
EI -1.0858*** -1.0925*** -1.0592*** -1.0656***
(0.3573) (0.3574) (0.3567) (0.3569)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450,764 450,764 450,764 450,764
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Siginificant at **5%, ***1%.
All monetary values are deflated to 2005 prices via provincial CPI. Year, province and
4-digit industry dummies are included in all specifications.
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4.1 Introduction
As one of the most rapidly growing consumer markets in the world, China has received
considerable attention from multinational retailers. China’s retail sales in 2014 reached 23.45
trillion RMB (US3.78 trillion in 2015 prices), 12.2 percent higher than the previous year
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2014). Hence, China’s growing consumer market
presents an enormous opportunity for domestic and foreign firms. One particular difficulty
faced by foreign firms is the lack of market access to certain sectors which have been subject
to strict government regulation on the degree to which foreign investment is permitted. These
restrictions were particularly prevalent in the retail gasoline sector which is considered to be
one of the most profitable sectors in China. As the world’s second largest oil consumer, and
since 2010 the world’s largest energy consumer, China’s demand for conventional gasoline
has grown rapidly and is predicted to continue to grow further as automobile ownership
expands.1
Prior to China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) very little foreign investment
was permitted in the energy sector. However, following a series of concessions agreed by
China as part of the WTO negotiations, entry barriers in the gasoline retail sector have
gradually been eliminated. China’s new stance on the energy sector is based on the premise
that the economy and consumers would benefit from greater market-oriented competition,
enhanced brand awareness and improvements in non-fuel service quality. The most significant
policy change came in December 2004 when the Measures for the Administration on Foreign
Investment in Commercial Sector was issued by the Ministry of Commerce. This new ruling
permitted, for the first time, foreign-funded retail enterprises to establish gasoline retail
service stations and allowed foreign firms to buy and sell refined oil without geographical
1Recent data shows that the motor vehicles, motorcycles, fuel and auto parts sectors account for 30% of
China’s total retail assets and 13% and 20% of physical retail enterprises and employment, respectively (Third
National Economic Census 2014).
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restrictions (Ministry of Commerce, PR China). The 2004 deregulation was followed in
December 2006 by a similar measure that opened up the wholesale market for refined oil to
foreign firms after which China’s energy market was considered to be fully open.
The contribution of this paper is to be one of the first to examine the impact of China’s open
market policy on the retail gasoline and wholesale gasoline markets. Our research follows in
the tradition of Basker (2005) who examines Wal-Mart’s entry into local markets on local
prices in the US and Holmes et al. (2013) who investigate the determinants of gasoline price
integration in the US. More specifically, we provide an insight into how the entry of a large
multinational company, in this case Royal Dutch Shell (hereafter Shell), affected retail and
wholesale energy prices and the pattern of energy price convergence within China. In this
paper we investigate two potential mechanisms by which foreign entry has an impact on
gasoline market in China. The first channel is a local or market-specific mechanism that
works though retail competition at the local market level. The average price level tends to
decrease at the beginning due to the undercutting initiating by new entrants to steal market
share. When margins get too low and the allocation of market tends to be settled down, the
average price rebounds significantly. The second channel, which we call the aggregation
mechanism, works through upstream interactions with domestic incumbents in the wholesale
market and which in turn may affect the wholesale price of fuel across the whole of China.
Our data are derived from the combination of two unique datasets. The first is the location
and opening year of China’s Shell branded service stations opened either by Shell alone or as
part of a joint venture. Over the last ten years Shell has managed to develop a network of
more than 1,100 service stations across 48 cities covering the northern, southern, central and
southeastern areas of China. The scale of Shell’s activity coupled with their early entry into
China makes their experience an interesting quasi-experiment by which to investigate various
aspects of energy price dynamics in China. The second is a dataset of service station-level
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fuel prices for 2001 to 2012 from the China Price Monitoring Centre (CPMC) which is a
branch of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). To take into account
heterogeneity in the quality across varieties of fuel we consider three different grades of
gasoline: super premium (Gas#97); premium (Gas#93); and standard (Gas#90).2
Our methodological approach is to combine a pairwise approach with the difference-in-
differences (DID) method to identify the causal relationship between Shell’s entry into a local
market and the subsequent effect on absolute price differentials. Following Pesaran et al.
(2009) and Holmes et al. (2013) we first calculate the absolute price differentials between
gasoline prices for any two cities which have similar propensities to be populated by Shell in
a year. We then adopt the DID method and compare the absolute price differentials between
two cities where one city has experienced the entry of Shell (the treated) to the absolute
price differentials between two cities where neither has a Shell station (the control), and
compare the price differentials before and after the entry year. Besides Shell’s entry, we
also account for the impacts of distance between cities and economic and demographic
factors. Considering the differentials of macroeconomic data helps to alleviate concerns
of endogeneity as the entry decision of international retailers is unlikely to be based on
the economic development gap between any two cities. The pairwise approach is newly
developed and commonly used in studies that investigate price behaviour (see e.g. Pesaran
et al., 2009; Yazgan and Yilmazkuday, 2011; Holmes et al., 2011, 2013). Through taking
the differentials of gasoline prices between any two pairs of cities, the pairwise approach
is reasonably robust to cross-section dependence (Pesaran et al., 2009). For example, since
within our time period there was considerable energy market deregulation leading to a
decentralization of prices, taking differences enables us to eliminate the impact of common
shocks that effected all cities in the same year. In addition, taking the difference between
any two cities, instead of the difference with group mean or a baseline city, enables us to
2Descriptions of each gasoline type are provided in the data section of the paper.
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avoid any undesirable shocks from a specific year or the baseline city. Finally, the pairwise
approach allows us to also investigate the impact of distance on price dispersion.
To briefly summarize our results, we find that Shell’s entry into China’s retail gasoline market
had a statistically significant effect on gasoline prices across China. Specifically, our results
suggest that the entry of Shell into a city increased the average dispersion of prices in China
between 1.3 and 1.5 percent in the year of entry although, crucially this positive impact
disappears over time. Of the three different fuel types, we find a larger effect for super
premium gasoline (Gas#97), that historically had higher profit margins than regular gasoline
prices both locally and nationally. For all fuel types we found that the greatest absolute price
effect was found in China’s less developed western cities which, due to limited competition
in the past, would have been exposed to greater competitive pressures following Shell’ entry,
certainly compared to the already relatively more mature markets in eastern cities. To explain
the rise in dispersion we then look at how Shell entry impacts prices and we find that the
local retail price for Gas#93 and Gas#97 fell by between 4.2 to 5.0 percent immediately after
Shell’s entry before increasing by between 2.4 to 3.2 percent in the second year after entry.
In terms of the wholesale market, we find that by cooperating with domestic partners, Shell
managed to achieve end-to-end integration of the value chain from upstream refineries to
downstream retail networks leading to a reduction in overall wholesale prices across China.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of the
literature. Section 4.3 describes the data and presents some descriptive evidence of the
pattern of price dispersion in China. Our empirical approach is presented in Section 4.4
and our empirical results are provided in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 investigates the potential
mechanisms that are driving the entry effect and Section 4.7 presents the results from a series
of robustness checks. The final section concludes.
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4.2 Literature Review
The last thirty years has seen a growth in research examining price dispersion among
related products or customers with different preferences. We present in this section studies
examining the price effect of the entry of multinational retailers. Significant price reductions
are observed at the local level due to the entry of multinational retailers. We also summarize
the literature that specifically study the gasoline market and price dispersion. Gasoline price
dispersion can be caused by differences in market structure and market conduct, as well as
the emergence of vertical integrated refiners. Furthermore, a saw-toothed gasoline pricing
pattern named Edgeworth price cycle is investigated in the literature. Overall, studies of the
gasoline market are limited and have tended to focus on developed countries.
The review of literature begins with the investigation of persisting price differences. In a
monopolistic competition setting, assuming firms can distinguish between customers, firms
will price discriminate based on demand elasticities with the result that monopolistically set
prices tend to be higher than those under perfect competition. As a result, firms with pricing
power set prices above marginal costs. In an imperfectly competitive setting, prices should
gradually converge as the entry of new firms leads to greater competition. With new entry
(and no exit), price differences should disappear and the average market price should return
to the marginal cost level. This brief literature review discusses the various mechanisms by
which Shell’s entry into China could affect absolute price levels for gasoline in both the retail
and wholesale markets and levels of price dispersion within and across cities.
There are numerous explanations why price dispersion can persist across firms within an
industry. One sector that has been analyzed in detail is the airline industry. For example,
Borenstein and Rose (1994) examined the US airline industry in 1986 and surprisingly
found evidence of a positive relationship between price dispersion and competition. They
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highlighted two main sources of price differences. The first is that variation in prices is
driven by the cost-base of firms (airlines serving different passengers in different locations
could have a different cost base depending on where the airline is geographically located).
Second, prices could differ due to price discrimination usually as a result of differences in
market structure, consumer preferences and product characteristics. More recently and in line
with traditional microeconomic theory, a second study of the US airline industry by Gerardi
and Shapiro (2009) that coincided with the entry of the low-cost carriers finds a significant
negative relationship between competition and price differences.3
A smaller body of research examines the competition effect of the entry of multinational
retailers into local markets including Chen (2003), Basker (2005),Dukes et al. (2006), Haus-
man and Leibtag (2007), Gielens et al. (2008). As one of the largest players in international
retailing, Wal-Mart often serves as a case study. For example, Basker (2005) studies the
entry effect of Wal-Mart by combining quarterly price data for a series of commonly bought
products after the opening of Wal-Mart stores across the US and finds that after a store is
opened there are significant price reductions for several daily consumables such as toothpaste
and shampoo. The magnitude of the reduction tended to be in the range of 1.5 to 3 percent
in the short term and up to four times higher in the long run. Drawing upon studies on
the Wal-Mart effect, two mechanisms are highlighted. First, Wal-Mart’s highly efficient
supply chain reduces operating costs with Walmart’s superior logistics, infrastructure and
distribution networks regarded as important components of their retail strategy. In addition,
Wal-Mart’s high sales volumes means that it is generally regarded as a principal buyer so that
it is able to obtain concessions from manufacturers including preferential wholesale prices
(Dukes et al., 2006). An indirect effect of Walmart’s purchasing power is that suppliers also
appear to lower the prices they charge to other retailers in the same locale who stock similar
3One reason given by Borenstein and Rose (1994) to explain their positive findings was the widespread use
of frequent flier points (FFPs) such that new entrants affect the less-frequent customers market but have little
effect on frequent fliers due to high levels of brand loyalty.
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goods (Chen, 2003). A second mechanism is through an increased competition effect in local
markets. Hausman and Leibtag (2007) find a price effect from new competition when they
examine customer benefits after the entry and expansion of Wal-Mart with the downward
pricing pressure on incumbents being greater, the geographically closer they are to a new
store. Wal-Mart’s entry also had the effect of reducing wholesale prices. Gielens et al. (2008)
argue that incumbents need to consider specialized and exclusive selling strategies or increase
service augmentation to remain competitive given Wal-Mart’s emphasis on low prices.
Studies of the gasoline retail market are more limited and have tended to focus on developed
countries, such as the US and Canada. For example, Eckert and West (2004) investigate the
difference in pricing behavior between Ottawa and Vancouver and argue that the substantial
differences in pricing are likely to be caused by differences in market structure and market
conduct. The authors point out that tacit collusion and coordination behavior contributed to
short-run price stickiness and long-run price uniformity in Vancouver whereas in Ottawa the
entry of maverick independent gasoline retailers eroded existing collusive behavior as new
competitors sacrificed short run profits and undercut rivals to gain market share. A study of
independent retailers in Southern California by Hastings (2004) following the acquisition
of the Thrifty Oil Company in 1997, finds that retail prices rose once independent gasoline
stations were converted into fully vertically integrated service stations. Their quasi-natural
experiment predicts a 5 cent increase in the average retail price following the loss of one
independent gasoline station. The ability of branded gasoline stations to exploit brand loyalty
was also given as an explanation for an increase in prices as market share increases.
In a study of retail and wholesale gasoline prices in the US, Zimmerman (2012) finds that
hypermarkets with a gasoline retail service exerted considerable downward pressure on
nearby retail gasoline prices. Based on Hastings and Gilbert (2005) study of the US West
Coast gasoline market, vertical integration is argued to be the primary reason for regional
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wholesale price differentials. In the market where integrated refiners have a large market share,
they have a positive incentive to raise the unbranded wholesale price for its retailing rivals.
Employing a pairwise approach, Holmes et al. (2013) find a cointegration of regional gasoline
prices in the US. Their results suggest that the distance between states plays an important role
in determining the speed of price converge. Yilmazkuday and Yilmazkuday (2016) list four
sets of determinants of price dispersion in the retail gasoline sector: competitor density and
station concentration levels; station characteristics (whether they have convenience stores
or repair services); local demographic and economic conditions; and brand or contractual
agreements.
A second strand of the literature examines the asymmetric movement of gasoline retailing
prices. Maskin and Tirole (1988) first described the saw-toothed pricing pattern and developed
the Edgeworth price cycle theory. Under a duopoly with alternating moves, competitors
selling homogenous goods tend to undercut each other gradually until they approach the
wholesale price. Following a war of attrition, one competitor relents and retail prices rebound
rapidly before starting the next round of price cuts. Empirical evidence based on high
frequency retail prices have been found in mature gasoline markets worldwide such as in
Canada (Noel, 2007a,b, 2009; Eckert, 2002, 2003; Eckert and West, 2004; Byrne and de Roos,
2017), the US (Lewis, 2009; Lewis and Noel, 2011) and Australia (Bloch and Wills-Johnson,
2010; Byrne, 2012). Independent (non-branded) small firms have the greatest incentive
to begin undercutting their larger rivals while large firms normally take the leadership in
restoring prices (Eckert, 2003; Byrne et al., 2013). The Edgeworth cycle revolves faster, with
a greater magnitude with less asymmetry in markets with more independent competitors
(Noel, 2007a).4
4See Eckert (2013) for a detailed summary of empirical studies that examine different aspects of gasoline
retailing.
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Finally, only a few number of papers have examined the behaviour of energy prices in China.
Ma et al. (2009) use 10-day energy spot price data for 35 major cities to investigate the
extent of price convergence across China graphically and parametrically. The data reveal
considerable price variation across the 31 mainland provinces for four major fuels (coal,
electricity, gasoline and diesel) with price differences driven to a large extent by different
energy reserve levels and transportation costs. As a consequence, cities close to gasoline
production areas are predicted to enjoy a lower retail price. While gasoline and diesel
prices behave fairly consistently, spatial price dispersion is still observed implying that
the energy market for China remains segmented. Ma and Oxley (2012) confirm the result
that energy prices in certain regional energy markets in China have converged but that this
tends to be within groups of regions rather than across the whole country. Testing for club
convergence and clustering, the evidence shows that several regional clusters for gasoline
exist simultaneously but that they are becoming generally geographically connected as energy
markets have become more open.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Royal Dutch Shell in China
We begin with a brief review of the retail gasoline sector in China. Despite the complicated
licensing process, multinational oil giants such as Shell, BP and Exxon have managed to
access China’s energy markets and have expanded their networks to include not just down-
stream retail gasoline service stations but also upstream refinery and fuel supply businesses.
The reasons we focus on Shell are two-fold. First, Shell has the largest retail service network
of the big four foreign companies (Shell has 862 stations in 48 cities compared to BP’s
291 stations in 26 cities, Total’s 202 stations in 41 cities, and Exxon’s 14 stations across 10
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cities). Second, Shell’s official website provides detailed information on the location of each
retail gasoline station (information not readily available for the other three companies). The
presence of new international competitors has diversified not only the ownership of service
stations but also the ownership of wholesalers.
From the late 1990s onwards Shell began to build jointly branded gasoline stations with local
partners in a number of Chinese cities. The first Shell station was established in Tianjin in
1997, with 25% of the equity held by Tianjin Nongken State-owned Company. Shell then
proceeded to develop a retail network that now covers the majority of metropolitan areas
in the northern, southern, central and southeastern provinces. Shell’s primary strategy was
to find a local partner and then initiate a joint company within a given geographical area
(which tended to be at the province level). By the end of 2014 Shell operated approximately
1,000 retail gasoline retail stations in China. The second stage of development was to build
new service stations and to take over a number of existing unbranded service stations whilst
continuing to seek new partnerships. At the current time all of China’s major national oil
companies have collaborative agreements with Shell, including China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Shaanxi Yanchang Group Company (YCG). These
four oil companies are also the only companies that own petroleum exploration licenses for
China.
The service station data that we use in this paper are available from the Shell website.5 Figure
4.1 provides a geographical overview of Shell’s gasoline service station footprint for 2013.
The larger the symbol the higher the number of service stations in the city. The largest service
station networks are in Shaanxi, Sichuan and Hebei provinces. For example, Yanchang and
Shell Petroleum Company own more than 290 service stations in Shaanxi and Yanchang and
Shell (Sichuan) Petroleum Company own 153 stations. In total Shell has a presence in 9 of
5See http://www.shell.com.cn/en/aboutshell/our-business-tpkg/china.html for details.
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China’s 31 provinces.6 Table 4.1 complements Figure 4.1 by providing a summary of Shell’s
service station network also for 2013 including a number of other variables of interest. There
is no obvious relationship between the location of Shell’s gasoline stations and the production
of gasoline per million people or per million vehicles. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the number
of retail gasoline service stations per million people and per million vehicles for each of
the 9 provinces with a Shell retail presence. Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between the
gasoline production/surplus level and Shell’s entry decision. A surplus in this context means
that the province is a net exporter of gasoline products and a negative value implies that the
province is a net importer of gasoline. The raw data suggests that Shell does not have an
obvious tendency to locate its retail network in relatively high fuel production areas such as
Shaanxi, Hebei and Shandong as the majority of provinces that Shell has chosen to locate are
net fuel importing provinces such as Sichuan, Tianjin, Shanxi, Chongqing, Guangdong and
Beijing. Table C.1 in the appendix lists each province ranked by gasoline production as well
as consumption and surplus/deficit values.
[Figure 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 about here]
[Table 4.1 about here]
Within the 9 provinces listed in Table 4.1, Shell has a presence in 48 out of 94 prefecture-
level or above cities.7 However, due to a lack of gasoline price data we had to drop 37
cities from our sample. 8 We only include cities where the first entry year is between 2001
and 2012 which means excluding Tianjin (first entry year 1997) and Jinan (first entry year
6Shell has different partners in different regions for both upstream and downstream operations. According
to the official website, there are five joint companies for the retailing business in China. They are Beijing Shell
Oil Co. covering Beijing and Chengde city, Shell North China Petroleum Group Co. covering Tianjin, Hebei
and Shandong, Yanchang and Shell (Guangdong) Petroleum Co. covering Guangdong, Yanchang and Shell
(Sichuan) Petroleum Co. covering Sichuan, Yanchang and Shell Petroleum Co. covering Shaanxi and Shanxi.
7According to China.org.cn “Prefectural-level cities are large and medium-size cities not including sub-
provincial level cities. Normally, they are cities with a non-farming population of more than a quarter of a
million.” Source: http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/28842.htm.
8Our gasoline price dataset includes prices for 62 cities.
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2013). Our Shell-presence group is therefore 9 cities across 6 provinces with a first year of
entry between 2001 and 2012. The nine cities are Beijing, Taiyuan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen,
Chongqing, Chengdu, Zigong, Xian and Baoji. The dates for Shell’s first year of entry and
the number of stations are listed in Table 4.2. Our non-Shell group includes cities which
have never previously had a Shell gasoline station. Tianjin (first entry year 1997) and Jinan
(first entry year 2013) are excluded from both groups.
[Table 4.2 about here]
4.3.2 Retail and Wholesale Gasoline Prices in China
We now provide a brief overview of the gasoline pricing mechanism in China. To prepare
for entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), China adopted the world price of
oil in June 1998. The pricing reform scheme issued by the State Development Planning
Commission (SDPC) (renamed as National Development and Reform Commission in March
2003) proposed an adjustment to the monthly prices of crude oil and refined products based
on Singapore market prices although the adjustment frequency did not become monthly until
June 2000. China’s previous pricing mechanism was a two-tier system which had remained
unchanged since the early 1980s. In 2001 the Chinese government went further and linked
domestic prices to international prices based on prices from the Singapore, Rotterdam, and
New York markets with weights given by 6:3:1 respectively. At the same time crude oil prices
were set by the two largest vertically-integrated oil companies instead of the SDPC. However,
the government continued to provide guidelines and would make adjustments when the gap
between domestic and international prices became too large. A new formula for setting
baseline prices based on prices from the Brent, Dubai and Minas markets was introduced
in January 2007. More recently there has been a narrowing of the interval and an increased
frequency for price adjustments to be made. The latest refined products pricing scheme
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issued on March of 2013 allows the mutually supplied crude oil prices to be set jointly by
Sinopec and PetroChina based on local refining conditions. Crude oil produced by CNOOC
and other producers are set by the companies themselves. In the retail market, gasoline
service station retailers can set their own prices as long as they are below a maximum price
set by the NDRC for individual provinces and some major cities.
Generally speaking, each province has its own price cap. For example, the NDRC announced
a decrease of 95 yuan/ton for wholesale and retail gasoline prices in July 7 2015. Shaanxi
province then announced a decrease of 0.08 yuan/liter for gasoline, with a maximum price
of 6.4 yuan/liter for the middle and north of the province and 6.48 for the south of the
province. At the same time, Guangdong province set a maximum price of 6.13 yuan/liter
for the province as a whole for the same product. A common perception of the energy
market in China is that it is highly regulated and as such domestic fuel prices are underpriced
relative to the world price which in turn encourages greater domestic consumption with
implications for congestion and air pollution (Hang and Tu, 2007; Tan and Wolak, 2009).
Drawing lessons from a widespread power shortage in 2008, Wang et al. (2009) argue that
the centrally planned policy-oriented pricing mechanism encouraged excessive growth in
heavy industry, and hence was inconsistent with a strategy to promote energy-conservation
and sustainable development.
This paper analyzes the pricing behavior of three different grades of fuel. The current
industrial classification for automotive gasoline products in China is GB 17930 “Automotive
Gasoline”. Within this classification there are three type of gasoline that we label Gas#90,
Gas#93 and Gas#97. The number associated with each product represents the octane rate.
For example, Gas#97 gasoline contains 97% iso-octane and 3% n-heptane. The gasoline
octane number is designed to be compatible with the compression ratio of the engine. If an
engine with a high compression ratio is used with a low octane gasoline the engine tends
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to knock, which can cause problems such as piston splintering and piston ring breakage. If
an engine with a low compression ratio is used with a high octane gasoline, the ignition
timing may be altered, which can cause incremental sedimentation inside the engine cylinder
thus shortening engine life (Sinopec Corp. 2014). The compression ratio is an important
structural parameter for the engine. Generally speaking, a high compression ratio indicates
high thermal efficiency giving the automobile more power, grater acceleration and a higher
maximum speed. Hence, high performance cars need higher quality gasoline (a higher octane
percentage).
The initial gasoline price data is a panel dataset collected by the China Price Monitoring
Centre (CPMC) on every 5th, 15th and 25th day of each month. From 2001 to 2012, spot
prices were obtained from several (normally 2-5) permanent anonymous services stations for
a number of different gasoline varieties. Since there is no brand information for the stations
from which the price information is taken, we simply take the arithmetic mean between
monitoring stations as the market average price for that city. For our analysis, we aggregate
spot price data at the annual average level for the following reasons. First, the gasoline
pricing regime and the price cap mechanism during the study period have slowed down the
speed of price adjustment significantly. Figure C.1 in the Appendix presents the spot price
trend from the anonymous station no.1 in each of our sampled cities. For most cities the
price changes 2 to 5 times a year although the price is collected every 10 days.9 Using high
frequent data will cause a large amount of repeated records in our sample and this may lead
to an estimation bias of Shell’s entry effect. Second, due to a lack of the precise date of
Shell’s entry into a city, using annual price data enable us to match the entry as well as other
economic and demographic variables on a yearly basis. Finally, many retail sectors show a
strong seasonality and using annual data avoids the undesired seasonal fluctuation.
9A similar example can be found in Figure 6 and 7 in Ma et al. (2009)
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4.4 Identification Strategy
Our methodological approach is to use a difference-in-differences (DID) pairwise estimator
to help us identity the causal relationship between price dispersion across cities and the entry
of Shell into a local market. We first match each of the Shell-presence cities with several
non-Shell cities using propensity score matching (PSM) technique. The matching procedure
includes a number of macroeconomic control variables to address self-selection concerns
related to the difference in development levels between cities.10 Second, following Pesaran
et al. (2009) and Holmes et al. (2013), we take the absolute gasoline price differentials
between any two cities in a group including one Shell-presence city and its corresponding
matched non-Shell cities. Since there was considerable deregulation in China’s energy market
during our period of study, taking differences removes the effect of common shocks that
impacted all cities in a given year. By taking differences relative to another city or cities
instead of simply taking the group mean also allows us to examine the impact of distance
on price dispersion. Finally, we adopt the DID method on the bivariate price differentials.
The coefficient on the DID interaction term measures the entry effect of Shell on the price
dispersion in a given year in China. In a sense, a DID model on differential data is a triple
difference model.
We employ the PSM approach matching on a range of city-level characteristics which are
GDP per capita, population density, average wages, passenger traffic by highway and the
price for Gas#90).11 The results of our initial matching are presented in Table 4.3. In Table
10The usual DID approach selects the treatment and control groups based on a different application of a
policy across, for example, geographical regions where a region is allocated to either a treatment group (policy
applied) or a control group (no policy applied). However, if the regions selected to receive intervention were
picked because of certain regional characteristics, the treated and control groups may have different pre-policy
trends. Since conducting a natural experiment in economic research is rare, finding an efficient counterfactual
for the treated units of analysis becomes a precondition for the construction of the DID framework. PSM allows
the researcher to generate matched controls for each treated unit of analysis with post-matching balancing tests
used to ensure that for a given PSM, the DID approach is appropriate.
11See Table C.2 in the appendix for definitions of our matching variables. All monetary values are deflated
in 2005 prices using a province level Customer Price Index (CPI). Estimation of propensity scores using a logit
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4.4 we present the results from post-match balancing tests which assess the accuracy of our
PSM matching method for individual variables as well as the overall covariate balance. The
results show that the balancing assumption is satisfied both individually and overall.
[Table 4.3 about here]
[Table 4.4 about here]
After matching we adopt the pairwise approach and calculate the extent of any absolute
price differences between a Shell-presence city and its corresponding matched controls. The
pairwise approach is recently developed by Pesaran (2007b) who tests the output and growth
convergence and Pesaran et al. (2009) who test the Law of One Price in 50 countries over
the period 1957 to 2001. Holmes et al. (2013) employ the pairwise approach to examine
the gasoline market integration in the US and find a strong evidence of gasoline price
convergence.12 For cities i and j in group g, the price differential of each of our gasoline fuel
types z in time t is defined as:
Dispersionz,i j,t = |log(Pricez,i,t)− log(Pricez, j,t)|
For convenience we use pair p to denote a combination of city i and j.
Dispersionz,p,t = |log(Pricez,i,t)− log(Pricez, j,t)| p = 1,2 . . .
9
∑
g=1
C2Gg
estimation are presented in Table C.3. Overall coefficients were significant and the pseudo-R square reveals
that the equation explains 21.9% of the variation and indicate the potential benefit of matching the sample
according to propensity scores (Baser, 2006). The Gas#90 price is included in the matching as a benchmark of
local gasoline price level and is insignificant in both the logit regression and post matching tests. Our results
suggest that the local gasoline price is not an important consideration for Shell to make the entry decision.
12To be precise, the pairwise approach used in this paper is part of the the pairwise method mentioned in
Pesaran (2007b), Pesaran et al. (2009) and Holmes et al. (2013). In these three papers a variety of unit root tests
are conducted on all possible N(N−1)/2 bivariate differentials between any pairs of N countries or states.
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group g contains 1 treated city and (Gg−1) control cities which implies ∑9g−1C2(Gg−1) treated
pairs and ∑9g=1C
2
(Gg−1) control pairs in total.
Before modelling the causal relationship between price dispersion and foreign entry, we
characterize some general patterns of price dispersion that we find in the data. Following Fan
and Wei (2006) and Holmes et al. (2013) we examine fluctuations in retail gasoline prices
taking into account the distance between cities and a time trend given by:
Dispersionz,p,t = γ0+ γ1Trendt + γ2Distancep+ γ3Distance2p+ εt
Table 4.5 presents the results for a simple OLS regression examining the impacts of a
linear trend and distance on price dispersion. The spatial distance between pairwise cities
is calculated using the great circle formula according to information on the latitude and
longitude of the centroid of the cities. The immediate observation is the importance of
distance. The further two cities are away from each other, the greater the absolute price
difference. In columns (4) (5) and (6) where we also include squared distance terms, we
find a positive impact of distance on price dispersion for all of our three products but at a
decreasing rate. Our finding is in line with Holmes et al. (2013) who find an asymmetric
relationship between the distance and the speed at which gasoline prices converge to the
long-run equilibrium. The negative and significant time trend for our period of analysis also
suggests a general reduction in price dispersion for Gas#93 and Gas#97 but a significant
and positive effect on price dispersion for Gas#90. In the following analysis distance is
considered as a pair-specific effect and year-specific effect accounts for the linear trend.
Other controls are also included.
[Table 4.5 about here]
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Since one of our key testable hypotheses is whether price dispersion changed after Shell’s
entry, for each of our pair cities, the treatment effect after s years of entry is measured as:
Dispersion1z,p,t+s−Dispersion0z,p,t+s
where the superscript implies whether a pair of cities is being treated (Treatment = 0,1) and
the subscript t + s implies s(s = 0,1,2) years after the entry date t. However, the second
term in the equation is unobservable. Based on the results of our matching procedure, each
treated city has several matched controls which have similar economic and demographic
characteristics. Therefore, the price dispersion between two valid control cities within one
group are regarded as the appropriate substitution for the unobservable term. As a result, the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) given by:
AT T = E[Dispersion1z,p,t+s−Dispersion0z,p,t+s|Treatmentp,t = 1]
= E[Dispersion1z,p,t+s|Treatmentp,t = 1]−E[Dispersion0z,p,t+s|Treatmentp,t = 1]
= E[Dispersion1z,p,t+s|Treatmentp,t = 1]−E[Dispersion0z,p,t+s|Treatmentp,t = 0]
s = 0,1,2 p = 1,2 . . .
9
∑
g=1
C2Gg
Hence, our pairwise DID estimator, based on the matched sample, is given by:
AT T =
1
∑9g=1(Gg−1)∑
[∆sDispersion1z,p−∆sDispersion0z,q]
where ∆sDispersion1z,p is the difference in absolute price differential after s years of the entry
for the treated pair p, and ∆sDispersion0z,q is the difference in absolute price differential after
s years of entry for control pair q.
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Disentangling the different sources of price dispersion is important if we are to identify the
causal relationship between Shell’s entry and the subsequent behavior in gasoline prices.
Based on Vita (2000) and Zimmerman (2012), a vector of covariates are taken into account in
the measurement of price dispersion including income per capital, population density, average
wage per worker, population at the end of the year and highway passenger traffic. According
to Borenstein and Rose (1994), price dispersion may arise from two sources, namely cost
variations and discriminatory pricing. However, it is difficult to separate the cost-based
dispersion from the discrimination-based dispersion because of market heterogeneity. For
example, on one hand, management costs and transaction costs per sale could be lower in
high population density cities than in relatively small cities due to economies of scale. It
implies that retailers can set lower prices in these locations to acquire greater market share,
even by compensating for losses in small cities. On the other hand, the demand elasticity for
fuel may be lower in larger cities which provides an incentive to price discriminate. Hence,
we control for the relationship between price dispersion and factors that might indicate a
basis either for cost variations or discrimination within a DID framework. Considering
the possibility of a delayed impact of Shell’s entry and the fact that the first Shell station
might only have a minor effect on the local market, we include lags and the corresponding
interaction terms for Shell’s entry decision. We therefore estimate a basic and an extended
model given by.
Basic framework
Dispersionz,p,t = α+β1Treatmentp+β2Postp0+β3Treatmentp×Postp0
+∆pControl · γ +∑
p
γpPairp+∑
t
δtYeart + εz,p,t
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Extended framework
Dispersionz,p,t = α+β1Treatmentp+β2Postp0+β3Treatmentp×Postp0
+β4Postp1+β5Treatmentp×Postp1+β6Postp2+β7Treatmentp×Postp2
+∆pControl · γ +∑
p
γpPairp+∑
t
δtYeart + εz,p,t
Subscript z represents our three gasoline products Gas#90, Gas#93 and Gas#97 described
in previous section. Subscript p indicates each combination of two cities. Treatmentp is a
binary variable indicating whether one city in the pair has been or will be entered by Shell.
Postp0, Postp1 and Postp2 are dummy variables representing the entry year, one year and
two years after entry respectively. ∆pControl represents the covariate matrix including the
differences in income per capital, population density, average wage of workers, population at
the end of year and passenger numbers travelling by highway. Our measure of the absolute
differences in the independent variables is calculated using the same order between cities as
we used to generate our price dispersion variable, which were randomly assigned. Pairp and
Yeart represent pair-specific fixed effects and time fixed effects respectively and εz,p,t is the
error term. Table 4.6 presents a summary of our differenced variables and shows, for example,
that the average price dispersion for Gas#90 retail price between any two matched cities in
our sample is approximately 4% and slightly lower than those for Gas#93 and Gas#97.
[Table 4.6 about here]
4.5 Results
Table 4.7 presents our difference-in-difference estimation results for the determinants of
retail price dispersion for the whole sample. Columns (1), (4) and (7) present the results
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from a fixed effects regression for each of our three gasoline products. Columns (2), (5)
and (8) control for a number of additional social economic factors while columns (3), (6)
and (9) include lags and interactions with the treatment indicator to allow us to consider the
longer term impact. Year specific and individual pair effects are included in all regressions.
Coefficients are estimated with robust standard errors.
[Table 4.7 about here]
According to the Difference-in-Difference model the Treatment variable takes a unit value
of one if a city in the pair has a Shell retail station or will have a Shell retail station. Post0 is
equal to one since the entry year is set to the same value for treated and control cities within
one group. Our results presented in Table 4.7 reveal a positive and then negative impact of
Shell’s entry on the degree of price dispersion for highly refined products as indicated by the
Treatment×Post0 and Treatment×Post1 variables. The degree of price dispersion between
Shell populated cities and non-Shell populated cities increases by approximately 1.3 to 1.5
percentage points before falling by 1.5 to 1.8 percentage points in the following period.
When we compare across gasoline types it appears that Shell’s entry into a city tends to have
a larger impact on the price dispersion of highly refined gasoline rather than the more regular
gasoline products. The coefficients on the interaction term for Gas#93 and Gas#97 are similar
in both the range and the statistical significance, while the elasticity for Gas#90 tends to
be lower and insignificant except for the third period after entry. There are two possible
explanations. First, highly refined gasoline tends to be more profitable (had previously
higher margins). The market for high performance fuels is also likely to be more attractive
to foreign firms where they may also have a technological advantage coupled with higher
advertising and marketing budgets. For the 862 Shell service stations over the whole of
China, more than 95 percent of the stations sell highly refined gasoline. In contrast, only
a small number of service stations in Beijing, Shandong and Guangdong sell the regular
4.5 Results 133
gasoline product. Furthermore, unbalanced entry implies that the two large government-
owned vertically-integrated oil companies, Sinopec and PetroChina, have greater monopoly
power in the production and retail of regular gasoline. With a large market share occupied by
incumbents, the average price level is less likely to respond to or be influenced by the entry
of international retailers such as Shell and such an effect is confirmed by our results.
Second, the cross-elasticities of demand from consumers tend be different between Gas#90,
Gas#93 and Gas#97. According to a survey by Sohu, Gas#90 is used mainly by commercial
vehicles such as taxis and buses. These operators prefer low grade gasoline in order to reduce
operating costs, while private car owners tend to pay more attention to the condition of their
vehicle and are more likely to use higher grade gasoline. Given private car owners are also
more likely to have a preference for quality and non-fuel services, the entry of Shell is more
likely to increase competition in the Gas#93 and Gas#97 markets and should therefore have
a larger impact on local market prices. In addition, commercial vehicles are often tied into
long-term contracts with incumbents and are thus less likely to change brand in response to
price competition. As a result, the market price distribution for Gas#90 is less likely to be
influenced by the entry of a foreign competitor.
Turning to the other covariates, we find a negative effect from the absolute difference in
GDP per capita between cities for Gas#93 and Gas#97 but a positive effect on the absolute
dispersion of Gas#90. Of the remaining explanatory variables, average wage per employee
tends to be a cost shifter while population and highway passenger traffic numbers are demand
shifters. According to Lin (1985) population density plays a mixed role and could be regarded
as both a cost and a demand shifter. In our case, when we consider the whole sample, greater
differences in these variables tends to exert a negative impact on price dispersion. The
dispersion of average wage has a negative and statistically significant impact on all of our
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three products. Differences in the population and passenger traffic by highway are also
significant and negative determinants of price dispersion for Gas#90.
In the next stage we investigate whether our results are driven by a segmented market effect.
To do this we run regressions for different regional markets by identifying whether the treated
city is located in the western region for each gasoline type and using the full specification
including lags on the entry decision.13 The results are presented in Table 4.8. The first three
columns of Table 4.8 are based on east/central subsample while columns (4) to (6) are for the
subset of western regions. At the first glance it appears that Shell’s entry had a greater and
more immediate impact on price changes in western regions. The positive impact following
by the reduction in prices occurs from the first period of Shell’s entry for western cities while
it starts from the second period after entry in east/central area. One explanation could be
the regional convergence clusters theory Ma and Oxley (2012) which argues that the eastern
energy market is more mature and hence has a higher level of competition so firms are more
likely to be price takers.
[Table 4.8 about here]
4.6 Pricing Mechanisms
As one of a leading group of energy and petrochemical companies, Shell has various busi-
nesses in China including upstream and downstream activities. Its size and expertise means
that it can undertake complex projects using world leading innovative technologies. As a
new entrant, Shell has the managerial skills, scale and financial backing to be considered
an efficient competitor. Following Basker (2005) study on Wal-Mart’s entry effect on local
13The treated cities located in the western region are Chongqing, Chengdu, Zigong, Xian and Baoji. Beijing,
Guangzhou and Shenzhen are regarded as eastern cities and Taiyuan is considered as a central city.
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prices in the US and Hastings (2004) about vertical relationships and competition in the
retail gasoline market we now investigate two potential mechanisms that may affect price
dispersion.
4.6.1 The market-specific mechanism
The market-specific mechanism works through retail competition at the local market level.
New foreign gasoline retailers are assumed to exert competitive pressure in localized gasoline
markets. Previous empirical studies suggest an inverted relationship between the degree of
market diversification and gasoline prices (Hastings, 2004; Zimmerman, 2012). To account
for Shell’s uneven network distribution across China, we construct a measure of the degree
of competition from Shell based on the number of Shell stations in an individual market
scaled by the maximum number of Shell stations in a city (in our dataset this is Xian with
113 stations).14 We calculate our competition indicator in the entry year as:
Competition0it =
Total number o f Shell stations in city i
Max number o f Shell stations in a city
×Posti0
The delayed effect of increased competition is captured by the corresponding indicators
generated with Posti1 and Posti2 giving us our Competition1 and Competition2 variables.
Table 4.9 presents our estimation results for the impact of the extent of Shell’s competitive
impact on the retail price for our three different types of gasoline. Note that the unit of
analysis is an individual city rather than a comparison across cities which implies that the
left hand side variable is simply the price level rather than a measure of price dispersion.
The first three columns use the overall matched sample and the final three columns consider
14Since retail networks are generally built gradually over time, ideally our Shell competitive index should
also increase over time. However, we only have the total number of stations located in a city and not the opening
date for each individual station. Using the total number of stations enables us to get a rough approximation of
the degree of Shell’s presence in a local market.
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the western area only (sample size issue means that we are unable to report the eastern
and central city results). A negative and statistically significant coefficient on the impact of
competition on price for Gas#93 and Gas#97 shows that Shell’s presence in a local market
increases competition and leads to a reduction in the retail price for two of our three gasoline
products immediately after Shell’s entry.
Our results suggest that in the year of entry in Xian, for Gas#93 and Gas#97 prices fall by
between 4.2 and 5.0 percent (column 2 and 3 in Table 4.9). Hence, the impact of Shell’s entry
on the price level in a treated city tends to decrease relative to the price in the control group
of cities.15 The results suggest that the initial positive effect of entry on price dispersion is
driven by price falls in treated cities and that this effect is particularly true for highly refined
products. Similarly, the rebound in prices in the second stage indicated by the coefficient
of Competition1 captures the decrease in price dispersion in Table 4.7. One explanation for
these overall price dynamics comes from the Edgeworth price cycle hypothesis that was
discussed in the literature review where an asymmetric pattern of price changes is comprised
of numerous small prices decreases that are then interrupted by occasionally large price
increases (Maskin and Tirole, 1988; Noel, 2011). The argument follows that after the entry
of new competitor, firms tend to undercut each other (normally initiated by smaller firms) in
order to achieve a greater market share. Eventually, a restoration of the higher price occurs,
generally by parties with large market shares, and a new sequence of undercutting is initiated
(Noel, 2007a; Eckert, 2003).
As we found previously, the impact of competition is driven mainly by a strong entry effect
in western regions of China and is again more significant for highly refined gasoline. Turning
15If we take Xian as an example a 4.2 and 5.0 percent decrease (Column (2) (3) in Table 4.9) means a price
reduction of approximately 230 and 290 yuan/ton (0.17 and 0.21 yuan/liter) for Gas#93 and Gas#97 after
Shell’s entry compared with non-Shell cities everything else equal. Although economically this is small effect
these numbers feel intuitively plausible given the characteristics of the retail gasoline market in China.
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to our other controls, we find a generally positive impact on gasoline prices from population
density which could be considered as a demand driver.
[Table 4.9 about here]
4.6.2 The aggregation mechanism
The second mechanism we investigate is the impact of entry on the wholesale price of gasoline
and how this is affected by Shell’s relationship with local partners who can share valuable
resources and information which could take a long time to develop such as government
relationships, supply networks and knowledge of local markets (Lu, 2010). Over the last ten
years, Shell has developed a number of partnerships with domestic companies and has built
relationships with all of the major national oil companies in China, including China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNPPC) and Shaanxi Yanchang Group Company (YCG).
By doing so Shell has achieved end-to-end integration of the entire value chain from upstream
refineries to downstream retail gasoline stations. The effect on prices could be two-fold.
First, companies such as Shell can bring the global management practices to bear and second,
they have experience operating complex global supply chains. This effect is likely to be
stronger when foreign firms partner with existing refineries run by the large incumbents in
the Chinese market.
In Table 4.10 we present the results for the entry effect on the dispersion of the purchase price
faced by gasoline service stations across China and can be compared to the results in Tables
4.7 and 4.8. If Shell’s entry leads to changes in the average wholesale price across different
cities then local retailers may also be affected and even benefit from Shell’s negotiations
with upstream industries in order to set similar retail prices in different local markets. For
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Gas#97 the coefficients on the first interaction term Treatment×Post0 are always positive
and significant which suggests that the entry of Shell did lead to a significant impact on
wholesale gasoline prices. In Table 4.11 we also break down the effect by region and again
find that the entrant effect on market wholesale price dispersion is higher for western markets
for Gas#97. In Table 4.12 we estimate the competitive effect with the level value of wholesale
prices. Similarly, we also find that the increase in price dispersion is driven by a reduction in
prices in treated cities. Hence, it appears that customers benefit more from a more general
impact of Shell on wholesale prices.
[Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 about here]
4.7 Robustness Checks
In this section we conduct a series of robustness checks. The first is to implement a placebo-
control test based on the potential control cities. Within the group of non-Shell cities, a
random sample of cities with random entry years were selected as the treatment group
(we chose 6 to 10 cities as the treated cities with entry years between 2002 and 2011) and
implemented our pairwise DID estimator to investigate the first, second and third period
entry effect. The process was simulated 300 times and no significant entry effects were found
for any period after the assumed year of entry. This gives us confidence that we are capturing
the impact of Shell’s entry on prices.
Second, although Shell has the largest gasoline retail network, it is not the only foreign oil
company to have entered China’s gasoline retail market. British Petroleum (BP), Total S.A.
and Exxon have also made inroads into China’s retail market since the beginning of the
1990s. One concern is that our potential control cities also include international retailers
which may lead to an underestimate of the entry effect of Shell. Therefore, we use data from
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the top four international retailers’ entry in China combined with our gasoline price dataset.
A city is labeled as a treatment city if any one of the four retailers has opened a gasoline
retail station in that city. The treatment date was set as the year of the first retailer’s entry.16
Although we replicated Tables 4.7 – 4.11 we present only the main results. The other tables
are available from the authors upon request.
[Table 4.13 about here]
Table 4.13 presents the entry effect results for four retailers on the retail prices dispersion
for Gas#90, Gas#93 and Gas#97. Including lagged entry period and various covariates in
column (3), (6) and (9), the entry of an international retailer into a local market leads to a
decrease in the absolute price dispersion for Gas#90 and increases and then a fall for Gas#93
and Gas#97. Again, the entry effect tends to be stronger for highly refined products (Gas#93
and Gas#97) rather than that the regular product (Gas#90). The coefficients are similar with
those in Table 4.7.
4.8 Conclusions
The recent fall in crude oil prices provides China with an opportunity to implement further
energy market reforms. Promoting a more market-orientated pricing regime through a
diversified ownership structure is an integral part of such a process. After the opening up
of the retail and wholesale market many of the world’s largest multinational oil companies
sought access to China’s energy industry and in many cases they expanded rapidly. In this
paper we examine Shell’s entry into China and investigate the entry effect on gasoline price
16The location and entry date information are collected manually on Baidu Map and local newspaper/news
website, which makes the results are only indicative.
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convergence across China for three different type of gasoline on both the retail and wholesale
prices.
Combining a pairwise approach and the difference-in-difference model we show that the
absolute price differential between cities where Shell has a presence and a similar city
without Shell increased by between approximately 1.3 and 1.5 percent compared to the price
differential between any two non- Shell targeted cities. The increased price gap was found to
close again in the following two years. Highly refined gasoline products tend to be the most
affected. The price effect is largest for Western China where the competitive effect of a large
new entrant is felt most keenly. Two potential mechanisms, the market-specific mechanism
and the aggregation mechanism, explain the increase in the price gap. The market-specific
mechanism works through the local market and retail prices for premium products (Gas#93
and Gas#97) where we find a price fall between 4.2 to 5.0 percent in the entry year before
prices rise again by between 2.4 to 3.2 percent over the next two years. When we consider
the aggregation mechanism we find that the dispersion of the wholesale price for Gas#97
follows a similar pattern. The difference in the magnitude of the impact across our three
gasoline products and two regions holds. The main results are robust to a placebo-control
test and controlling for the entry of other foreign multinational retailers.
Deregulation and market liberalization of China’s energy market has been in progress for
more than ten years. The outcome appears to be positive for consumers who have experienced
lower prices for gasoline. With China’s development entering a period of lower growth,
energy consumption has slowed dramatically. During the first ten years of 21st century, the
annual average growth rate for energy consumption was 9.4%. Between 2011 and 2014
this has fallen to 4.3% and is expected to grow around 3% for the next five years. Hence,
China is likely to have sufficient energy supplies to meet this lower than expected demand.
Hence, politically, the current period could represent an ideal time to pursue further reform
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of the energy market. One example of the progress being made is the, so-called, “mixed-
ownership” reforms when in 2014 Sinopec sold off around 30% of its retailing business to
private investors raising more than 100 billion yuan. Efforts to encourage mixed ownership
in upstream exploration by, for example, allowing oil companies to enter the oilfield services
sector should also be considered. Reform of the resource tax system is also an area that needs
careful attention (Huang, 2015).
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Figures and tables
Fig. 4.1 The location of Shell service stations in China (2013)
Source: Shell website http://www.shell.com.cn/en/aboutshell/our-business-tpkg/china.html
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Fig. 4.2 Number of Shell service stations per million people (2013)
Fig. 4.3 Number of Shell service stations per million vehicles (2013)
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Fig. 4.4 Average gasoline production and surplus at the provincial level (2001-2012)
Source: China Energy Statistical Yearbooks. Unit in 10,000 tons.
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Table 4.2 Number of Shell service stations in our nine treated cities (2001-2012)
City Province Stations First entry date
Beijing Beijing 24 2003
Taiyuan Shanxi 13 2010
Guangzhou Guangdong 9 2007
Shenzhen Guangdong 1 2007
Chongqing Chongqing 37 2007
Chengdu Sichuan 68 2005
Zigong Sichuan 4 2005
Xian Shaanxi 113 2009
Baoji Shaanxi 20 2010
Note: Data sources from Shell China
http://www.shell.com.cn/en/aboutshell/our-business-
tpkg/china.html. First entry date are collected from the
internet.
Table 4.3 Treated and control groups (2001-2012)
Group Treated cities Control cities Group Treated cities Control cities
1 Beijing Datong 6 Chengdu Fuzhou
1 Beijing Hefei 6 Chengdu Haikou
1 Beijing Nanchang 6 Chengdu Hefei
1 Beijing Pingliang 6 Chengdu Nanchang
1 Beijing Wuhan 6 Chengdu Wuhan
1 Beijing Xiamen 6 Chengdu Zhengzhou
2 Taiyuan Datong 7 Zigong Dalian
2 Taiyuan Jiaxing 7 Zigong Haikou
2 Taiyuan Pingliang 7 Zigong Nanning
2 Taiyuan Wuhan 7 Zigong Qingdao
2 Taiyuan Xingtai 7 Zigong Quanzhou
2 Taiyuan Xuzhou 7 Zigong Shenyang
3 Guangzhou Nanjing 7 Zigong Zhengzhou
3 Guangzhou Xiamen 8 Xian Nanjing
3 Guangzhou Xingtai 8 Xian Wuhan
4 Shenzhen Jiaxing 8 Xian Xiamen
4 Shenzhen Xingtai 8 Xian Xingtai
4 Shenzhen Xuzhou 8 Xian Xuzhou
4 Shenzhen Zhoukou 9 Baoji Dalian
5 Chongqing Nanjing 9 Baoji Fushun
5 Chongqing Shanghai 9 Baoji Guiyang
9 Baoji Shijiazhuang
9 Baoji Yantai
Note: Only cities which have never been entered by Shell are included as possible
control cities. The PSM procedure is based on nearest neighbor matching. A
robustness check using radius matching gives similar results which are available
upon request.
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Table 4.4 Post-matching tests for balanced assumption
Variable Matching Mean %Bias %Bias T test P-value V(T)
Treated Control Reduction /V(C)
GDP per capital Unmatched 10.35 10.15 40.00 2.21 0.03 0.81
Matched 10.35 10.29 11.60 70.90 0.46 0.65 0.64
Population density Unmatched 6.46 5.98 90.30 4.72 0.00 0.59
Matched 6.46 6.42 7.60 91.60 0.35 0.73 0.76
Average wage Unmatched 10.23 10.05 58.60 3.22 0.00 0.79
Matched 10.23 10.21 3.80 93.50 0.18 0.86 1.24
Passenger traffic by highway Unmatched 9.16 9.00 17.30 1.16 0.25 1.91
Matched 9.16 9.20 -4.40 74.40 -0.20 0.85 2.41
Gas#90 Unmatched 8.66 8.65 3.60 0.18 0.86 0.51
Matched 8.66 8.68 -8.50 -139.00 -0.45 0.66 1.07
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias B R %Var
Unmatched 0.21 54.06 0.00 41.90 40.00 132.90 0.64 0.00
Matched 0.01 0.52 0.99 7.20 7.60 16.80 1.40 20.00
Notes: The first table compares the extent of balancing for each variable. The standardized
percentage bias (column 5) is the sample mean difference between the treated and non-treated
sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in both
sub-samples (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). A lower bias percentage implies a better match with
the covariates. Column 7 shows the t-test for equality of means in both samples. The high p-values
in the final column indicate that there is no significant difference between the treatment and the
control group. The variance ratio of treated over non-treated is displayed in the last column and
it should equal to 1 if there is perfect balance. The second table calculates the overall measures
of covariate balance. The likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance and the corresponding
p-values are present in column 2 and 3. The mean and median bias as summary indicators of the
distribution of the absolute bias are shown in column 4 and 5. Robin’s B (the absolute standardized
difference of the means of the linear index of the propensity score in the treated and (matched)
non-treated group) is recommended to be less than 25 and Rubin’s R (the ratio of treated to
(matched) non-treated variances of the propensity score index) is recommended to be between 0.5
and 2 for the samples to be considered sufficiently balanced (Rubin, 2001).
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Table 4.5 The impact of distance on price dispersions (OLS regression 2001-2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Gas #90 Gas #93 Gas #97 Gas #90 Gas #93 Gas #97
Trend 0.0027*** -0.0013*** -0.0015*** 0.0026*** -0.0013*** -0.0016***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Log(Distance) 0.0105*** 0.0071*** 0.0048*** 0.0690*** 0.0371** 0.0592***
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0191) (0.0148) (0.0140)
Log(Distance)2 -0.0041*** -0.0021** -0.0038***
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Constant -5.3664*** 2.5557*** 3.0918*** -5.3674*** 2.5497*** 3.0776***
(0.7703) (0.6271) (0.6388) (0.7606) (0.6230) (0.6300)
Observations 1,262 1,316 1,302 1,262 1,316 1,302
R-squared 0.0572 0.0396 0.0321 0.0640 0.0428 0.0430
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels
respectively.
Table 4.6 Description of the variable dispersion (2001-2012)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
∆log (Gas#90 retail price) 1,262 0.0402 0.0491 0.0000 0.2716
∆log (Gas#93 retail price) 1,316 0.0354 0.0373 0.0000 0.2197
∆log (Gas#97 retail price) 1,302 0.0356 0.0361 0.0000 0.2030
∆log (Gas#90 wholesale price) 1,116 0.0625 0.1738 0.0000 1.4323
∆log (Gas#93 wholesale price) 854 0.0409 0.0325 0.0000 0.2064
∆log (Gas#97 wholesale price) 854 0.0416 0.0351 0.0000 0.2143
∆log (GDP per capita) 1,604 0.6893 0.5250 0.0016 2.6764
∆log (Population density) 1,539 0.4895 0.4290 0.0009 1.8431
∆log (Average wage) 1,422 0.2021 0.1810 0.0001 1.1389
∆log (Population) 1,680 0.7086 0.5405 0.0017 2.1276
∆log (Passenger traffic by highway) 1,434 0.7663 0.5586 0.0006 3.2216
Note: The dispersion rates (in absolute values) for all variables are calculated with the
same order which is randomly assigned. All monetary values are deflated in 2005 prices
using province level CPI.
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Appendix C
Fig. C.1 The sport price trend of Gas#90 in China (2011-2013)
Note: Data source CPMC. The spot price shown in this figure is from the anonymous station no.1 in each of our sampled cities. Unit
yuan/ton.
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Table C.1 The competitive impact of foreign entry on the wholesale price (2001 - 2012)
Province Gasoline production Gasoline consumption Deficit No. of Stations
Liaoning 936.49 401.80 534.69 0
Shandong 688.31 469.09 219.21 89
Guangdong 454.93 731.21 -276.28 34
Heilongjiang 409.40 333.26 76.14 0
Shaanxi 407.18 190.63 216.55 290
Shanghai 263.64 290.61 -26.97 0
Zhejiang 262.16 409.29 -147.13 0
Gansu 255.09 78.39 176.70 0
Xinjiang 240.73 115.11 125.62 0
Hainan 239.11 38.45 200.66 0
Jiangsu 238.46 496.11 -257.65 0
Hebei 221.88 213.33 8.55 113
Beijing 196.31 267.75 -71.44 24
Hubei 185.70 400.88 -215.18 0
Jilin 165.95 125.32 40.64 0
Henan 159.91 221.12 -61.20 0
Tianjin 140.35 150.03 -9.68 70
Hunan 138.78 215.20 -76.42 0
Fujian 112.95 228.15 -115.20 0
Jiangxi 89.76 93.30 -3.54 0
Anhui 84.03 120.02 -35.99 0
Guangxi 63.80 167.45 -103.65 0
Ningxia 59.91 21.79 38.13 0
Inner Mongolia 39.47 202.50 -163.03 0
Sichuan 37.19 338.90 -301.71 153
Qinghai 29.97 20.01 9.95 0
Shanxi 2.01 162.71 -160.70 58
Chongqing 0.42 89.77 -89.35 37
Yunnan 0.02 159.16 -159.14 0
Tibet . . . 0
Guizhou . 94.61 . 0
Note: Data source from China Energy Statistical Yearbooks. Data for Tibet is not available.
Values in 10,000 tons.
Table C.2 Summary for variable definitions and units
Variable Definition Unit
Gasoline price Gasoline price for Gas#90, Gas#93 or Gas#97 Yuan/ton
GDP per capita Per capital of Gross Domestic Product Yuan/person
Population density Population divided by land area Person per square km
Average wage Average wage of staff and workers Yuan
Population Total population at the end of the year 10,000 persons
Passenger traffic by highway Passenger traffic by highway 10,000 persons
Note: All monetary values are deflated in 2005 prices using province level CPI.
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Table C.3 Estimation of propensity scores with logit
Entry Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval
Log(GDP per capita) -2.648 0.695 -3.810 0 -4.010 -1.287
Log(Population density) 2.751 0.530 5.190 0 1.713 3.789
Log(Average wage) 7.284 1.603 4.540 0 4.142 10.430
Log(Passenger traffic by highway) -0.648 0.274 -2.360 0.018 -1.185 -0.110
Log(Gas 90) -2.386 1.305 -1.830 0.067 -4.944 0.171
Constant -39.840 9.830 -4.050 0 -59.100 -20.570
N 464
Prob> χ2 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.219
Note: All monetary values are deflated in 2005 prices using province level CPI.
Chapter 5
Energy Abundance, Trade and the
Geographical Distribution of the
Manufacturing Sector in China
Energy Abundance, Trade and the Geographical Distribution
of the Manufacturing Sector in China
Abstract
The next decade will see pressing demands on China to deliver a low-carbon economy and
address growing energy shortages. In this paper we identify the impact of energy resources
on industry location, structure and trade patterns. Employing a pseudo-endowment approach,
we measure energy abundance using three-dimensional input data at the province-sector-year
level from 2003 to 2009. Our results suggest that energy abundance has a significant impact
on industry location and trade patterns, especially for energy intensive sectors. Two impact
channels are specified, namely the availability of natural resource reserves and regulation
laxity. Further analysis suggests that both components play a role in determining the industry
location and trade with OECD countries. Our results suggest that environmental and energy
regulations can be used to shape China’s industrial structure.
JEL: F10; Q40; R12
Keywords: Energy abundance; Industry distribution; Trade patterns
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5.1 Introduction
Energy has long been recognized as one of the most important inputs into the industrial
production process. However, the impact of energy prices and the abundance of energy
resources on industry location is little researched. Growing pressure on countries to develop
low-carbon and sustainable economies means that identifying the impact of energy resources
on industry specialization is of interest to both academics and policy makers. The purpose
of this paper is to investigate the impact of energy abundance on industry location and
the subsequent trade flows of firms in those locations within China. More specifically,
we investigate how a comparative advantage in energy abundance affects the geographical
distribution of firms and how this affects trade with OECD countries.
The contribution of our paper is two-fold. First, we utilize a cost-minimizing micro-based
approach to estimate a pseudo-endowment indicator to proxy province level energy abun-
dance. This approach enables us to estimate energy abundance directly from input data
despite the regionally heterogeneous industrial structure (Gerlagh and Mathys, 2011).1 This
helps us to overcome problems of data availability and reliability across space and time. For
robustness we employ two additional measures of energy abundance which are derived from
different data sources. Second, to better understand the mechanisms through which energy
abundance affects industry distribution and trade, we decompose the pseudo-endowment
indicator into two components, resource reserves and regulation laxity, and investigate their
impacts individually.
After 30 years of rapid growth, China now plays a major role in the international economy.
Taken together with its position as the world’s largest energy consumer, it is important to
understand the impact of energy abundance on industrial production. The previous decade
1A revised version of Gerlagh and Mathys (2011) has been published in Energy Journal, see Gerlagh et al.
(2015)
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has witnessed an increase in the energy and environmental related costs faced by Chinese
manufacturing plants. Industrial electricity prices ranged from 510 to 930 yuan per MWh
across Chinese provinces in 2012 which is 20% higher than the prices in 2006 (SDRC,
2016). It places Chinese manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage compared to some
international competitors. The electricity price for energy-intensive large-scale consumers
in China is considered as one of the highest of all major exporters (Ecofys et al., 2015) and
hence, means that some sectors may be increasingly vulnerable to international competition.2
To briefly summary our results, we find that energy abundance has a significant impact on
industry location and hence trade location, especially for energy intensive sectors. Provinces
with a higher level of energy abundance tend to specialize in producing and exporting energy
intensive products. On average, a one percentage point change in energy abundance yields
an approximately 0.2% change in the share of industrial production. The energy effect is
confirmed by two alternative measures of province level energy abundance, namely the
energy self-sufficiency ratio and the industrial electricity price. A one percentage point rise
in the energy self-sufficiency ratio and a one percentage point decrease in the industrial
electricity price leads to an approximately 0.6% and 2.0% rise of production share for
sectors with an average energy dependency, respectively. Further analysis reveals that both
resource reserves and regulation laxity are important mechanisms by which energy abundance
affects the distribution of industry and trade. Provinces with relatively rich resources and
lax environmental controls produce and export more energy intensive goods. Finally, we
consider the comparative advantage of energy abundance at both the local level and global
level. Based on the data of export transactions to OECD countries, the impact of energy
abundance remains significant for energy intensive sectors. We find that countries with higher
2According to an international comparison of electricity costs of energy intensive industries (Ecofys et al.,
2015, Figure 1), China ranks in 7th place behind Canada, the U.S., France, Germany, the Netherlands and South
Korea but above Denmark, the UK, Italy and Japan. When comparing electricity rates subject to small, medium
and large manufacturing firms, U.S. has a cost advantage for all three types of consumers. The largest gap is
between medium electricity consumers in two countries where the U.S. rates can be 34%-49% lower than that
in China (BLS and Tractus, 2016).
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industrial electricity prices import more energy intensive goods from China’s more energy
abundant provinces. The result confirms previous findings and contributes to the evidence
for developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a comprehensive
review of previous researches covering the decision of industry location and energy related
investigation. Section 5.3 presents the econometrical methodology and derivations for the
factor endowment and industry intensity. Section 5.4 describes the data we use and empirical
results are provided in Section 5.5. Conclusion is presented in Section 5.6.
5.2 Literature Review
There is a growing literature that examines the impact of energy abundance on international
trade. A recent strand of literature considers energy endowments as one input into the
production function together with capital and labour. Multi-country studies include Mulatu
et al. (2010) and Gerlagh and Mathys (2011) while country specific studies include Ederington
and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor (2008). The way that energy endowments are
modelled varies from study to study, depending largely on the research question. Some
develop indicators to measure environmental capacity or utilize policy dummies while others
employ continuous variables such as energy prices or pollution taxes. Although the literature
has verified the important role of energy resources and environmental regulation in production
location and global trade patterns, these studies have tended to concentrate on developed
countries and it is unclear whether the result holds for developing countries.
Understanding the industrial spatial distribution across countries or across regions within a
country is of interest to both academics and policy makers. The workhorse in the literature
is the theory of comparative advantage that emphasizes the role of factor endowments and
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argues that countries tend to produce goods that consume more resources of which they
have an abundance. Ricardo (1817) developed the classical theory of comparative advantage
and Heckscher, Ohlin and Samuelson (HOS) extended the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model in
the middle of nineteenth century. Leontief (1953), in a study of U.S. trade flows, finds that
against expectations, U.S. imports were more capital intensive than exports.
Subsequent studies relax key assumptions of the HO model (Davis et al., 1997; Davis
and Weinstein, 2000; Hakura, 2001). Davis et al. (1997) examines the factor abundance
theory by exploring both international and Japanese regional data. They find the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model performs poorly under the conventional restrictive assumptions.
However, when the assumption of universal factor price equalization is relaxed, the modified
model fits remarkably well. Early studies also assume that countries use the same technology
in production. The neglect of technological difference is assumed to systematically under-
estimate factor endowment effect. By calculating the actual technology matrices based on
data from manufacturing and non-manufacturing in ten rich OECD countries, Davis and
Weinstein (2000) find that the factor endowment theory is well identified by the data. A
substantial 38 to 49 percent of trade flows can be explained by the endowment effect.
Hakura (2001) departs from the two-country model and analyzes the impact of factor endow-
ments between each country and the rest of the world. The result highlights the importance
of technology differences. It is notable that many of the studies have drawn a conclusion
that the industry location model tends to fit better with data from a limited country or region
rather than a broad cross country studies as there are fewer distorting trade barriers (Davis
et al., 1997; Kim, 1999; Hakura, 2001).3
Recent studies have been carried out that combine models of comparative advantage with
New Economic Geography (NEG) theory (Midelfart et al., 2000; Romalis, 2004; Egger
3Based on the two-digit manufacturing data across the U.S. from year 1880 to 1987, Kim (1999) finds that
factor endowments contribute definitively to the industry location and interregional trade patterns.
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and Egger, 2005; Klein and Crafts, 2012). Midelfart et al. (2000) develop a econometric
framework to estimate the industry location across countries including both factor endow-
ments and geographical characteristics such as transport costs and spatial patterns of demand.
Employing sectoral data from 14 EU countries during the period 1980 to 1997, the study
demonstrates that the skilled labour and scientific inputs are the major determinants of
industry location. Romalis (2004) introduces a multinational HO model with continuous
goods including the impact from scale economies, production differentiation and transport
costs. Two predictions are proved using trade data from the U.S. and the Asia “miracle”
four countries: countries with a large share of production and trade in goods that use their
abundant factors intensively; rapid growth of an industry is followed by the accumulation of
factors that are used intensively in that industry. Egger and Egger (2005) examine bilateral
processing trade patterns between 14 EU countries as a microcosm of global trade. By
summarizing different strands of production location theories, they include four categories
of covariates in the model covering market size, endowments, trade costs information and
infrastructure variables. Thus, trade costs turn out to be the most important factor followed
by infrastructure variables in affecting processing trade. Relative endowment levels which
are represented by absolute difference in GDP per capital are important in affecting outward
processing trade. Klein and Crafts (2012) take the degree of market availability into account
and find that market access is a determinant of U.S. industrial location between 1880 and
1920. Factor endowments matters only in the late 19th century with the influence fading
away gradually.
More recently, due to increasing concerns about levels of pollution and environmental
degradation, a large and growing body of literature extends the comparative advantage
theory to include energy and environmental restrictions (Ederington and Minier, 2003;
Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Cole et al., 2005; Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Hanna, 2010).
The argument is summarized as the Pollution Heaven Hypothesis (PHH) which argues
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that in response to increasing regulations, developed countries tend to transfer pollution-
intensive or energy-intensive production overseas where environmental regulations are less
stringent. Based on a small open economy setting, Copeland and Taylor (2004) show that
strict environmental regulations affect production location and trade flows. With the emphasis
of endogenous environmental policy, Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor
(2008) both find the significant impact of environmental regulations on U.S. trade patterns.
Moreover, Cole et al. (2005) provide an alternative explanation for the minor impact of
environmental regulations on trade and investment based on industrial characteristics. The
fact that pollution intensive industries require a large amount of physical and human capital
means that developing countries are less attractive as a target for relocation. From an outward
foreign direct investment perspective, Hanna (2010) finds that multinational firms based
in the U.S. have a strong incentive to transfer their assets (5.3 percent) and production (9
percent) aboard due to the impact of the Clean Air Act Amendments initially passed in 1970.
Similar results are found in studies of the EU emission trading system.4
Studies that consider the impact of energy abundance on production location include, from a
global perspective, Mulatu et al. (2010); Gerlagh and Mathys (2011); Sato and Dechezleprêtre
(2015). Utilizing the Johnson-Neyman technique for conditional effects, Mulatu et al.
(2010) analyzes data covering 16 manufacturing industries from 13 European countries and
concludes that the pollution heaven effect is present. However, both environmental stringency
and the pollution intensity of an industry matter since the effect of environmental regulation
is only significant for heavily polluting industries. As for the magnitude, environmental
regulations have a similar effect to other determinants of industry location such as agriculture,
education and research and development (R&D) expenditure.
To further examine the role of energy endowments, Gerlagh and Mathys (2011) present a
new approach by estimating factor endowments with input data. Using this approach, factor
4See Arlinghaus (2015) for a summary of the results of recent papers.
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abundance can be measured independently of industry structure and thereby avoiding the
weak proxy issue of environmental regulations. Their study focuses on 14 high income
countries and corroborates the finding that energy abundant countries have a comparative
advantage in energy intensive sectors. A recent study from Sato and Dechezleprêtre (2015)
also confirms the energy effect from the global perspective by investigating the impact of
asymmetric energy prices. The dataset used is comprehensive and includes bilateral trade
transactions covering 62 sectors between 42 countries between 1996 and 2011 which counts
for 62% of global commodity trade. Although the impact is statistically significant, the
magnitude of the impact is very small and explains less than 0.01% of the variation in trade
flows.
Other recent studies (e.g. Ben Kheder and Zugravu, 2012; Michielsen, 2013; Aldy and
Pizer, 2015) also confirm the impact of energy endowments on production location at the
sub-regional level within one country. Based on U.S. industry, Aldy and Pizer (2015) find
that higher energy prices lead to a decline in production of between 3 to 4 percent among key
energy-intensive sectors. One the demand side, consumption declines by 2 to 3 percent which
implies that roughly 1 percent of production has been transferred overseas. Michielsen (2013)
carries out an investigation across 50 US states based on different types of resources including
coal, national gas, oil and hydropower. The effect of energy endowments on industry location
is confirmed statistically and economically even through energy is considered as tradable
within a country. For sectors that have the energy intensity above the average, he finds
a 20 percent increase of industrial value added due to a one standard deviation increase
of coal or natural gas endowment. Hydro-power and oil endowments are also found to
have a direct impact on production when controlling for energy prices. Focusing on French
firm-level outward investment, Ben Kheder and Zugravu (2012) validate the impact of
environmental regulation on firms’ location choice for developed countries, most of emerging
economics and Central and Eastern European countries. While for developing countries and
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the Commonwealth of Independent States, they reach a contrary conclusion where a stricter
environmental regulation seems attract more investment from French firms. Collectively,
these studies outline the important role of energy endowment in production location and
trade patterns, at least for high income countries and for energy intensive sectors.
To date, little evidence has been found to confirm the competitiveness effect of energy
endowments on industry location in China. To our best knowledge, the only recent exceptions
are studies from Batisse and Poncet (2004) and Grether et al. (2014). With a focus on local
protectionism, Batisse and Poncet (2004) finds that natural resources only exert a minor
impact on industry location across Chinese provinces between 1992 and 1997. Specifically,
the natural resource level is measured by the weighted average output of three energy
products, i.e. oil, coal and ferrous and non-ferrous minerals. Little significance for the
effect of natural resources is found except for provinces with a low level of international
openness. Grether et al. (2014) highlights the determinants of production location from both
comparative advantage and new economic geography aspects. With a balanced panel covering
12 industries in 28 provinces from 1999 to 2009, determinants tested include three traditional
input factors (capital stock, skilled labour and energy inputs) and new economic geography
factors (market potential and supplier access). Energy abundance is measured by total energy
production per worker as well as disaggregated energy productions including coal, oil and
natural gas. A positive and significant correlation is found between the aggregated energy
abundance and industrial production share, although different energy carriers are found to
have contradictory impacts. In summary, these two studies are much more concerned with
natural resource reserves measured by energy productions. Little is known about the impact
of environmental and energy regulations on industry distribution in China. Furthermore, as
one of the major energy inputs in production process, the availability of electricity and the
corresponding impact on industry distribution has yet to be fully understood.
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More broadly, several studies (Chen, 1996; Cheng and Stough, 2006; Dean et al., 2009; Lan
et al., 2012) examine the regional determinants of inward foreign direct investment (FDI)
in China which involves energy resources and environmental regulations. One early study
from Chen (1996) looks at the provincial data from 1987 to 1991 and argues that foreign
investors have taken advantage of abundant energy resources in Western China in spite of the
inefficient resource allocation. To examine the location choices of Japanese manufacturing
FDI across Chinese provinces, Cheng and Stough (2006) include yearly electricity generation
over provincial industrial output as one of the independent variables to measure the energy
scarcity in a province. They analyze FDI data from 764 Japanese affiliates during year 1997
to 2002 and conclude that there is no significant impact of energy scarcity level on Japanese
FDI location. Furthermore, Dean et al. (2009) investigate the PHH in China with a sample of
equity joints ventures investments during 1993 to 1996. The water pollution levy is employed
to measure the environmental stringency and results vary based on the source country of
investment and sectoral pollution intensity. Only investments in pollution intensive sectors
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan are found to be attracted by weak environmental
stringency. Lan et al. (2012) argues that human resources play a crucial role in delivering a
Pollution Heaven effect across Chinese provinces. Human capital is measured by the average
year of schooling of the population aged above 15. It turns out that provinces with lower
schooling years tend to be more attractive to dirty FDI and vice versa.
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 Estimation of energy abundance
One of the contributions of the paper is to develop a measure of energy abundance for
Chinese provinces that is independent of a province’s sectoral structure, which in part
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addresses the endogeneity concerns. More specifically, our measure is estimated from a firm’s
profit maximizing behavior and abstracted from provincial sector level input data. Another
advantage of this identification strategy compared to proxies such as energy production and
prices is that it provides us with a systematic and uniform estimator in order to measure
energy’s impact on industry location across space and time. Such an approach is particularly
useful for developing country studies that are often subject to limited data availability and
inconstant statistics across space and time. Our approach, developed by Midelfart et al.
(2000) has also been used by Gerlagh and Mathys (2011) to estimate the factor abundance
level for 14 high-income countries between 1970 and 1997.5 Following Gerlagh and Mathys
(2011), the aggregate output Yi,s for province i, sector s is given by:
Yi,s = AiBsK
αs
i,s E
βs
i,sL
1−αs−βs
i,s
where Ki,s, Ei,s and Li,s are capital, energy and labour inputs for sector s in province i
respectively.6 The parameters Ai and Bs indicate province and sectoral technical capabilities
and αs and βs are production elasticities with respect to capital and energy.7 Based on the
production function, total profit are given by:
Total pro f it = Total production−Total cost
= AiBsK
αs
i,s E
βs
i,sL
1−αs−βs
i,s − (riKi,s+ viEi,s+wiLi,s)
where ri, vi and wi represent the unit cost of capital, energy and labour respectively. To
maximize profits, the first order conditions shows that in equilibrium, the relative input of
factors depends on the relative factor scarcity (unit cost ratio) and the sectors’ dependency
5See Midelfart et al. (2000) for details of the methodological approach.
6For convenience, the subscript t for time is omitted in this section. All variables are time variant unless
noted otherwise.
7For simplicity’s sake, we assume a constant return to scale for all sectors. In later estimations the impact of
return to scale will be accounted as sector-specific year effects.
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on the factor (elasticity ratio);
 ln(
Ki,s
Li,s
) =−ln( riwi )+ ln(
αs
1−αs−βs )
ln(Ei,sLi,s ) =−ln(
vi
wi
)+ ln( βs1−αs−βs )
We use θi to indicate the factor abundance level in province i and πs for sectoral dependency
on the factor;  ln(
Ki,s
Li,s
) = θK,i+πK,s+ εK,i,s
ln(Ei,sLi,s ) = θE,i+πE,s+ εE,i,s
Hence, the relative inputs are decided jointly by province and sectoral characteristics. By
regressing relative inputs on province fixed effects and sectoral fixed effects, θi and πs are
the parameters of the dummy variables. The estimate θE,i represents the energy abundance
normalized by labour abundance in province i which depends on natural resource endow-
ments, policies to encourage or restrict low-carbon or high-carbon industries, subsidies and
preferential taxation rates. We classify the impact sources into two categories, namely natural
resource endowments and policy orientation. Given that coal accounts for more than 80%
of China’s primary energy consumption during our study period, we use provincial coal
production in natural logs to capture the natural resource endowment level. By regressing
estimated energy abundance on coal production and province fixed effects, the coefficient
vector of dummy variables measures the average strength (laxity) of local energy-related
policies during the sample period.
θE,i = γ0+ γ1Productioni+Laxityi×Dummyi+ εE,i (5.1)
The estimate Laxityi is time invariant and endogenous since policies are not implemented
randomly. Generally speaking, developed provinces tend to adopt stricter regulations and
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have a greater demand for better environmental conditions. Such endogeneity downwardly
biases the estimation of the impact of energy abundance on industry location.
5.3.2 Measurement of industry location
To formally capture the industry location across provinces in China, we use the industrial
value added of sector s in province i dividing the domestic total sectoral value added normal-
ized by province level total industry value added.8 It gives us a double relative production
share Si,s =
Yi,s
∑i Yi,s∑s Yi,s
. The impact of factor abundance can be then formulated as follows:
lnSi,s = α+
F
∑
f=1
β f (θ f ,i− θ¯ f )(π f ,s− π¯ f )+ εi,s (5.2)
The coefficient β f indicates the importance of each input (relative to labour) in determining
the production share. θ¯ f and π¯ f indicate the cut-off points that represent the neutral level
of factor abundance and factor dependency.9 More specifically, when provinces have an
energy abundance of θ¯E , firms are considered to be indifferent to locate there regardless
of there energy dependency. Likewise, sectors with π¯E are considered to be indifferent to
energy scarcity and hence unlikely to take province level energy abundance into account
when deciding their location. As a result, sectors that rely significantly on energy inputs
will be attracted to provinces that are rich in natural resources and relatively less stringent
environmental regulations. The share of production under this situation will be increasing. In
other words, βE is expected to be positive and significant.
8The same measure of industry location is used by Midelfart et al. (2000) and Gerlagh and Mathys (2011).
In Mulatu et al. (2010) the regional population is used for normalization to eliminate the size effect. In later
estimation, we include both time variant province fixed effect and time variant sector effect and the denominator
of the share is inoperative literally.
9Appendix D provides a derivation of cut-off points.
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5.3.3 Testable hypotheses
Following Gerlagh and Mathys (2011), we test three related hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Industry specialization: Provinces with relatively high energy abundance
levels attract energy intensive sectors. In other words, the share of energy intensive sectors is
higher in energy abundant provinces everything else equal. We examine the industrial value
added share and the employment share. After rearranging, Equation 5.2 is transformed into
the equation below
lnSi,s,t = α+β1θE,i,tπE,s,t +φi,t +ηs,t + εi,s,t (5.3)
The dependent variable is the double relative industrial value added (or employment) share
of sector s in province i. Our main variable of interest is the interaction between the energy
abundance of province i and the energy dependency of sector s. In addition, we include time
variant province fixed effects and time variant sectoral fixed effects to capture unobserved
provincial and sectoral characteristics respectively.
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, energy abundance is a combination of sources that we classify
into two categories, namely natural resource endowment and policy orientation. Thus,
Equation 5.3 is expanded to the equation below:
lnSi,s,t = α+β1Productioni,tπE,s,t +β2LaxityiπE,s,t +φi,t +ηs,t + εi,s,t
Coal production is our proxy for the provincial resource reserves level and regulation laxity
measures as the average energy-related regulation strength. Coefficients for both interaction
terms are expected to be positive.
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Hypothesis 2. Trade specialization: Provinces with relatively high energy abundance export
more energy intensive goods. We test the impact of energy abundance on the distribution of
trade flows across Chinese provinces. The dependent variable is the exports of sector s in
province i over total exports of sector s and total exports of province i. We also consider net
export share as a robustness check. Hence, the estimation equation is given by:
lnSXi,s,t = α+β1θE,i,tπE,s,t +φi,t +ηs,t + εi,s,t
lnSXi,s,t = α+β1Productioni,tπE,s,t +β2LaxityiπE,s,t +φi,t +ηs,t + εi,s,t
Positive and significant coefficients on the interaction terms imply that energy availability is
an important consideration when importers choose the origin of their imports. Provinces with
relatively higher energy abundance are assumed to specialize in the production of energy
intensive goods and correspondingly have a comparative advantage in exporting energy
intensive goods.
Since the energy abundance indicator reflects variation at the province level, no comparison
is made between domestic and foreign trade partners. Previous studies demonstrate that coun-
tries with strict environmental regulations and costly energy prices tend to transfer domestic
polluting industries to, or import more polluting products from, developing countries that
usually have less strict environmental regulations (Ederington and Minier, 2003; Ederington
et al., 2005; Hanna, 2010; Sato and Dechezleprêtre, 2015). To investigate the impact of
energy on trade patterns, we collect the industrial electricity prices of 32 OECD countries and
construct a triple interaction term. Trade flows are identified by sector, province, destination
and time period. More specifically, industrial electricity prices are considered as a measure
of energy abundance in destination countries. The competitive advantage of provinces with
abundant energy is expected to be more obvious when facing trade partners with relatively
high energy or environmental costs which leads to our third hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 3: Provinces with relatively high energy abundance export more energy intensive
goods to countries with relatively high energy costs. The estimation equation is given by:
lnSXi,s,d,t = α+β1θE,i,tπE,s,t +β1θE,i,tπE,s,t lnIEPd,t +λi,d +φi,t +ηs,t + εi,s,t
The subscripts s, i and d indicate the sector, original province and destination information of
trade flows. IEPd,t is the industrial electricity price in the export destination countries.10 As
well as time variant province and sectoral fixed effects, we also include the province-country
specific effects to take into account existing trade relationships. The energy abundance level
are compared not only from the horizontal (between provinces) but also from the vertical
(between China and destination countries).
5.4 Data Description
The creation of a comprehensive dataset of inputs is essential for the estimation of energy
abundance and energy dependency. Capital, energy and labour are considered as factor
inputs into a firm’s production process. Province-sector input data are collected from annual
province statistical yearbooks. We also measure the energy abundance using two alternative
proxies collected from different sources. The first proxy is the energy self-sufficiency ratio
defined as province electricity production over electricity consumption. Both production
and consumption data are from province energy balance sheets. The second proxy is the
industrial electricity price of 36 large and medium cities collected from the Price Monitoring
Center under the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC 2016). Most of these
36 large and medium sized cities are capital cities of provinces and we use them to represent
10Annual average industrial electricity prices of OECD countries can be found in Table D.1 in the appendix.
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the province level electricity price. For provinces with two or more than two reported cities,
we take the annual average.11
For the dependent variables, industrial value added and employment for province i sector s
are from annual province statistical yearbooks. The trade data are obtained from the General
Administration of Customs of China. We aggregate the transaction data per product type,
export location and destination country when we focus on OECD countries.12 A summary of
definitions can be found in Table D.2 in the appendix. A summary of statistics are presented
in Table 5.1. Xinjiang and Tibet are excluded from the sample due to incomplete industry
records. Hainan province is also excluded because of a lack of industrial activity. Our final
unbalanced panel covers 30 2-digit manufacturing sectors in 27 provinces for the period 2003
to 2009.
[Table 5.1 about here]
To give a brief overview of the industrial structure in China, Table 5.2 provides the sectoral
average input information for each province. Jiangsu, Guangdong and Shandong are the
three provinces that use the most energy and capital. Eastern provinces use more than central
and western provinces. Table 5.3 shows the sectoral input information for each 2-digit
manufacturing sector. As expected, manufacturing related to metal and chemicals production
have the highest energy requirements.
[Table 5.2 about here]
[Table 5.3 about here]
11The 36 large and medium size cities include 31 province-equivalent municipalities or provincial capitals,
and 5 large non-capital cities including Qingdao (Shandong province), Ningbo (Zhejiang province), Dalian
(Liaoning province), Shenzhen (Guangdong province) and Xiamen (Fujian province). Due to the data availabil-
ity, the industrial electricity price ranges from year 2006 to 2009 which is shorter than our main investigation
period 2003 to 2009.
12The dataset provides detailed information about the transaction such as firm identification, trading time
and the product type (8-digit HS code). We use concordances provided by Dean and Lovely (2010) and GTAP
(2006) to convert Customs HS code to Chinese industrial classification code.
5.4 Data Description 177
Finally, we calculate the production elasticities for our three inputs, i.e. capital, energy and
labour. To address the measurement units problem we estimate the input data using beta
coefficients to make the coefficient comparable. The estimation equation is then given by:
lnYi,s,t = α+β1lnKi,s,t +β2lnEi,s,t +β3lnLi,s,t +φi+ηs+λt + εi,s,t
Subscripts i and s are for provinces and sectors respectively. We include province and
sectoral fixed effects. Table 5.4 presents the results. To exclude the impact of the financial
crisis, column (2) presents a subsample regression for period between 2003 and 2007. At
a glance, all our three inputs exhibit a positive and significant impacts on industrial value
added. During our period, capital tends to be the most important factor. A one standard
deviation increase in capital use leads to a 52.3% to 63.5% standard deviation increase in
industrial value added holding other factors constant. Labour is the second most important
factor. A one standard deviation change in labour inputs increases the value added by 20.3%
to 28.3% standard deviation of the normalized value. Energy is statistically significant at
the 1% level in both specifications a smaller coefficient compared to capital and labour. Our
results are in line with Yang and He (2014) who study 29 two-digit manufacturing sectors in
China during 1998 to 2007 and find the capital and labour elasticities as around 0.6 and 0.3
respectively.
[Table 5.4 about here]
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Estimation of energy abundance
Based on our methodology the time variant relative factor abundance θE , θK and factor
intensity πE , πK are estimated using capital, energy and labour input data. Table 5.5 provides
a descriptive summary of these estimators. Figure 5.1 complements Table 5.5 by presenting
the relative positions of Chinese provinces regarding energy abundance levels. From the
bottom, bars to the right means that the provinces have good access to energy either through
rich resource reserves or lax environmental policies. Inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Guizhou,
Qinghai and Shanxi are the top five energy abundant provinces relative to labour according
to our estimates. Reassuringly, provinces with large positive energy abundance are generally
rich in natural resources. For example, Shanxi and Inner Mongolia have been the largest coal
producing provinces in China since 2000.13 Sichuan also has hydropower reserves of up to
150 million kw which is second only to Tibet, and it also leads the country in the reserves
in titanium, vanadium, calcium and fluorite etc. which are important inputs in many metal
related industries.14 On the other hand, the top of Figure 5.1 shows the provinces that have
low energy inputs relative to labour. Bars to the left show that a province has limited energy
accessibility. As the capital of China, Beijing has the strictest environmental regulations
and restricts the production of heavy industry. Hence, Beijing has the highest percentage
difference between tertiary and secondary production relative to GDP. During our period
13Although the coal consumption is falling in recent years, coal resources still remain an important energy
source in China. In 2006, Shanxi province produced 581.42 million tons of coal which is the largest producer
in China followed by Inner Mongolia with 297.60 tons of production. At the end of our period, Inner Mongolia
surpassed Shanxi with the coal production 600.58 tons and became the largest coal production province (NBSC,
2016).
14See http://www.china.org.cn/e-xibu/2JI/3JI/sichuan/sichuan-ban.htm for a description of natural conditions
of Sichuan province.
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2003 to 2009, the annual average secondary industry production relative to GDP in Beijing
is 24.90% and the percentage for the tertiary industry is 74.07% giving a gap of 49.17%.
[Table 5.5 about here]
[Figure 5.1 about here]
Table 5.6 presents energy abundance levels for each province as well as the annual average
coal production and regulation laxity. Corresponding to Figure 5.1, Beijing has the lowest
energy abundance and has the strictest energy and environmental controls. Shandong, Hebei,
Tianjin, Fujian and Shanghai have similar levels of strict environmental controls but different
resource reserves levels. As the political and cultural centre in China, Chinese central
government has released a series of regulations and measures to promote industrial upgrading
and the relocation of heavy industries out of Beijing.15 Particular effort were made before the
Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics when nearly 200 coking, steel and chemical enterprises were
relocated to neighbouring provinces such as Hebei and Tianjin (Ramzy, 2014). Amongst the
most well-known was the move of Shougang Group, the fourth largest steel & iron enterprise
in China from 2006 to 2011. In contrast, Sichuan, Guizhou and Guangxi had relatively loose
energy and environmental regulations over this period with laxity values of 1.63, 1.48 and
1.35 respectively. In Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 displaying the energy abundance we observe that
eastern provinces tend to have stricter regulations compared to central and western provinces.
[Table 5.6 about here]
[Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 about here]
15For example, regulations and measures include “Measures to promote the relocation of polluting and
disturbing enterprises, and speed up industrial restructuring in Beijing (1999)”, “Beijing government’s im-
plementation of the investment system reform from the State Council (2005)” and “Notice on regulating the
polluting and disturbing enterprises in Beijing (2007)”
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We also utilize two alternative proxies of province level energy abundance and investigate
their correlations with θE . Table 5.7 presents the correlation matrix and all parameters are
significant at the 1% level. Energy abundance is positively correlated with the self-sufficiency
ratio and negatively correlated with industrial electricity prices. Table 5.8 presents the pooled
OLS results between the three variables at the province-year level. Bootstrapped standard
errors with 500 replications are adopted to account for the small sample size. The results
confirm a significant correlation between θE and the two alternative measures. In columns
(2) and (4) we control for year specific effects. Both of the specifications are significant and
robust. A ten percentage point increase in the energy abundance increases the self-sufficiency
ratio by approximately 2.62% and 3.13% respectively and the electricity price falls by 1.03%
and 1.04%. We now test our three hypotheses using three energy abundance measures (θE ,
self-sufficiency ratio and industrial electricity price) as well as the two impact channels
(resource reserves and regulation laxity).
[Table 5.7 about here]
[Table 5.8 about here]
5.5.2 Hypotheses testing
The theory of comparative advantage suggests that countries that differ in their level of
resource endowments will export goods requiring intensive input of the abundant resource. In
our case, provinces with abundant energy resources should have an advantage in producing
and hence exporting goods that require intensive energy inputs. As a result, the share of
energy intensive industries are expected to be higher in energy abundant provinces keeping all
other conditions the same. The expectation is framed as Hypothesis 1. Table 5.9 presents the
empirical results. The first four columns are based on the share of industrial value added in
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province i industry s. The remaining columns have the share of employment as the dependent
variable. Province specific time effects and sector specific time effects are included in all
specifications to account for time variant provincial and sectoral characteristics.16 Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the province-sector level allowing for intragroup correlation
(Rogers, 1994).
[Table 5.9 about here]
At first glance, the results suggest a statistically significant impact of energy abundance on
industrial location through all of our three energy abundance measurements from column
(1) to (3) and column (5) to (7). The coefficients of the interaction constructed by θE and
the sectoral energy dependency πE range from 0.205 to 0.165. This implies a 10 percentage
point change of θE gives an approximately 2 percentage point change in the local production
share for sectors with πK at unit value all other things equal. Due to the nature of interaction
term, the overall impact of energy abundance on industrial location depends not only on the
abundance level, but also on the sectoral dependency on energy resources. The larger the πE ,
the greater the production share will change given to a certain change in θE . For example,
Manufacture of Foods (2-digit CIC code 14) has an energy dependency as 1.416 and for
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers (2-digit CIC code 28) it is 3.101. Hence, a ten percentage
point increase of θE in a province will lead to an approximately 2×1.416 = 2.8% increase
of the product share of food manufacturing and a 2×3.101 = 0.62% increase of the product
share of chemical fibers manufacturing. On average, the impact of energy abundance on
production share is approximately 2×1.65 = 3.3% as the mean value of energy dependency
is equal to 1.65. Gerlagh and Mathys (2011) finds the impact coefficients on the interaction
terms range from 0.728 to 0.753 for value added share and 0.429 to 0.450 for employment
share. Hence, they find a stronger impact of energy resources on industry location than we
do for China. One possible explanation for the difference is that the panel used by Gerlagh
16In this case, any variation at province-year level and sector-year level will be captured by dummies.
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and Mathys (2011) includes 14 high-income countries where firms are able to more quickly
adapt to changes in energy and environmental conditions when choosing where to locate. In
addition, they only include 10 broad sectors many of which are energy intensive sectors such
as construction, transportation, iron and steel. Hence, the coefficient is likely to be larger
than estimations based on a wider range of manufacturing sectors.
When we consider the self-sufficiency ratio in column (2) and (6), a ten percentage point
increase leads to a 5.92×1.65 = 9.8% to 6.36×1.65 = 10.5% increase of the production
(employment) share for sectors that have an average dependency on energy inputs. 17
Estimations based on industrial electricity prices in column (3) and (7) yield the largest
elasticities. A ten percentage point increase in the electricity leads to a 19.01×1.65= 31.4%
to 21.76×1.65 = 35.9% fall in the production (employment) share for the average energy
dependent sectors all other things equal. Hence, for Manufacture of Foods and Manufacture
of Chemical Fibres, this means a 19.01× 1.416 = 27% and a 19.01× 3.101 = 59% fall
respectively. Intuitively, taking the mean value of industrial electricity prices as an example,
a ten percentage point change is equal to a 69 yuan/MWh price increase. As a result, a 69
yuan/MWh industrial price increase will lead to a 27% fall of production share for food
manufacturing and a 59% fall of production share for chemical fibres manufacturing all other
things equal.
In columns (4) and (8) we present the results where we distinguish between resource reserves
and regulation laxity. Both resource reserves and regulation laxity have a statistically
significant impacts on the industry location. Hence, our results confirm Hypotheses 1 that
energy abundance impacts industry location in China. The decomposition results suggest that
both natural resource reserves and energy-related regulations are important determinants of
17Note that although many of the manufacturing sectors are labour intensive compared to energy inputs, and
hence have an energy dependency πE below the neutral level π¯E , the share of the production will still rise when
the energy abundance increases in a province.
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industry distribution across provinces. Provinces with rich coal resources or loose regulation
controls are more attractive to energy intensive sectors.
Table 5.10 presents the results for our test of Hypothesis 2 which examines the impact
of energy abundance on trade specialization. Results show that energy abundance has a
smaller impact on trade flows. The self-sufficiency ratio and industrial electricity prices
are significant at the 5% level and 1% level respectively although no significant correlation
is found between θE and trade shares. The magnitude of both the self-sufficiency ratio
elasticity and the industrial electricity price elasticity are smaller than those in Table 5.9.
This result may be explained by the fact that the trade flows are jointly decided not only by
the domestic economic conditions but also by the international trade environment. Results
in columns (4) and (8) indicate that both resource reserves and regulation laxity remain
significant determinants of the location of trade flows, but again, with smaller elasticities
than those in Table 5.9 . Provinces with rich natural resources and loose regulation controls
are attractive to energy intensive sectors from both a production and an export perspectives.
[Table 5.10 about here]
To better understand the impact of energy abundance on trade patterns, we investigate the
energy impact on the bilateral trade patterns between China and OECD countries. Each
transaction is identified by sector, province, destination and year information. As a reminder,
Table D.1 in the appendix provides a list of OECD countries and the annual average industrial
electricity prices (IEP).
[Table 5.11 about here]
Table 5.11 provides the estimation results considering both inter-region and inter-nation
energy abundance. We start by asking whether provinces with abundant energy have an
advantage in exports generally regardless of the product type. In columns (1) to (3), the
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dependent variable is the total exports from province i to country d. The insignificant coeffi-
cients on the interaction terms reveal that there is little evidence associating general trade
flows and energy abundance, despite using three different measures of energy abundance.
When we concentrate on energy intensive sectors, we find a highly significant triple inter-
action terms in column (4) to (5) which indicates a strong impact of energy abundance on
the exports of energy intensive products. Our results suggest that countries with significant
higher IEP are more cautious when choosing their overseas origin for energy intensive goods.
More specifically, they import more energy intensive goods from provinces with either rich
resource reserves or loose energy and environmental controls. Hence, the significant impact
of energy on international trade flows only holds for goods that rely heavily on energy inputs
relative to labour inputs. Comparing the results from Table 5.11 with those in Table 5.10,
it can be seen that the impact of energy abundance is enhanced if the import country is
energy-scarce. Our finding is in line with the conclusion that relative energy prices play a
significant role in bilateral import flows, especially for energy intensive goods (Sato and
Dechezleprêtre, 2015).18
To test the robustness of our findings, we run a series of regressions following the framework
in Tables 5.9 to 5.11. As shown in Figure 5.1, it is apparent that Beijing has an extraordinarily
low energy abundance level compared to other provinces. Hence, we exclude Beijing as a
outlier from our sample and the sub-sample results are present in Table D.3 in the appendix.
The first four columns are based on the dependent variable production share; Columns (5)
to (8) are based on exports share and the last four columns are based on trade flows with
OECD countries. Results are significant and consistent with previous findings in Tables 5.9
to 5.11. To limit possible endogeneity issues, we further conduct a robustness check using
18Sato and Dechezleprêtre (2015) find that on average a 10 percentage point increase in the relative energy
price gap between two countries would induce a 0.2% increase in import flows. The impact is higher for energy
intensive sector with the elasticity of 0.027%. Hence, a 4% increase in the price difference between the UK
and India tends to increase the UK’s import by approximately 0.1%. The impact is small in magnitude but
significant statistically.
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lagged explanatory variables.19 Table D.4 presents the lagged identification. All our three
energy abundance measures as well as two channels are lagged by one year considering the
relatively short time period. The results are broadly similar to our previous findings in terms
of both size and significance.
5.6 Conclusions
Although energy resources have long been recognized as an important input into the pro-
duction function, whether it has a direct impact on industry location remains unclear. To
date evidence has tended to focus on developed countries. Following two decades of rapid
growth, China has since 2010 surpassed US and become the world’s largest energy consumer.
Under increasing pressure China has started to emphasize energy conservation and pollution
reduction. Hence, understanding the factors that influence industry location is of first-order-
importance for policy makers who are looking to develop instruments to address China’s
pollution concerns and its unbalanced industrial development.
This paper investigates the impact of energy abundance on industry location and trade in
China. Using a pseudo-endowment method, we introduce a time variant indicator to measure
province level energy abundance between 2003 and 2009. Three hypotheses are tested
covering the aspects of industry specialization and trade specialization. Our results suggest
that provinces with relatively higher energy abundance have a comparative advantage in
producing energy intensive goods and hence have a higher production share and export share
of energy intensive goods on average. Both resource reserves and energy-related regulation
controls are important determinants of manufacturing sectors’ distribution. In addition,
based on trade with OECD countries, the energy effect on trade specialization is enhanced
19Using lagged identification enables us to reduce the correlation between the independent variable and the
error term under some circumstance (Bellemare et al., 2017).
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if the industrial electricity price in destination countries is higher. The results are robust to
alternative measures of province level energy abundance and confirmed by further robustness
checks.
Our findings confirm the conclusion made by early studies about the importance of energy
inputs based on developed countries. Furthermore, our results emphasize the importance of
regional heterogeneity in China and provide insights for energy studies for other developing
countries such as India. Despite the well-developed nationwide electricity transmission
and distribution network, natural resource endowments remain an important determinant
of the structure of local manufacturing. Industrial upgrading is one solution. Energy and
environmental related policies can be used as effective instruments to simulate industrial
upgrading due to the apparent significant impact of regulation stringency. Although strict
regulations induce higher production costs which means the elimination of production
capacity, it may promote the development of new energy resources and environment friendly
industries. In addition, efficiency improvement from production specialization can yield
benefits to offset the increasing energy cost to some extent.
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Fig. 5.1 Relative energy abundance referring from the neutral level (2003-2009)
Fig. 5.2 Energy abundance footprint in China (2003-2009)
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Fig. 5.3 Coal resource distribution in China (2003-2009)
Fig. 5.4 Environmental regulation stringency in China (2003-2009)
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Table 5.1 Summary statistics (2003-2009)
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
Capital 2,744 833,158 1,422,276 810 9,202,900
Energy 2,875 1,955,000 4,049,000 1,310 26,000,000
Labour 2,937 73,022 133,763 106 837,800
Industrial value added 2,937 833,502 1,485,000 662 9,274,400
Export 2,937 620,043 1,705,000 30.50 10,450,000
Self-sufficiency ratio 2,937 0.000 0.300 -1.000 0.600
Industrial electricity price 1,834 692 0.089 480 905
Coal production 2,669 9,793 14,067 12.300 63.021
Note: Data are summarized based on an unbalance panel of 30 manufacturing sectors in 27
Chinese provinces during the period from 2003 to 2009. The original trade data is in US
dollar and we convert it into Chinese yuan based on annual exchange rate collected from
NBSC website. The industrial electricity price covers the period from 2006 to 2009 due to
data limitation. Monetary variables are deflated by Producer Price Index (PPI) at 2003 price.
Table D.2 in the appendix presents variable definitions and units.
Table 5.2 Annual average capital, energy and labour inputs in China (2003-2009)
Province Capital Energy Labour West Central East
(10,000 yuan) (MWh) (Person)
Jiangsu 2,667,041 5,839,673 227,428 0 0 1
Guangdong 2,374,794 5,071,886 279,581 0 0 1
Shandong 2,500,825 4,667,911 221,060 0 0 1
Zhejiang 1,959,558 4,592,201 220,934 0 0 1
Guizhou 3,213,941 16,670 1 0 0
Henan 937,274 2,874,143 102,599 0 1 0
Inner Mongolia 381,568 2,566,042 21,553 1 0 0
Sichuan 735,401 2,172,760 71,776 1 0 0
Hebei 946,000 2,070,070 79,876 0 0 1
Shanxi 668,438 2,051,073 41,198 0 1 0
Liaoning 1,314,786 2,048,726 63,386 0 0 1
Hubei 1,030,994 1,974,071 67,188 0 1 0
Hunan 569,637 1,670,709 52,384 0 1 0
Shanghai 1,511,412 1,610,034 87,469 0 0 1
Qinghai 139,668 1,447,933 4,835 1 0 0
Gansu 341,257 1,441,204 19,829 1 0 0
Fujian 708,487 1,418,248 93,106 0 0 1
Guangxi 383,678 1,390,929 28,950 1 0 0
Yunnan 319,508 1,352,469 19,185 1 0 0
Ningxia 156,867 1,247,761 7,024 1 0 0
Anhui 574,579 1,129,502 43,007 0 1 0
Shaanxi 411,436 1,005,844 31,126 1 0 0
Tianjin 571,063 907,672 37,119 0 0 1
Jiangxi 452,202 782,320 41,359 0 1 0
Chongqing 395,617 706,445 31,528 1 0 0
Heilongjiang 336,029 617,482 47,908 0 1 0
Jilin 486,185 612,394 28,153 0 1 0
Beijing 524,902 599,416 30,623 0 0 1
Note: Data source annual provincial statistic yearbooks. Capital data for Guizhou
is missing for the whole period.
Figures and tables 190
Ta
bl
e
5.
3
A
nn
ua
la
ve
ra
ge
re
la
tiv
e
in
pu
ts
fo
rm
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
se
ct
or
s
in
C
hi
na
(2
00
3-
20
09
)
C
IC
M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
in
du
st
ri
es
C
ap
ita
lr
el
at
iv
e
to
la
bo
ur
E
ne
rg
y
re
la
tiv
e
to
la
bo
ur
33
Sm
el
tin
g
an
d
pr
oc
es
si
ng
of
no
n-
fe
rr
ou
s
m
et
al
s
32
.3
0
19
7.
16
32
Sm
el
tin
g
an
d
pr
oc
es
si
ng
of
fe
rr
ou
s
m
et
al
s
38
.3
6
14
7.
98
28
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
ch
em
ic
al
fib
re
s
23
.7
8
13
3.
77
26
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
ch
em
ic
al
ra
w
m
at
er
ia
ls
an
d
ch
em
ic
al
pr
od
uc
ts
21
.0
2
87
.2
4
25
Pr
oc
es
si
ng
of
pe
tr
ol
eu
m
,c
ok
in
g,
pr
oc
es
si
ng
of
nu
cl
ea
rf
ue
l
49
.3
5
77
.0
6
42
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
ar
tw
or
k
an
d
ot
he
rm
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
8.
71
68
.0
6
31
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
no
n-
m
et
al
lic
m
in
er
al
pr
od
uc
ts
16
.2
5
62
.5
5
29
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
ru
bb
er
15
.4
5
39
.3
3
22
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
pa
pe
ra
nd
pa
pe
rp
ro
d.
16
.6
6
37
.3
1
43
R
ec
yc
lin
g
an
d
di
sp
os
al
of
w
as
te
12
.2
3
35
.4
6
34
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
m
et
al
pr
od
uc
ts
10
.4
8
30
.9
2
30
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
pl
as
tic
s
12
.4
9
27
.5
2
27
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
m
ed
ic
in
es
15
.4
6
24
.9
5
20
Pr
oc
es
si
ng
of
tim
be
r,
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
w
oo
d,
ba
m
bo
o,
ra
tta
n,
pa
lm
,a
nd
st
ra
w
pr
od
uc
ts
11
.2
6
23
.3
9
16
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
to
ba
cc
o
40
.7
9
22
.4
5
24
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
ar
tic
le
s
fo
rc
ul
tu
re
,e
du
ca
tio
n
an
d
sp
or
ta
ct
iv
ity
6.
02
22
.2
0
21
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
fu
rn
itu
re
7.
34
18
.1
5
40
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
eq
ui
pm
en
t,
co
m
pu
te
rs
an
d
ot
he
r
14
.2
6
17
.8
4
19
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
le
at
he
r,
fu
r,
fe
at
he
ra
nd
re
la
te
d
pr
od
uc
ts
5.
87
16
.7
6
41
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
m
ea
su
ri
ng
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
an
d
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
fo
rc
ul
tu
ra
la
ct
iv
ity
an
d
of
fic
e
w
or
k
8.
75
16
.5
1
13
Pr
oc
es
si
ng
of
fo
od
fr
om
ag
ri
c.
pr
od
uc
ts
12
.6
0
16
.4
5
37
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
tr
an
sp
or
te
qu
ip
m
en
t
24
.1
5
15
.4
2
14
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
fo
od
s
12
.1
7
14
.5
5
15
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
be
ve
ra
ge
s
18
.1
3
14
.4
5
17
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
te
xt
ile
s
7.
41
13
.4
2
23
Pr
in
tin
g
an
d
re
co
rd
ed
m
ed
ia
14
.7
7
12
.9
6
39
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
el
ec
tr
ic
al
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
an
d
eq
ui
pm
en
t
9.
98
12
.4
4
35
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
ge
ne
ra
lp
ur
po
se
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
8.
41
11
.2
6
18
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
te
xt
ile
,a
pp
ar
el
,f
oo
tw
ea
r,
an
d
ca
ps
3.
94
10
.2
1
36
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
of
sp
ec
ia
lp
ur
po
se
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
9.
45
9.
38
N
ot
e:
D
at
a
so
ur
ce
fr
om
an
nu
al
pr
ov
in
ci
al
st
at
is
tic
ye
ar
bo
ok
s.
Figures and tables 191
Table 5.4 Production elasticity estimation (2003-2009)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Industrial value added Industrial value added
(2003-2009) (2003-2007)
Capital 0.523*** 0.635***
(0.040) (0.035)
Energy 0.076*** 0.051***
(0.018) (0.017)
Labour 0.283*** 0.203***
(0.031) (0.025)
Observations 2,691 2,117
Adjusted R-squared 0.925 0.923
Note: Beta coefficients are reported in the table with robust standard
errors in parentheses.
Table 5.5 Factor abundance and factor intensity (2003-2009)
Indicators Mean S.D. Min Max Cutoff point
Energy abundance 1.088 0.528 -0.260 3.444 0.782
Capital abundance 0.800 0.357 -0.405 2.846 1.655
Energy intensity 1.649 0.982 -0.237 4.122 3.848
Capital intensity 1.384 0.636 -0.0231 2.957 2.376
Note: Indicators are estimated based on the methodology described
in Section 5.3. The cutoff points represent the neutral level of factor
abundance and factor intensity.
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Table 5.6 Energy abundance and channels decomposition (2003-2009)
Province Energy abundance Coal production Regulation laxity
Beijing 0.00 6.61 0.00
Shandong 0.71 9.57 0.00
Chongqing 0.71 8.19 0.76
Hebei 0.72 9.01 0.00
Jilin 0.77 8.03 0.71
Tianjin 0.81 0.00 0.00
Heilongjiang 0.83 9.11 0.75
Fujian 0.83 7.46 0.00
Anhui 0.86 9.12 0.87
Jiangxi 0.90 7.83 0.95
Hunan 1.00 8.58 1.02
Shanghai 1.04 0.00 0.00
Liaoning 1.09 8.78 0.93
Zhejiang 1.13 3.25 0.78
Gansu 1.17 8.22 0.96
Hubei 1.22 6.82 0.98
Yunnan 1.23 8.60 1.17
Shaanxi 1.26 9.75 1.12
Henan 1.33 9.82 1.21
Ningxia 1.34 8.20 0.98
Guangxi 1.36 6.35 1.35
Guangdong 1.43 4.98 1.23
Jiangsu 1.45 7.89 1.13
Shanxi 1.49 10.89 1.08
Qinghai 1.52 6.96 1.24
Guizhou 1.67 9.28 1.48
Sichuan 1.68 8.94 1.63
Inner Mongolia 10.34 8.63 1.25
Note: The estimation of energy abundance indicator is introduced in Section
5.3.1. Coal production data is collected from China Energy Statistics books
and is at the annual average level in natural logs. Regulation laxity is estimated
through Equation 5.2.
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Table 5.7 Correlation matrix between energy abundance indicator, self-sufficiency ratio and
industrial electricity price (2003-2009)
Energy abundance indicator Self-sufficiency ratio Industrial electricity price
Energy abundance indicator 1
Self-sufficiency ratio 0.620*** 1
Industrial electricity price -0.221*** -0.181*** 1
Table 5.8 Pooled OLS estimation of three energy abundance proxies (2003-2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Self-sufficiency ratio Industrial electricity price
Energy abundance 0.262*** 0.313*** -0.104*** -0.103***
(0.059) (0.082) (0.032) (0.030)
Constant -0.238*** -0.112 -0.269*** -0.325***
(0.074) (0.096) (0.036) (0.042)
Observations 145 145 100 100
Adjusted R-squared 0.244 0.259 0.096 0.159
Year specific effects No Yes No Yes
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significant
at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Figures and tables 194
Ta
bl
e
5.
9
T
he
im
pa
ct
of
en
er
gy
ab
un
da
nc
e
on
in
du
st
ry
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
in
C
hi
na
(2
00
3-
20
09
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Sh
ar
e
of
IV
A
Sh
ar
e
of
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
In
te
ra
ct
ed
w
ith
en
er
gy
de
pe
nd
en
cy
E
ne
rg
y
ab
un
da
nc
e
0.
20
5*
**
0.
16
5*
*
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.0
68
)
Se
lf
-s
uf
fic
ie
nc
y
ra
tio
0.
59
2*
**
0.
63
6*
**
(0
.1
61
)
(0
.1
22
)
In
du
st
ri
al
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
pr
ic
e
-1
.9
01
**
*
-2
.1
76
**
*
(0
.3
43
)
(0
.3
60
)
C
oa
lp
ro
du
ct
io
n
0.
11
3*
**
0.
13
9*
**
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
24
)
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
la
xi
ty
0.
27
9*
*
0.
24
5*
**
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.0
92
)
C
on
st
an
t
-4
.5
74
**
*
-3
.6
61
**
*
-4
.0
61
**
*
-3
.9
24
**
*
-4
.2
13
**
*
-3
.1
73
**
*
-3
.9
89
**
*
-3
.5
46
**
*
(0
.3
82
)
(0
.5
66
)
(0
.3
03
)
(0
.5
20
)
(0
.2
61
)
(0
.4
07
)
(0
.2
62
)
(0
.3
62
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
2,
93
7
2,
93
7
1,
83
4
2,
66
9
2,
93
7
2,
93
7
1,
83
4
2,
66
9
A
dj
us
te
d
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
62
2
0.
63
1
0.
66
4
0.
63
7
0.
57
0
0.
58
5
0.
61
5
0.
60
5
N
o.
of
cl
us
te
rs
77
3
77
3
68
3
74
3
77
3
77
3
68
3
74
3
Pr
ov
in
ce
-y
ea
rfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Se
ct
or
-y
ea
rfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
ot
e:
C
lu
st
er
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
at
th
e
pr
ov
in
ce
-s
ec
to
rl
ev
el
ar
e
re
po
rte
d
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
*1
0%
,*
*5
%
,*
**
1%
.P
ro
vi
nc
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ye
ar
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
se
ct
or
sp
ec
ifi
c
ye
ar
ef
fe
ct
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
in
al
ls
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
.T
he
tim
e
pe
ri
od
fo
rr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
in
cl
ud
in
g
in
du
st
ri
al
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
pr
ic
es
ra
ng
es
fr
om
20
06
to
20
09
du
e
to
da
ta
lim
ita
tio
n.
Figures and tables 195
Ta
bl
e
5.
10
T
he
im
pa
ct
of
en
er
gy
ab
un
da
nc
e
on
tr
ad
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
in
C
hi
na
(2
00
3-
20
09
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Sh
ar
e
of
ex
po
rt
Sh
ar
e
of
ne
te
xp
or
t
In
te
ra
ct
ed
w
ith
en
er
gy
de
pe
nd
en
cy
E
ne
rg
y
ab
un
da
nc
e
0.
06
5
0.
24
6*
**
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
76
)
Se
lf
-s
uf
fic
ie
nc
y
ra
tio
0.
20
2*
*
0.
29
7*
**
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.1
03
)
In
du
st
ri
al
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
pr
ic
e
-0
.6
96
**
*
-1
.0
06
**
*
(0
.2
21
)
(0
.2
82
)
C
oa
lp
ro
du
ct
io
n
0.
05
8*
*
0.
06
0*
*
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
25
)
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
la
xi
ty
0.
23
3*
*
0.
24
0*
*
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.0
96
)
C
on
st
an
t
-3
.1
27
**
*
-2
.8
11
**
*
-3
.4
94
**
*
-2
.5
44
**
*
11
.8
64
**
*
12
.2
90
**
*
12
.3
47
**
*
12
.3
49
**
*
(0
.2
82
)
(0
.3
54
)
(0
.2
59
)
(0
.4
10
)
(0
.5
10
)
(0
.4
88
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.5
70
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
2,
93
7
2,
93
7
1,
83
4
2,
66
9
2,
01
4
2,
01
4
1,
35
3
1,
84
3
A
dj
us
te
d
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
73
8
0.
73
9
0.
82
6
0.
72
3
0.
78
2
0.
78
1
0.
83
1
0.
77
4
N
o.
of
cl
us
te
rs
77
3
77
3
68
3
74
3
65
8
65
8
59
2
63
3
Pr
ov
in
ce
-y
ea
rfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Se
ct
or
-y
ea
rfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
ot
e:
C
lu
st
er
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
at
th
e
pr
ov
in
ce
-s
ec
to
rl
ev
el
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
*1
0%
,*
*5
%
,*
**
1%
.P
ro
vi
nc
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ye
ar
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
se
ct
or
sp
ec
ifi
c
ye
ar
ef
fe
ct
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
in
al
ls
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
.T
he
tim
e
pe
ri
od
fo
rr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
in
cl
ud
in
g
in
du
st
ri
al
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
pr
ic
es
ra
ng
es
fr
om
20
06
to
20
09
du
e
to
da
ta
lim
ita
tio
n.
Figures and tables 196
Ta
bl
e
5.
11
T
he
im
pa
ct
of
en
er
gy
ab
un
da
nc
e
on
ex
po
rt
s
to
O
E
C
D
co
un
tr
ie
s
(2
00
3-
20
09
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
VA
R
IA
B
L
E
S
Pr
ov
in
ce
ex
po
rt
s
to
co
un
tr
y
d
Pr
ov
in
ce
ex
po
rt
s
of
se
ct
or
s
to
co
un
tr
y
d
IE
P
×
E
ne
rg
y
ab
un
da
nc
e
0.
05
8
(0
.1
18
)
IE
P
×
Se
lf
-s
uf
fic
ie
nc
y
ra
tio
-0
.1
86
(0
.1
90
)
IE
P
×
In
du
st
ri
al
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
pr
ic
e
-0
.4
00
(0
.3
99
)
IE
P
×
E
ne
rg
y
ab
un
da
nc
e
×
E
ne
rg
y
de
pe
nd
en
cy
0.
01
3*
**
(0
.0
04
)
IE
P
×
Se
lf
-s
uf
fic
ie
nc
y
ra
tio
×
E
ne
rg
y
de
pe
nd
en
cy
0.
04
3*
**
(0
.0
05
)
IE
P
×
In
du
st
ri
al
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
pr
ic
e
×
E
ne
rg
y
de
pe
nd
en
cy
-0
.0
18
**
*
(0
.0
04
)
IE
P
×
C
oa
lp
ro
du
ct
io
n
×
E
ne
rg
y
de
pe
nd
en
cy
0.
00
8*
**
(0
.0
01
)
IE
P
×
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
la
xi
ty
×
E
ne
rg
y
de
pe
nd
en
cy
0.
04
0*
**
(0
.0
05
)
C
on
st
an
t
-8
.5
45
**
*
-8
.4
61
**
*
13
.3
00
-1
7.
14
9*
**
-1
7.
15
6*
**
-8
.4
02
**
*
-1
6.
97
4*
**
(0
.2
92
)
(0
.3
05
)
(1
6.
62
4)
(0
.3
94
)
(0
.3
94
)
(0
.1
44
)
(0
.4
11
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
3,
87
4
3,
87
4
2,
79
5
82
,9
06
82
,9
06
62
,3
94
72
,3
96
A
dj
us
te
d
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
87
8
0.
87
8
0.
89
3
0.
63
6
0.
63
6
0.
68
1
0.
60
2
N
o.
of
cl
us
te
rs
90
1
90
1
85
2
22
75
8
22
75
8
21
44
2
20
89
0
Pr
ov
in
ce
-y
ea
rfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Se
ct
or
-y
ea
rfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
ou
nt
ry
-y
ea
rfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
ot
e:
C
lu
st
er
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
pr
ov
in
ce
-c
ou
nt
ry
le
ve
lf
or
th
e
fir
st
th
re
e
co
lu
m
ns
an
d
at
th
e
pr
ov
in
ce
-s
ec
to
r-
co
un
tr
y
le
ve
lf
or
th
e
re
m
ai
ni
ng
co
lu
m
ns
.S
ig
ni
fic
an
ta
t*
10
%
,*
*5
%
,*
**
1%
.P
ro
vi
nc
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ye
ar
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
co
un
tr
y
sp
ec
ifi
c
ye
ar
ef
fe
ct
s
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
in
fir
st
th
re
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
Fo
rt
he
re
m
ai
ni
ng
co
lu
m
ns
co
un
tr
y
sp
ec
ifi
c
ye
ar
ef
fe
ct
is
al
so
in
cl
ud
ed
.T
he
tim
e
pe
ri
od
fo
r
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
in
g
in
du
st
ri
al
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
pr
ic
es
ra
ng
es
fr
om
20
06
to
20
09
du
e
to
da
ta
lim
ita
tio
n.
Appendix D
Derivation of cut-off points
In the paper we are interested in whether factor abundance plays an important role in
determining industry location, or at least, for some specific sectors. The question can be
expressed algebraically using the derivative relation below:
∂ lnSi,s
∂θ f ,i
= β f (π f ,s− π¯ f )
Hence, it is important to know the cut-off point and the relative position of each province
with regard to their abundance level. To calculate the cut-off point, equation 5.2 is expanded
as below:
lnSi,s = α ′+
F
∑
f=1
β fθ f ,iπ f ,s+
F
∑
f=1
γ fθ f ,i+
F
∑
f=1
δ fπ f ,s+ εi,s
where
α ′ = α+
F
∑
f=1
β f θ¯ f π¯ f
γ f =−β f π¯ f
δ f =−β f θ¯ f
198
Thus, cut-off points π¯ f and θ¯ f can be calculated reversely.
Table D.1 Annual average IEP for OECD countries (2003-2009)
Country Average price Country Average price
Norway 56.425 Greece 113.101
Canada 62.694 Germany 117.908
Korea 63.121 Turkey 121.249
United States 65.485 Portugal 124.465
New Zealand 66.116 Luxembourg 126.035
Estonia 82.057 Czech Republic 127.037
Sweden 84.607 United Kingdom 131.742
Switzerland 87.814 Slovenia 131.989
France 88.601 Austria 132.500
Finland 91.910 Japan 132.516
Israel 92.095 Chile 133.014
China 92.535 Netherlands 134.137
Poland 98.717 Belgium 138.693
OECD 98.896 Hungary 142.080
Spain 102.303 Slovak Republic 150.960
Mexico 103.164 Ireland 156.415
Denmark 109.524 Italy 253.120
Note: Data source from IEA Electricity Information 2012. Unit
USD/MWh. Australia is not included due to missing values.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions, Limitations and Future
Research
6.1 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This thesis has presented four empirical studies with the aim of making an original contri-
bution on the topic of energy economics in China. Following the first chapter laying the
groundwork, the second chapter investigates the determinants of provincial energy inten-
sity (energy consumed per unit of output) in China over the period 1995 to 2012. Special
attention is paid to the role of urbanization. Through the recently developed mean group
estimation technique, we find a positive direct impact of urbanization on energy intensity.
However, the indirect impact of urbanization through four channels (construction, industrial
upgrading, transportation and changing lifestyles) tend to be negative. The results highlight
the difference between formal and informal urbanization.
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In the third chapter we investigate how changes in energy prices affect manufacturing firms’
product choices for the period 2005 to 2007. Employing an instrumental approach, our
results suggest that higher electricity prices tend to promote surviving firms to adjust the
4-digit industry they operate in. More specifically, we find that higher energy costs provide
an incentive for firms to switch to a less energy intensive industry, and to dampen a firm’s
desire to switch to a less energy intensive industry. Besides energy costs, we also find
some significant firm-level characteristics and industrial characteristics that influence firms’
switching decision.
Inspired by the global expansion of multinational retailing corporations, the fourth chapter
investigates the entry effect of Royal Dutch Shell on China’s retail and wholesale gasoline
markets. Utilizing the propensity score matching method, each of the Shell populated city
has been matched with three to five counterfactual cities that have similar possibilities to
be populated by Shell in a specific year. Through the pair-wise approach, the absolute
gasoline price differentials are calculated between any two matched cities for the purpose
of measuring the market dispersion level. Our results from difference-in-difference method
suggest that Shell’s entry into Chinese gasoline market caused a significant degree of price
dispersion in the first year of entry. The increased price dispersion is found to close again
over the following two years. Highly refined gasoline products and the segmented market in
Western China tend to be the most affected. Two potential mechanisms, the market-specific
mechanism and the aggregation mechanism, explain the increase in the price dispersion.
The fifth chapter looks at the competitiveness impact of energy abundance on production
distribution and trade patterns in China for 2-digit manufacturing sectors over the period
2003 to 2009. Energy abundance is measured by three indicators, the pseudo-endowment
indicator estimated by a cost-minimizing approach, energy self-sufficiency ratio and industrial
electricity prices. We find that the energy abundance level measured by all three indicators
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shows a consistent and significant impact on industrial distribution and hence trade location.
The impact is mainly dominated by energy intensive sectors. Both resource reserves and
regulation stringency are effective mechanisms by which the energy abundance level affects
industry and trade distributions. Firms that rely heavily on energy inputs tend to cluster in
regions with rich resource reserves and/or under relatively lax energy and environmental
controls.
Taken together, the empirical findings in this thesis highlight several policy implications.
First, the results in Chapter two emphasize a substantial difference between the formal
urbanization and the informal urbanization in terms of influencing the efficiency of energy
usage. Hukou system has played a crucial role in the formation of this substantial difference.
Our results support the existing argument that migrants without urban hukou are perceived
to receive unfair treatment in regard to the availability of public services and social welfare.
Therefore, reforming or abolishing the hukou system should be an integral part of policies
that promote the rural-urban transition and the development of sustainable society.
Second, our results in Chapter three and Chapter five suggest that energy policies including
market-based pricing tools is prone to be effective in promoting industrial structure shifting
and industry specialization, both of which are crucial to bolstering energy efficiency. How-
ever, there tends to be a gap between national plans and policy outcomes at the local level.
Although environmental goals and policies at the national level are ambitious and compre-
hensive, insufficient and inconsistent local level implementation can hold back significant
improvements in urban environmental quality. One way that may prevent the disparity is
to assign a higher weight to environment protection in officials’ performance evaluations.
The prospect for career advancement may stimulate provincial and local officials to take
environmental pollution as a serious concern. In fact, the environmental quality has been
taken into account in the guidelines for cadre performance evaluation in several provinces.
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Third, the findings in the fourth chapter suggest that opening up power sectors to foreign
direct investment can enhance market competition to some extent. In recent years the
government has consistently demonstrated its willingness to invest heavily in renewable
energy and green technologies to resolve the pollution problem. Considering the existing
ownership structure in conventional energy sectors, renewable energy sector may provide
greater opportunities for foreign investments. Investment incentives and preferential policies
shall be considered to support foreign investments as well as private investments.
6.2 Limitations
The major limitation of this thesis is the lack of detailed energy data in China. For example,
in Chapter four when we study the market-specific mechanism, we construct a measure of
the degree of competition from Shell based on the number of Shell stations in an individual
market scaled by the maximum number of Shell stations in a city which is Xian with 113
stations. Ideally our Shell competitive index should be a time-variant variable and increase
over time since the gasoline retail network is built up year by year. However, we only have
the total number of stations located in a city and not the opening date for each individual
station. Using the total number of stations at least provides us some insight to measure
the competitive strength from Shell. Furthermore, the relatively short period of the panel
data used in Chapter three when we study firms’ switching behaviour adds further caution
regarding the generalizability of the findings.
Our estimates may suffer from an inherent bias due to the endogeneity of energy and
environmental policies. We hope that through econometric tools such as instrumental variable
and propensity score matching, the results reflect reality. As we stated previously, there tends
to be a gap between national plans and policy outcomes at the local level. This also leads
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to a difficulty of measuring the actual effect of energy and environmental restrictions at the
local level.
We do acknowledge that using linear probably model for binary dependent variables may
result in some estimation issues despite our remediations. The error terms may not be
normally distributed, and there tends to be heteroskedasticity. The predicted values may fall
outside the logical boundaries of 0 and 1. The selection of econometric techniques shall
depend on many factors, such as the context of the core question and characteristics of the
data. Presumably, one suitable technique for binary dependent variable with a large number
of zeros is the robust weighted kernel logistic regression.
6.3 Future Research
The previous decade has witnessed an increase in the energy related costs faced by Europe
manufacturing. The development in global energy markets, the EU Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS), and the promotion of renewable energy sources put challenges in providing
affordable energy for Europe manufacturing. Particularly, the long-term commitments of the
EU and Germany to make their energy systems climate-neutral by 2050 will require additional
investments and subsidies in the trillions. This will affect energy costs for manufactures
unavoidably. Meanwhile, with the introduction of a national Emission Trading System and
the coal-to-gas switching policy, an increase of energy costs is also expected for Chinese
manufacturing firms. Further research could usefully investigate the impact of relative energy
abundance between Germany and China on bilateral trade – both countries are among the
world’s largest economies and international trade plays a significant role in their economies.
For the future development of domestic energy policies, it is important to understand the
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mechanisms through which domestic (China) and foreign (Germany) energy policies affect
the bilateral trade relationship.
Furthermore, there are still many unanswered questions about firms’ reactions to changing
energy and environmental constraints. In particular, I am interested in the conditions under
which firms will choose to (1) exit the market shortly, (2) stay in the original industry/location,
(3) switch to another industry and produce another product (resources reallocation), (4)
switch to another location (resource relocation) when facing more stringent energy and
environmental constraints. Possible factors that influence the choice may include the type of
energy and environmental constraints, levels of capital intensity and labour intensity, and
the degree of industrial agglomeration. The results shall shed a light on avoiding undesired
outcomes induced by energy and environmental policies.
Last but not least, I would be interested to explore how the increase of energy costs are
shared between buyers and sellers. Currently two chapters study the energy usage from the
producer side. Given the role of consumers and the demand side, very little is known about
how increases in energy input costs are split between consumers and producers. Existing
literature on carbon cost pass-through suggests that the power sector, as the most analyzed
and largest regulated sector under the EU ETS, is able to pass a major part of the freely
allocated allowances costs during the first two trading periods (2005-2012). According to the
Theory of Incidence, the degree of pass-through of energy taxes from producers to consumers
tends to be related to some key factors such as inputs substitution, returns to scale, market
competition, and consumers’ demand substitution. More information on energy usage at the
firm level would help us to establish a greater degree of accuracy on this matter.
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